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This dissertation contributes to the literature on decision-making under poverty by 
empirically examining the relationship between income poverty and the decisions that 
households make due to shocks. This dissertation is composed of three essays attempting to 
identify ways policy can be used to influence the trajectory of poverty for generations to come. 
Each chapter focuses on gaining a deeper understanding of the decision-making processes of 
households and individuals living in poverty. In the first essay, I identify the indirect impact of 
the Malawi Social Cash Transfer Program on youths’ present bias, by examining the 
intergenerational transmission of such bias within the household from caregivers to youth. The 
second essay is focused on negative income shocks and marriage outcomes for youth in rural 
Malawi. The paper utilizes survey data from a cohort of unmarried youth and follows them over 
three years as they transition into and out of relationships, identifying the influence negative 
shocks have on these outcomes. In the final essay, I show the impacts of the Malawi Social Cash 
Transfer Program and the Zambia Child Grant Program on stress and affect, and, subsequently, 
whether these psychological indicators affect savings and intertemporal choices. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world with nearly half of its 18 million 
citizens surviving on less than a dollar a day (UNICEF, 2003; World Bank, 2017). In fact, the 
UNDP ranked Malawi the 18th least developed country in 2017. Moreover, about 30% of the 
country’s GDP stems from agricultural production, and 90% of the population lives in rural areas 
relying on subsistence agriculture, leaving the majority of the citizenry vulnerable to weather-
related shocks such as droughts and floods as well as changes in crop prices (World Bank, 2007, 
2017). Even though strides have been made to improve the economic and non-economic 
development outcomes of the country, Malawi still lags behind the majority of other countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, especially among those that are similar in geography and demography 
(IMF, 2017). What are some of the ways in which we can improve the livelihoods of individuals 
living in Malawi and other such underdeveloped countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the world? 
How can we design effective policies and programs that enable these individuals and households 
to pull themselves out of poverty? 
Individuals and families living in poverty constantly struggle to make ends meet and are 
more apt to face negative income shocks and make short-sighted decisions. This is particularly 
true in Malawi where these phenomena are exacerbated by the lack of infrastructure and high-
income inequality which are rampant throughout the developing world. Even more concerning is 
the strain placed on these already under-resourced communities by diseases such as HIV. 
According to the literature, the root of the issue stems from the economic hardship of 
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impoverished households, and their limited access to cash and credit which, in turn, limits their 
productive abilities and investment in other income-generating activities (e.g., Pitt, Khandker, & 
Bank, 2001; Kazianga & Udry, 2005). Moreover, these economic barriers have been shown to 
hinder the human capital and capabilities development of not only the household heads, but that 
of their children as well which enables the vicious cycle of poverty to repeat for subsequent 
generations.  
My dissertation is composed of three papers attempting to identify ways policy can be 
used to influence the trajectory of poverty for generations to come. Each chapter focuses on 
gaining a deeper understanding of the decision-making processes of households and individuals 
living in poverty: from discerning what causes people to make short-sighted decisions to how the 
circumstances faced by such households rationalize the subsequent decisions that are made. 
Taken together, these three essays explore why and how the cycle of poverty is perpetuating 
itself, and identify ways interventions, particularly cash transfer programs, can be used to 
mitigate the intergenerational transmission of poverty. This dissertation consists of three essays 
addressing these objectives: 
Essay One 
This essay examines the intergenerational transmission of time discounting within the 
household. Time discounting denotes the importance an individual assigns to consumption and 
gratification in the present versus the future (Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2002). As 
such, time preferences are a key determinant of the decision-making process relating to 
everything from human capital investment decisions to financial decisions, the uptake of risky 
behaviors, and even subjective well-being. Using data from 1,728 youth-caregiver pairs from the 
evaluation of the Malawi Social Cash Transfer Program (SCTP), this study exploits the random 
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assignment of treatment and the change in caregivers’ discounting to exogenously predict 
youth’s discounting at endline using an instrumental variables approach. I find evidence to 
support the overall transmission of time discounting within the household, and stronger effects 
for females, older youth, and youth with female caregivers.  
Essay Two 
This essay is motivated by the ever-increasing prevalence of negative shocks experienced 
by poor, vulnerable households in Malawi, and the often-extreme measures they take to recover 
from their negative income effects. One potential coping mechanism households may use, 
particularly in patrilineal households, is child marriage. Therefore, this study examines whether 
youth in households experiencing a negative shock are more likely to get married than those 
whose households did not experience a shock based on the lineage system to which their family 
belongs. I show that marrying off daughters is, in fact, a coping mechanism used by households 
after experiencing a shock and is more likely used by patrilineal households. These effects are 
strongest for girls who are already out-of-school compared to those currently attending school. 
Conversely, I find no significant effect for males. Additionally, I find suggestive evidence of an 
increased likelihood of girls engaging in transactional sexual relationships after a shock as an 
individual-level coping mechanism. Understanding the underlying mechanisms leading to the 
increased incidence of child marriages and transactional sex provides valuable information for 
policymakers aiming to combat such practices.  
Essay Three 
Individuals living in poverty are often less likely to save and plan for the future opting 
instead to focus their attention on the more pressing needs of today thus perpetuating the 
condition of poverty. Additionally, poverty affects one’s psychological well-being by triggering 
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stress and negative emotional states, and laboratory results suggest that stress and negative 
emotion may influence time discounting. We show that results from laboratory experiments hold 
in the field by examining the effect of the Malawi SCTP and the Zambia Child Grant Program 
(CGP) on stress and affect, and, subsequently, whether these psychological indicators affect 
savings and intertemporal choices. The programs are found to significantly impact positive affect 
and to reduce stress. Moreover, stress and affect are predictive of savings and waiting for future 
money. The results indicate that the psychological toll of poverty has a direct effect on economic 
decisions, which then reinforce poverty. There remains a need to understand the mechanisms 
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CHAPTER 2: THE INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF TIME 
DISCOUNTING: EVIDENCE FROM THE MALAWI  
Introduction 
It is often assumed that people living in poverty make certain decisions because of their 
differing preference structure compared to those living more affluent lives (e.g., limited 
investments in education or healthcare, lack of savings). These perceived ‘bad’ choices are 
commonly associated with perpetuating the cycle of poverty. Researchers have sought to 
determine the mechanisms underlying these intertemporal choices, such as time discounting. 
According to Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue (2002), time discounting denotes any 
reason an individual assigns more importance to consumption and gratification in the present 
versus the future. It is a key determinant of the decision-making process relating to everything 
from human capital investment decisions to the uptake of risky behaviors, financial decisions, 
and even subjective well-being (Falk et al., 2013; Frederick, Loewenstien & O’Donoghue, 2002; 
Martorano et al., 2015; Tanaka, Camerer, & Nguyen, 2010). Time discounting includes one’s 
actual discount rate applied to decisions which is indicative of one’s more general time 
preference – simply a person’s preference for consumption today versus in the future. Higher 
time discounting causes an individual to shift consumption to the present at the expense of the 
future, and results in individuals being less willing to invest in activities with high costs and 




This phenomenon partly explains the limited investments in human capital seen in poor 
households as they do not prioritize the need for investing in education, for example, - the 
payoffs of which may not materialize for years into the future and which seem uncertain – when 
making intertemporal choices related to their children (Bradford, 2010; Lang & Ruud, 1986). 
Instead, these households often opt for sending their children to work to make a wage that will be 
realized in the much shorter term. Unfortunately, this intertemporal tradeoff has resulted in lower 
than desired human capital investment in poor households, especially among those in the 
developing world.  
The discourse surrounding the intergenerational transmission of poverty tends to focus 
exclusively on limited human capital investment as the basis for continued poverty amongst 
future generations positing that increasing the educational attainment and/or improving health-
seeking behaviors are the only means by which to break this cycle (e.g., Bird, 2007 or Moore, 
2001). While this pathway has been thoroughly studied, I contend it alone is insufficient to 
explain the intergenerational transmission of poverty, and suggest a new pathway enter the 
discussion – the intergenerational correlation in intertemporal choice. This study investigates this 
proposed new channel by examining whether caregiver’s time discounting is transmissible to 
youth in the household by exploiting data from the evaluation of the Malawi SCTP.  
The Malawi SCTP is an unconditional cash transfer (UCT) program implemented by the 
Government of Malawi in partnership with UNICEF. UCTs represent an ever-growing policy 
tool used throughout Sub-Saharan Africa to change behaviors and break the cycle of poverty. 
Governments and practitioners across the developing world have started focusing their efforts on 
increasing the ability for extremely poor households to smooth their consumption and alter their 
decision-making behaviors over time by introducing additional no-strings-attached income 
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through such UCT programs. The main objectives of Malawi’s SCTP are to decrease poverty 
and hunger, and to increase school enrollment for children – each of which necessitates 
beneficiaries making intertemporal decisions (Handa et al., 2014). The presence of strong 
impacts of the SCTP on indicators related to its main objectives absent conditions required to 
receive the payments implies that there is some inherent shift in beneficiaries’ thinking which 
enables them to be more future oriented. Similar research shows that the SCTP has a significant 
effect on reducing myopia in beneficiaries (caregivers) by making them more patient (Handa & 
Molotsky, n.d.). Understanding an individual’s time discounting helps to understand how 
intertemporal choices are made, and, more importantly, if time discounting is transmissible 
within the household, it opens the door to new policy options for breaking the cycle of poverty. 
Changing the time discounting of poor individuals may be one way to break the cycle of 
poverty by enabling them to devote more attentional resources to the future, and give more equal 
weight to benefits realized today and those received in the future. As such, I examine the 
relationship of two keys aspects of time discounting (henceforth simply referred to as 
‘discounting’) – an individual’s discount rate and their marginal rate of substitution (MRS) – 
between caregivers and youth. These measures of discounting are assessed through a 
hypothetical intertemporal choice task administered to both caregivers and youth. In this study, I 
begin by examining the factors influencing youth’s discounting finding that caregiver’s 
contemporaneous endline discount rate, youth’s age, and youth’s sex are some of the main 
determinants of discounting for youth. However, these estimates are likely biased due to 
endogeneity occurring at the household-level affecting both caregiver’s and youth’s discounting. 
Therefore, I implement an instrumental variables (IV) approach to address this situation using 
both random assignment to treatment and lagged differences in caregiver’s discounting outcomes 
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as instruments. The results of the IV analysis lend support to the hypothesis of the 
intergenerational correlation in discounting within the household. I further examine this 
relationship by assessing differential effects based on the sex and age of youth, sex of the 
caregiver, and caregiver-youth pairs in terms of both sex and relationship. In general, females 
spend more time in the home, so I hypothesize the relationship should be stronger for female 
youth as well as youth with female caregivers. Similarly, I assert that older youth have witnessed 
more of their caregivers’ decision-making, and are more apt to be making intertemporal choices 
of their own so they too will realize a stronger association. In line with these hypotheses, I find a 
stronger relationship for female youth as compared to their male counterparts. Similarly, female-
headed households exhibit higher rates of intergenerational correlation as compared to male-
headed households. Lastly, I find parent-child pairs and grandparent-grandchild pairs produce 
the only significant results in terms of the relationship between caregivers and youth in the 
household.  
Finally, I test for the moderation effect of caregiver socialization (defined as effort on the 
part of the caregiver to interact with the youth). The results show no clear pattern in greater 
socialization being indicative of a stronger relationship between caregiver’s and youth’s 
discounting. On the whole, I find caregiver’s discounting to be highly correlated with that of the 
youth in their household, and find evidence suggesting discounting is malleable at the household-
level. This suggests that a new pathway potentially exists to break the cycle of poverty for 





Background and Significance  
Discounting and Safe Transitions to Adulthood 
Discounting and patience (the ability to delay gratification) are found to be empirically 
linked to educational attainment, cognitive functioning, health behaviors, and economic 
outcomes later in life. The most famous evidentiary support for this claim stems from Mischel, 
Shoda & Rodriguez’s 1989 study of delayed gratification in kindergarteners colloquially known 
as “the marshmallow test.” Children that were able to delay gratification by waiting for a higher 
future payoff (in the form of marshmallows) were found to have higher standardized test scores 
in the future. While results from the marshmallow test served as the impetus for many 
subsequent studies examining the link between patience and future life outcomes, it has also 
been met with skepticism. Critics contend that children’s patience derived through such methods 
represents not only their self-control and ability to delay gratification, but also their views on the 
stability of the world (Kidd, Palmeri & Aslin, 2012; Ferdman, 2016; Sturge-Apple et al., 2016). 
In other words, context matters, and one’s environment may influence how they perform in these 
games; poorer children who opt for the immediate reward might be displaying rational decision-
making based on their learned behaviors related to living in scarcity rather than impulsiveness. 
Even so, similar studies of individual discount rates have shown their ability to foretell student 
achievement with lower discount rates being predictive of both higher grades and test scores 
(Benjamin, Brown & Shapiro, 2013; Duckworth & Seligman, 2005; Kirby, Winston & 
Santiesteban, 2005).  
Not only is time discounting associated with educational attainment, but also with one’s 
employment outcomes. Firstly, educational attainment is known to be an indicator of 
employment outcomes with higher levels of education having a direct, positive relationship with 
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employment and wages (e.g., Becker, 1964).  Moreover, evidence supports the notion that 
employment decisions represent important intertemporal choices individuals must make that are 
reflective of one’s discount rate. Multiple studies have identified a relationship between 
discounting and workers opting for immediate temporary or lower quality employment over 
higher paid, more stable options that are not available until later (Dohmen et al., 2011; Hesketh, 
Watson-Brown & Whiteley, 1998; Lee & Ohtake, 2012; Saunders & Fogarty, 2001; 
Schoenfelder & Hantula, 2003).  
Discounting is also intricately linked with decisions related to health outcomes including 
smoking, drinking, unhealthy eating, and uptake of preventive services. Decisions surrounding 
health behaviors offer prime examples of intertemporal tradeoffs as they most often entail the 
choice between a consequence realized today in exchange for some future benefit. For instance, 
foregoing a cigarette and its associated utility today will likely lead to a healthier, more 
productive life twenty years from now. Relatedly, receiving a small pox vaccine today will 
significantly reduce one’s chance of developing the disease in the future at the cost of 
unpleasantness of the injection and potential side effects today. Relationships between 
discounting and health outcomes have been found for a variety of addictive behaviors (Dohmen 
et al., 2011; MacKillop et al., 2011; Yi, Mitchell & Bickel, 2010), use of preventative care 
(Chapman et al., 2001; Urminsky, 2014), and BMI levels (Adams & Nettle, 2009; Bishai, 2005; 
Chabris et al., 2008; Urminsky, 2014).  
Furthermore, higher education and uptake of health services has been shown to promote 
healthier transitions to adulthood by reducing the likelihood of early marriage and early 
pregnancy, increasing the age of sexual debut, and reducing the risk of HIV infection, all of 
which have been linked to increased future well-being and productivity, especially for females 
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(Jewkes et al., 2001; Bearainger et al., 2007; Jain & Kurz, 2007; Handa et al., 2015). As such, 
these relationships signify substantial implications for the intergenerational transmission of 
discounting especially in poorer households.  
Intergenerational Transmission of Preference Traits  
The past two decades have seen an influx of empirical studies devoted to assessing the 
extent to which parents are able to shape the preferences, traits, and decision making of their 
children. Generally, these studies have found strong correlations between parents’ preference 
traits and those of their children with few exceptions. Children’s generosity (Wilhelm et al., 
2008), risk and trust attitudes (Alan et al., 2017; Dohmen et al., 2012; Zumbuehl, Dohmen & 
Pfann, 2013), time preferences (Gouskova et al., 2010), attitude towards women working 
(Escriche, Olcina & Sanchez, 2004), preferences for leisure activities (Volland, 2013), 
preferences for volunteering (Bekkers, 2007), culture (Bisin & Verdier, 2001), and values 
(Schonpflug, 2001) are all shown to be malleable with respect to their parents’ preferences. 
Conversely, Bettinger & Slonim (2007) studied the relationship between the discount rate of 
children and their parents and boast the only study which found no evidence of intergenerational 
correlations. However, their analysis relied on a small sample with just under 200 child-parent 
pairs so their study may not have been able to detect a meaningful relationship. In general, there 
is substantial evidence supporting the correlation in preferences between the generations within 
families. 
One of the main factors influencing the intergenerational transmission of traits is direct 
socialization or the effort put forth by parents to socialize their children to their particular 
preference set (Bisin & Verdier, 2001; Dohmen et al., 2012). The assumption that parents attain 
utility from their children exhibiting similar preferences and traits is key for rationalizing this 
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notion. This conclusion gives voice to the age-old nature-versus-nurture conundrum for child 
development implying a role for nurture in preference development. In the literature, the only 
substitute for direct socialization is oblique socialization which pertains to the influence of other 
adults in the child’s environment affecting the child’s preferences assuming some influence is 
necessitated for children to form their own preferences (Dohmen et al., 2012). Bisin & Verdier 
(2001) developed a theoretical model portraying these socialization pathways which will be 
further discussed in the following section.  
Theory 
Behavioral economics combines the disciplines of economics and psychology to better 
understand the complexities and nuances of human decision-making and actions. The field stems 
from the seminal work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) on prospect theory which theorizes that 
people’s choices made under risk do not align with traditional expected utility theory. Likewise, 
most classic economic models assume that individuals are rational actors, but often, a person’s 
actions do not mirror what theory predicts. Perhaps the most sought-after answers relate to how 
and why individuals’ decision-making deviates from these models in the real world even when 
living under the same or similar circumstances (Anderson & Stamoulis, 2006). 
In order to better understand the mechanisms of intertemporal choice, Samuelson (1937) 
proposed the widely touted discounted utility (DU) model which simplifies everything into a 
single parameter known as the discount rate. Generally speaking, the DU model suggests that an 
individual derives utility from receiving money or goods, but if they are received in the future, 
the individual applies some discount factor, 𝑓, defined by the discount rate, r, which varies in 
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regards to the time horizon, t.1 Therefore, an individual’s intertemporal choice is based off the 
comparison of the utility they derive from reception of the good today versus in the future.  
To model the intergenerational transmission of preferences and traits, Bisin and Verdier 
(2001) proposed a theory of cultural transmission and preference evolution focused on 
socialization within and without the household. Succinctly, the Bisin and Verdier model suggests 
that children’s preferences are acquired through imitation and adaptation dependent upon 
socialization, whether direct, 𝑑𝑖, (from parent to child) or oblique, 1 − 𝑑𝑖, (from a peer). Parents 
can directly affect the socialization of their children through their own effort, τ, (e.g., time spent 
with child) which comes at a cost, C(τ), or children can imitate their peers in the community.2 
Parents are assumed to prefer to socialize their child to their own preference set to improve their 
own utility as well as their child’s future welfare.  
More explicitly, in a community with two traits i and j, parents choose to maximize3: 
(1) 𝑢𝑖(𝑥𝑖) − 𝐶(𝜏𝑖) + (𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑖𝑖 + 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑉𝑖𝑗) 
subject to 
(2) 𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖(𝑞𝑖) + (1 − 𝑑𝑖(𝑞𝑖)) 𝑞𝑖 
(3) 𝑃𝑖𝑗 = (1 − 𝑑𝑖(𝑞𝑖)) (1 − 𝑞𝑖) 
                                                          
1Samuelson (1937) models the influence of the discount factor on utility as 𝑈0 = 𝑓(𝑡)𝑈𝑡, and the discount 




2The terms “parents” and “children” are used for ease of comprehension, but for the purposes of this study 
relate to the household caregiver and household youth regardless of relationship status.  
3The Bisin & Verdier model assumes families are composed of one child and one parent in a community 
with two potential traits, i and j, and that children are born without defined preferences or traits (2001). 
Rather, preferences and traits are only obtained through socialization.  
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(4) 𝑑𝑖 = 𝐷(𝜏𝑖, 𝑞𝑖) 
Equation (1) represents the expected lifetime gains of a parent with trait i minus the costs 
associated with the concerted effort to socialize their child to the same i trait. It is dependent 
upon the utility the parent derives from the likelihood their child is socialized to the same trait 
(𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑖𝑖) or a different trait (𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑉𝑖𝑗), where 𝑃𝑖𝑖 denotes the probability that the child is socialized 
to trait i, 𝑃𝑖𝑗 the probability they are socialized to trait j, and 𝑉𝑖𝑖 represents the utility the parent 
obtains from having a type i child, while 𝑉𝑖𝑗 is the utility for having a type j child. Equation (2) 
and (3), thus, represent the production functions of the probability that a child from a parent with 
trait i is socialized to trait i or trait j, respectively. These probabilities are, subsequently, a 
function of the inherent probabilities that a child receives direct socialization 𝑑𝑖(𝑞𝑖) versus 
oblique socialization 1 − 𝑑𝑖(𝑞𝑖) each of which depends upon the fraction of the population with 
trait i represented by 𝑞𝑖. Finally, Equation (4) illustrates that the production function of direct 
socialization is based on parental socialization effort, and the proportion of the community with 
trait i. As such, parental socialization acts as a moderator which strengthens the transmission of 
preferences and traits from parent to child.  
Using the discount rate obtained in accordance with the DU model, this paper will 
attempt to test Bisin and Verdier’s theory by ascertaining whether parental socialization has any 
influence over the strength of the transmission of discounting from caregiver to youth. I will test 
this proposed moderator using familial support indicators as proxies for direct socialization 




Malawi Social Cash Transfer Program 
Program Design 
The Malawi SCTP is an UCT program targeted to ultra-poor, labor-constrained 
households administered by the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Welfare.4 The program 
began as a pilot in the Mchinji district in 2006, was expanded to an additional eight districts out 
of 28 total districts by 2009 and was further expanded starting in 2014 to reach a total of 18 
districts and over 163,000 beneficiary households (Handa et al., 2016). Beneficiary households 
receive bimonthly payments of varying amounts depending on household size and the number of 
primary and secondary school-aged children in the home. By endline, the average monthly per 
capita transfer amount received by beneficiary households was equivalent to US$1.25 a month or 
about US$60 per household annually. Payments are made in cash every other month through a 
local pay-point manager to the main beneficiary, and there are no conditions to receive the 
money. Payments represent approximately 20 percent of pre-program consumption for 
beneficiary households. The overarching objective of the SCTP is to reduce extreme poverty and 
hunger, and to increase school enrollment among the ultra-poor. 
Malawi SCTP Study Design 
The evaluation study was designed around the Government of Malawi’s plans to extend 
and expand coverage of the SCTP starting in 2014. Two districts, Salima and Mangochi, were 
chosen to align the evaluation with the expansion plans. Randomization took place at multiple 
                                                          
4The SCTP Operations Manual defines ultra-poor as a household that is unable to meet the most basic 
urgent needs, including food and essential non-food items such as soap and clothing, while labor 
constrained refers to a household with a dependency ratio (ratio of ‘fit to work’ to ‘not fit to work’) of 
more than three or with no individuals who are fit to work. An individual who is considered not fit to 
work is someone under the age of 18, over the age of 64, or within the age range 18 to 64 but suffering 
from a chronic illness or disability or is otherwise unable to work (Handa et al. 2014).    
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levels within these two districts starting with Traditional Authorities (TAs) down to Village 
Clusters (VCs). Two TAs were randomly selected in each district to participate in the study, and 
29 VCs within the TAs were randomly assigned to either the treatment or delayed-entry control 
arm. Prior to treatment assignment, a list of eligible households within each VC was created 
based on a targeting procedure designed by the Government of Malawi. This process resulted in 
a final sample of 3,531 households – 1,678 in the 14 treatment VCs and 1,853 in the 15 delayed-
entry control VCs. For additional details on the sampling procedure and power calculations to 
determine optimal sample size, see the publicly available study baseline report (Handa et al. 
2014). 
The cluster-randomized, longitudinal study comprised multiple survey instruments 
including a household questionnaire, the main survey instrument, which covered a 
comprehensive list of topics including household composition, consumption, health, education, 
economic activity, time use, and subjective wellbeing, among others, an accompanying youth 
questionnaire, and a community survey. Surveys were administered in each of three rounds as 
follows: the baseline survey conducted mid-2013, the first follow-up survey conducted in late 
2014 through early 2015, and the final follow-up survey conducted in late 2015.  
Data 
Sample 
This present study uses data from all three waves of the household survey, and those from 
the endline youth survey. There was minimal attrition in follow-up rounds with 93.5% of 
baseline eligible households remaining in the sample at both midline and endline (Handa et al., 
2016). No differential attrition was found across follow-up rounds indicating that baseline 
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balance between treatment and control groups was preserved (See Table 2.1 for baseline balance 
tables at the household level). 
The youth questionnaire was administered to up to three youth in each household in each 
of the three rounds.5 This instrument was targeted at youth aged 13-19 at baseline and consisted 
of questions related to mental health, sexual behavior, perceptions of risk, and tobacco and 
alcohol use, among others. The intertemporal choice module was only administered to youth at 
endline, therefore this study focuses on the cross-section of youth interviewed at endline which 
results in a sample of 2,325 individuals aged 15-22 – 1,085 in treatment households, 1,240 in 
control households (See Table 2.2 youth characteristics by treatment status at endline for the 
youth analytic sample). Since not all eligible youth were interviewed at endline for any number 
of reasons (e.g., at school, out of town, or sick when enumerators came by), Table 2.3 compares 
key characteristics and shows that there are some significant differences between the two groups. 
Specifically, youth that were not interviewed are older, more likely to be out of school, but with 
more educational attainment, and more likely to be married. Additionally, the demographic 
composition of their households differ slightly, though caregivers are similarly aged. This 
implies that results from this study are likely not generalizable to all youth populations and are 
only applicable to youth with a similar propensity to be interviewed in such studies. 
 
                                                          
5The youth survey was conducted with replacement based on youth availability. This means that while the 
survey team tried to ensure the same youth were administered the survey in each round, they were 
instructed to replace youth who were unable to be surveyed in subsequent rounds. In other words, if there 
were more than three youth in the household, and one of the youth that had been surveyed at baseline was 
unreachable at the first follow-up, another youth that had not been surveyed at baseline but was available 
was administered the survey. This ensured that no more than three youth per household were surveyed in 





Both the youth and caregiver questionnaires contained intertemporal choice modules, 
with slight variations, following the discrete choice approach which has been used to elicit time 
discounting in field research since the 1980’s (Pender, 1996; van der Pol & Cairns, 2001; 
Harrison, Lau & Williams, 2002; Carvhalho, 2010; Tanaka, Camerer & Nguyen, 2010; Handa et 
al., 2014). The youth intertemporal choice module included six hypothetical scenarios each 
offering youth a choice between receiving 10,000 Malawi Kwacha (MWK) (approximately US 
$20) today or a different amount in one month’s time. Specifically, the youth were asked to 
identify which option they preferred for each of the following choice pairs:  
A. MWK 10,000 today or MWK 5,000 in one month.  
B. MWK 10,000 today or MWK 20,000 in one month.  
C. MWK 10,000 today or MWK 17,000 in one month.  
D. MWK 10,000 today or MWK 11,500 in one month.  
E. MWK 10,000 today or MWK 13,000 in one month. 
F. MWK 10,000 today or MWK 15,000 in one month. 
From this module, I assess an individual’s switch point – the point at which they switch from 
opting to take the money today to waiting for a specific future value. While the future amounts 
varied from 5,000 MWK to 20,000 MWK in the choice task, the questions were arranged in a 
random order (shown above) so that the proposed future amounts were not asked in ascending 
order as they are in other studies (e.g. Holt & Laury 2002). Because of this unique feature, I am 
able to identify those respondents who had multiple switch points – switched from selecting the 
10,000 MWK today, to waiting for a larger future value, and switched back to choosing the 
10,000 MWK today when offered the choice between an even larger future value. I consider 
such occurrences representative of inconsistent responses. Additionally, the youth module 
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offered another check by first asking about their preference between 10,000 MWK today and 
5,000 MWK in one month. If youth responded that they were willing to wait for the lower future 
amount, I again interpret this as having inconsistent preferences as it seems implausible one 
would opt to wait for a smaller, future value over a larger, immediate value. However, I 
acknowledge there may be extenuating circumstances inducing individuals to exhibit such 
preferences which I am terming inconsistent.6 For example, a woman may know that her 
husband will be away in one month’s time, so she would prefer any amount, even a smaller 
amount, in a month as she knows any amount she receives today will be taken away by her 
husband.  Even so, for the purposes of this paper, I exclude these inconsistent responses from the 
analysis. In total, I find only 3% of youth (approximately 70 youth) with double switches or 
opting to wait for 5,000 MWK which is lower than the rate of inconsistent responses reported by 
laboratory studies using ordered values (Bradford et al., 2014).7  
As mentioned, this subset of questions was hypothetical in nature meaning respondents 
were not incentivized and no monetary rewards were exchanged.8 While there is a debate in the 
literature over the merit of hypothetical versus incentivized choice modules, studies have found 
                                                          
6Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue (2001) suggest the situations researchers often deem to be 
‘anomalies’ (e.g., exhibiting inconsistent preferences in an intertemporal choice task) may in fact be 
errors of the model rather than of the people who commit them (p. 365). As such, I acknowledge that the 
responses of these individuals may actually be consistent and telling of some deeper situational 
preferences, however, for ease of interpretation of results, I chose to exclude them. 
7A switch point refers to the moment a respondent opted to wait for the future value over selecting to 
receive the value today. Switch points were assessed after putting questions back in ascending order to 
determine whether respondents exhibited consistent preferences. If so, respondents should only switch 
from not waiting to waiting a maximum of one time throughout the choice task. 
8The statement that was read to both youth and caregivers prior to express the hypothetical nature of the 
intertemporal choice module read as follows: “I am going to ask you about a hypothetical situation. 
Please think about what you would do if this situation were to occur. Suppose you suddenly find that a 
relative has left you 10,000 MWK. You can choose to receive the 10,000 MWK now or an amount at a 
later date. What would you choose? This is not a real situation and there is no real money.”  
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both types lead to similar responses, and hypothetical questions afford researchers the additional 
advantage of testing a broader range of values across a larger sample (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; 
Delavande et al., 2011; Harrison et al., 2002; Harrison et al., 2007; Holt & Laury, 2002; Johnson 
& Bickel, 2002; Kirby, 1997). Researchers must remain within their budget constraint, so 
incentivizing such tasks necessitates smaller sample sizes and lower future value ranges as the 
costs associated with paying out the rewards can quickly add up. Conversely, with hypothetical 
tasks, researchers are provided the opportunity to sample more individuals and use a much larger 
spread of future values. Since reviews show that preferences and discount rates stemming from 
each type are similar, it follows that the use of such hypothetical questions for this study is 
reasonable and that the responses are valid and believable. 
An almost identical intertemporal choice module was included in the household survey 
administered to the main caregivers. Unlike in the youth survey, this module was administered in 
each of the three survey rounds. While the amounts of the future values in the caregiver’s choice 
task differed slightly (ranging from 10,000-40,000 MWK), the overall structure was consistent 
with that in the youth survey. Correspondingly, caregivers with multiple switch points are 
excluded from further analysis. This resulted in an additional 10 youth from eight households 
being excluded – a further 0.58% of all youth dropped.  
To evaluate one’s time discounting, I create multiple variables based on the responses 
obtained from the intertemporal choice module. First, I create descriptive variables which serve 
to help explain patterns and trends in the data. To begin with, I look at the likelihood one chooses 
to wait for each future value and create binary variables for each representing whether the 
individual waited or not. Next, I create a dichotomous impatience variable which takes on the 
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value 1 if the individual never waited for a future value and 0 if the individual opted to wait for 
at least one future value regardless of what that future value was.  
I then create two key variables which serve as my outcome variables – youths’ MRS and 
discount rate based on switch points. The MRS is typically calculated at an individual’s 
indifference point where they can give up some amount of one good in exchange for some 
amount of another good maintaining the same level of utility. In this case, that would be the 
point at which an amount of money received in one month provides the youth with the same 
level of utility as receiving 10,000 MWK today. Similar to field-based studies, due to the nature 
of the intertemporal choice task, I am unable to obtain the actual values of this measure for each 
individual.9 Instead, I calculate an upper bound obtained by calculating the MRS at the switch 
point. Using the point at which the individual switches to waiting for the future amount, I 





For those that never switched, I calculated their MRS using the highest switch point and adding 
four.10 Similarly, the discount rate was calculated using the conventional future value formula 
from finance solving for the discount rate: 
                                                          
9While the hypothetical nature of the questions does allow a wider range of future values, it would be too 
time consuming to narrow down to this point of equivalency in utility in an already two-three hour 
survey. Matching-based tasks have also been used to elicit an individual’s time discounting where 
individuals are given an amount to receive today and are asked what amount they would need to be 
offered at some future time to either be indifferent or to opt for waiting (Thaler, 1981). Opponents of this 
elicitation method purport that the task is more cognitively demanding and allows for extreme answers 
that skew results and complicate analysis (Urminsky & Zauberman, 2015). 
10The value four was selected by taking doubling the highest possible value (two) based on the 
intertemporal choice task. A similar method was used to determine the MRS value to assign to never 




(6) 𝑟 = (
𝐹𝑉
𝑃𝑉
)1/𝑡 − 1 
where t was equal to one month based on the timeframe used in the intertemporal choice task. 
This measure captures an individual’s specific monthly discount rate based on monetary 
tradeoffs again using their switch point. Like the MRS, when calculating the discount rate for 
impatient individuals, I use the highest future value and add two. I calculate MRS and discount 
rates for caregivers in the same manner, as they serve as the key explanatory variables in my 
analysis.   
Methodology 
The main relationship of interest in this paper is that between youth and caregiver 
discounting. I start by modeling the determinants of a youth’s discounting (TDy) as a function of 
their caregiver’s discounting (TDcg), household characteristics (H), as well as time-varying and 
time-invariant characteristics of both themselves (X, A) and their caregiver (Z, C): 
(7) 𝑇𝐷𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑇𝐷𝑐𝑔𝑖𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝐴𝑖, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, 𝐶𝑖, 𝐻𝑖𝑡) 
Using the cross-section of youth surveyed at endline, I begin with a basic OLS 
specification of the determinants of discounting for youth i in household h to test the 
contemporaneous relationship with caregiver’s discounting: 
(8) 𝑇𝐷𝑦𝑖ℎ = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐷𝑐𝑔ℎ + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑋ℎ + 𝛽4𝑇𝑖 + 𝜇ℎ +  𝑖ℎ 
In this linear regression model, 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of individual youth characteristics, 𝑋ℎ 
represents household-level controls, and 𝑇𝑖 is an indicator for being in a treatment household. 
                                                          
individuals that never opted to wait by rerunning my analyses adding smaller and larger values to 
calculations using the highest future value for these individuals. After testing the different values for MRS 
and discount rate, I do find that my results are robust to these different calculations, so stick with adding 
double the highest value.  
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Individual characteristics include youth’s age, sex, marital status, and education levels. 
Household-level controls include baseline values of caregiver’s age, sex, and education as well 
as whether the household experienced any covariate shocks in the past 12 months, week of SCTP 
interview, community level prices at endline, and TA of residence. Standard errors are clustered 
at the village cluster level (level of randomization to treatment).11  
However, this model fails to take into account any endogeneity at the household level. It 
is likely there is a household level factor that affects both caregiver’s time discounting and that 
of the youth residing in the household; in other words, 𝑇𝐷𝑐𝑔ℎ is correlated with the time invariant 
portion of the error term denoted by 𝜇ℎ. Relatedly, there is likely some time-varying bias due to 
contemporaneous, idiosyncratic shocks, such as the death of a household wage earner, that 
affects both youth and caregiver discounting rendering the latter endogenous. As such, results 
from this model (discussed in the results section) may suffer from bias stemming from such 
unobservable household-level characteristics.  
To address the endogeneity of caregiver’s discounting, I use an instrumental variables 
(IV) approach where caregiver’s discounting is predicted in a first stage equation using 
instruments (Z) as follows: 
(9) 𝑇𝐷𝑐𝑔ℎ𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝒁ℎ𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋ℎ𝑡 + ℎ𝑡 + 𝜇ℎ 
                                                          
11Since there are only 29 village clusters in this sample, I use wild bootstrapping with 1000 repetitions to 




Equation (9) shows that caregiver’s discounting is a function of the instrument(s) 𝑍ℎ𝑡, and 
household characteristics 𝑋ℎ𝑡. The discounting predicted from this equation is then used in the 
second stage (equation 8) to predict youth’s discounting.  
I test multiple instruments for use in this approach. First, I exploit the random assignment 
to treatment in the SCTP. This is plausible because i.) treatment has been shown to decrease 
caregiver’s discounting (Handa & Molotsky, n.d.), and ii.) treatment does not significantly 
predict youth’s discounting (see Appendix Table A.1). Consequently, most changes within the 
household attributable to the introduction of the cash transfer (e.g., increased human capital 
investments, greater diet diversity) are a direct result of caregiver’s intertemporal decision-
making, which is intricately related to their discounting. This includes many benefits the youth 
themselves receives from the transfer suggesting the transfer most prominently influences 
youth’s discounting through its effect on caregivers’ discounting thus meeting the exclusion 
restriction. There may be a few instances, such as youth’s improved subjective well-being, where 
youth are more directly influenced by the household’s receipt of the transfer aside from the 
influence on their caregiver’s discounting. Even so, it is reasonable to assume that the transfer 
acts mainly through caregivers’ discounting to youths’ discounting. Unfortunately, treatment 
alone is found to be a rather weak instrument for predicting caregiver’s endline discounting (as 
shown by the instrument’s F-test and related R2 in Table 2.6). Therefore, I explore adding 
additional variables to the instrument set.  
This full instrument set includes the random assignment to treatment, the interaction of 
treatment with baseline community-level prices, and the lagged non-self (NS) cluster mean of 
caregivers’ discount rates. Baseline prices are only included as an interaction with treatment as 
they best represent the prices beneficiaries faced once they started receiving the cash. Therefore, 
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this interaction should represent how the effect of the cash transfer played out against 
households’ budget constraints which are dependent upon these prices. The lagged NS cluster 
mean represents the mean discounting of all other caregivers in the village at midline exclusive 
of one’s own caregiver’s discounting. As mentioned in the theory section, youths’ preferences 
may also be influenced by those of their peers, so it stands to reason that caregivers’ preferences 
can similarly be influenced by their peer group. Therefore, the NS cluster mean provides a 
source of exogenous variation for caregivers’ own discounting based on the average discounting 
of all other caregivers in the same village (cluster). Each of these instruments in this larger 
instrument set successfully remove 𝜇ℎ, the household-level time invariant component and the 
main driver of endogeneity in the error term in equation (9).  
Once the 𝜇ℎ is removed this leaves only the exogenous change in caregiver’s discounting 
over time to predict caregiver’s discounting at endline. Neither the interaction of baseline prices 
with treatment nor the lagged NS cluster mean should be included in the second stage equation 
as they have no direct bearing on youth’s discounting other than through their effects on 
caregiver’s discounting. Again, youth are not directly receiving the cash in beneficiary 
households so while their own discounting may be influenced by local prices, the treatment 
effect as a function of these prices should not directly predict their own discounting outside of 
the influence on their caregiver’s discounting. Likewise, while youths’ preferences and 
discounting may be influenced by their caregivers as well as their own peers, the mean 
discounting of other caregivers in the village at midline should have no explanatory power over 
youths’ discounting endline except through its predictive power on caregiver’s endline 
discounting. As such, each of these instruments theoretically meet the exclusion restriction. Even 
so, they may be correlated with the time varying portion, 𝑡 (or simply  as it appears in equation 
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8), at endline if there is serial correlation. It is likely that the correlation with this time varying 
piece of the error term pertains to idiosyncratic (household-level) shocks.12 In this case, serial 
correlation would only be a concern if such shocks were severe enough to produce effects which 
spilled over into the next survey round. Therefore, assuming no serial correlation, and with the 
additional assumption that such shocks do not relate systematically to any unobserved 
characteristics that may also influence youth’s discounting, this full instrument set remains 
viable. The results from the first stage (equation 9) and validity of the instruments are discussed 
further in the next section. 
Results 
Descriptive Results 
As mentioned, I dropped individuals from the analysis if they exhibited inconsistent 
preferences by reporting double switch points (20 youth) or opting to wait for 5,000 MWK in 
one month’s time over receiving 10,000 MWK at the time of the survey (52 youth). Additionally, 
youth were excluded if their caregivers exhibited similarly inconsistent preferences resulting in 
the loss of another 10 individuals for a total analytic sample size of 1,728 caregiver-youth pairs. 
Table 2.4 presents the summary statistics for youth in the final analytic sample (those with 
consistent responses) compared to those dropped based on inconsistent responses and shows 
there are relatively few statistically significant differences across for key independent or 
dependent variables.  
                                                          
12Idiosyncratic shocks can arguably be seen as exogenous. However, since their exogeneity is not agreed 
upon, I assess the robustness of my results by comparing my results between models controlling for and 
excluding the household reporting any idiosyncratic shocks at endline. Results are consistent regardless of 
specification, therefore, I assume there is no bias resulting from these shocks, and present results only 
from regressions exclusive of idiosyncratic shocks. 
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Since youth were only administered the intertemporal choice task in the final round of 
data collection, there is no way to compare how their time discounting changed over time. 
However, valuable information can still be obtained from looking at the trends in the data. Figure 
2.1 graphically depicts the proportion of youth willing to wait for each future value. As expected, 
as the future value increases, the proportion willing to wait increases as well. The same general 
upward trend is also seen in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. However, Figure 2 shows that females are 
relatively more patient than males with a larger proportion of females willing to wait for each 
future value. Interestingly, Figure 2.3 shows that as youth age, they are less likely to wait for 
future payment. Researchers, especially those who ascribe to the hyperbolic discounting model, 
suggest that discounting is higher at the age extremes – younger and much older individuals tend 
to have larger discount rates while they shrink in the middle years (e.g., Frederick, Loewenstein 
& O’Donoghue, 2002; Pender, 1996; Urminsky & Zauberman, 2015). While such studies have 
found that individuals tend to become more patient as they age, these studies focus on changes in 
patience over the life-cycle (e.g., differences between individuals in their 20’s, 40’s, and 60’s). 
This study, conversely, focuses on a narrow age range indicating the findings are not an inherent 
contradiction to results from those other studies.  
Determinants of Youth Discounting 
Next, I assess the relationship between caregivers’ discounting and youths’ discounting 
using equation (8). First, I look at the associations between caregiver’s discounting outcomes at 
endline (as measured by the MRS and discount rate) and youth’s outcomes. Table 2.5 shows that 
a caregiver’s discounting is highly correlated with youth’s discounting. On average, an increase 
in a caregiver’s MRS of one-point is associated with a 0.121 increase in the youth’s MRS (Table 
2.5, Column 8, Row 3). In other words, thinking back to the intertemporal choice task, a one-
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point increase in caregiver’s MRS is associated with an increase in the future value at the youth’s 
switch point by 1,210 MWK (or 12.51% of the present value). This implies that a youth that was 
previously willing to wait for 15,000 MWK will now require 16,210 MWK to be offered in one 
month’s time before they are willing to wait for future money. A similar increase in caregiver’s 
discount rate is associated with a 0.169 increase in youth’s discount rate, on average (Table 2.5, 
column 9, Row 1). This is equivalent to an increase in the future value for which they are willing 
to wait by 16.9% of the present value such that a youth who was willing to wait for 15,000 
MWK now will not wait until they are offered 16,690 MWK in one month. The associations 
between caregivers’ discounting and those of youth are very strong with all relationships being 
significant at the 1% level.13  
The results also show that both the age and sex of the youth are highly predictive of 
youth’s time discounting. As mentioned above, older youth are more likely to be impatient and 
have a higher MRS and discount rate than their younger counterparts (see Appendix Tables A-1 
and A-2). Also, males are found to be more impatient than females. This result supports previous 
research which has also found females to be the more patient sex. Caregiver characteristics do 
not appear to predict youth’s discounting suggesting the effect of these aspects act only through 
their effect on caregiver’s own discounting.  
First Stage Results: Treatment, Baseline Prices, and Lagged NS Cluster Mean  
In order for the IV approach to be viable, the instrument must account for a substantial 
amount of variation in the endogenous variable (caregiver’s discounting) and not be directly 
                                                          
13The dichotomous impatience outcome is not used in the IV models because of the use of the lagged 
difference instrument. Moreover, the results obtained when using the MRS variable are consistent with 
those generated when using the discount rate. Therefore, I will present only the results from the discount 
rate analysis for the remainder of this paper for ease of reading. Additional results from the MRS analyses 
are available in Appendix A.    
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related to the youth’s discounting. A common rule of thumb is that the F-statistic from the first 
stage should be at least 10, and the partial R2 should demonstrate the instruments are strong by 
predicting substantial variation in the endogenous variable after controlling for other exogenous 
variables.  
Table 2.6 shows the results from the first stage using the instruments to predict 
caregiver’s discount rate. Each column represents a different instrument set with Column 1 
presenting estimates when only including the random assignment to treatment as an instrument, 
whereas Columns 2 presents those from the full instrument set adding in the interaction with 
prices as well as the lagged NS cluster mean discount rate. Estimates from both columns pertain 
to caregiver’s endline discount rate. The F-tests and partial R2 testing the strength of the 
instruments are shown in the last three rows of each column.  
Treatment alone is found to have a significant effect on the discount rate at endline with 
an associated F-statistic of 13.98, but the specification explains only about 1% of the variation in 
caregiver’s endline outcome. To strengthen the instrument set, I add the interaction with baseline 
prices as well as the lagged NS cluster mean of caregiver’s discount rate shown in Column 2. 
However, when adding these additional instruments, Column 2 shows that treatment’s predictive 
power of caregiver’s endline discounting is reduced. Even so, this full instrument set results in an 
F statistic of 65.915, rendering it much stronger than treatment alone. Relatedly, results of the 
Lagrange Multiplier test for overidentifying restrictions fails to reject the null for the 
specification in Column 2 indicating that all instruments are valid. Thus, the full instrument set 
includes not only a theoretically strong group of instruments but also an empirically strong 




Intergenerational Transmission of Time Discounting 
Table 2.7 shows results comparing the OLS estimates with the IV estimates of the effect 
of caregiver’s discount rate on that of youth. Both IV estimates produce larger effect sizes with 
much larger standard errors, effects increased by 110 and 48 percent relative to OLS depending 
on the instrument set, but the results become only marginally significant with the lagged NS 
cluster mean, and treatment alone shows that caregivers’ discount rates does not significantly 
influence youth’s discount rates. Of course, these coefficients are not directly comparable as the 
former corresponds to the average treatment effect while the IV estimate pertains specifically to 
the local average treatment effect identified from the sample whose caregiver’s discount rates are 
influenced by the instrument set. More specifically, Table 2.7 shows that a one-point increase in 
the caregivers’ discount rate is associated with a 0.17 increase in youth’s discount rate when 
using a basic OLS specification. However, when the endogeneity is accounted for, the effect 
increases to 0.25 (Column 3). This effect is equivalent to saying that a youth whose caregiver’s 
discount rate increases by one-point switches from being indifferent between 10,000 MWK 
today and 15,000 MWK in one month, to 17,500 MWK in one month, effectively increasing the 
future value equivalency point by 2,500 MWK (25% of the present value).  
Results from a variant of the Hausman test reported at the bottom of Table 2.7 indicate 
that the OLS and IV coefficients are not statistically different regardless of the instrument set 
used. Even so, the remaining analyses in this paper will present results using the instrument sets 
containing treatment, and the full instrument set: a combination of treatment, baseline prices 
interacted with treatment, and the non-self cluster mean of caregiver’s discount rate. While 
treatment alone is a relatively weak instrument, results obtained using this specification will 




While there is overall evidence of the intergenerational transmission of discounting 
within the household, it is likely this average effect masks variation. As mentioned, females 
typically spend more time in the home assisting with domestic chores and caretaking, potentially 
affording them more interaction with their caregivers. Accordingly, I expect the relationship 
between caregivers’ and youths’ discounting to be stronger for female youth and youth in 
female-headed households. Relatedly, older youth may have spent more time in the household, 
as a function of their age similarly allowing them more frequent interactions with their 
caregivers. Moreover, older youth are more likely to make their own intertemporal decisions 
which, it is reasonable to assume, they base off of what and how they have witnessed their 
caregivers making decisions, again indicating they would boast a stronger relationship with their 
caregiver’s discounting. Additionally, studies have shown that the transmission of preferences 
and other traits are stronger for mother-daughter relationships compared to mother-son and even 
father-daughter relationships (Alan et al., 2017). As such, I expect the relationship to be strongest 
for female-female caregiver-youth pairs. In this section, I examine whether any of these 
theoretical and empirical considerations hold for the intergenerational transmission of 
discounting in my sample.  
Table 2.8 presents the results looking at differences in the effect of caregiver discount 
rate on male and female youth discount rates. Column 1 presents results from the IV model using 
treatment only, while Columns 2 and 3 derive from models using the full instrument set. The 
strength of treatment as an instrument diminishes when attempting to stratify the sample for 
subgroup analyses. Accordingly, when using this instrument, I use interactions to identify 
heterogeneous effects. For models using the larger instrument set, I present results from 
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stratifying the sample as the instrument remains strong enough for each of the subgroups.14 I find 
no evidence of a relationship between discount rates for male youth regardless of the 
specification, while, for the stratified model, there is a strong effect of caregivers’ discount rate 
on that of female youth suggesting the full sample effect is being driven by the influence on 
female youth. Females’ discount rates are found to increase by 0.336 points due to a one-point 
increase in their caregiver’s discount rate suggesting females are more affected by the 
preferences of their caregiver. In fact, endline means for youth aged 15 to 22 in the control group 
support this notion. 90% of female youth in control households reported engaging in household 
chores the day prior to the interview while only 58% of males affirmed the same. While similar 
proportions of male (68%) and female (63%) youth reported ever working in ganyu labor (short-
term, often physical agricultural labor outside the home) in the past year, males worked 
approximately 30% more days – on average, males worked 49 days while females only worked 
33 days. These numbers lend support to such a hypothesis relating to differences in time spent in 
the home between the two sexes.  
Next, I examine differences by age group and when youth entered the household. Table 
2.9 indicates that there are important heterogeneous effects as youth in the youngest and oldest 
two age groups (age 15-16 and age 20-22) are more influenced by the discounting of their 
caregivers compared to those aged 17-19. Specifically, a one-point increase in their caregiver’s 
discount rate is associated with an increase in the discount rate of 0.247 points for youth aged 15-
16, and 0.351 for youth aged 20 to 22 (Columns 4 and 6, respectively). I find no evidence of a 
                                                          
14Even though results from the model using interactions and those from stratified samples are not exactly 
comparable – one compares the relative strength of the effect amongst groups while the other simply 
identifies effects across subgroups but does not directly tell us how they relate to each other – they 
illustrate related findings. 
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relationship for youth in the middle age group, nor for any age group in the model using 
interactions. To test whether this is due exclusively to one’s age or if age is simply acting as a 
proxy for the length of interactions between youth and their caregiver, I restrict the sample to 
those youth that were in the household from baseline, and those that entered after baseline data 
collection (by either midline or endline). After restricting the samples in this manner, I find 
results being strongest for those who have been in the household since baseline (Columns 2, 7-
9). I find similar results for the stratified model (0.283 for youth aged 20-22, though it is only 
marginally significant). However, when using the interacted model, I find the effect is strongest 
for those in the youngest age group compared to the older age groups, and the magnitude is much 
larger (0.453).  There are no significant results for youth that have entered the household since 
baseline suggesting the duration of interactions with a caregiver is important for transmitting 
preferences; however, sample sizes for the new entrants are significantly smaller than those for 
baseline household members.  
Moreover, I test whether the results from the age subgroups is driven by gender as I’ve 
already established a stronger effect for females above. Table 2.10 presents results from this 
analysis. As expected, the age effects are larger and significant for females only. Both models 
show the largest effect for females in older age groups (age 17-19 in Column 2 and age 20-22 in 
Column 7). On average, a one-point increase in caregivers’ discount rate increases youths’ 
discount rate by 0.225 and 0.556 points, respectively. These results additionally indicate these 
interactions are most suited for transmission post to age 16, especially for females.  
Subsequently, I examine the intensity of intergenerational transmission based on the 
gender of the main caregiver. Mothers and other female caregivers are frequently associated with 
investing more in their children’s well-being than male caregivers (Duflo, 2000), and mother-
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daughter relationships have proved to be stronger predictors of the transmission of preferences 
than mother-son or father-daughter. As such, I expect youth residing in female-headed 
households to have larger rates of transmission of discounting, and, specifically, to see the 
largest effects for female-female caregiver-youth pairs compared to female-male pairs as well as 
male-female pairs. I explore these differential effects of transmission by sex of the caregiver as 
well as caregiver-youth pairs the results of which are shown in Table 2.11. I find that, overall, 
female caregivers have a positive and statistically significant influence on the youth in their 
households while there is no significant effect for male caregivers (for the stratified model, 
Columns 3 and 6) while no similar effects are found in the interacted model (Column 1). 
However, the effects for male caregivers should be interpreted with caution as over 85% of all 
households in the sample were female-headed and the sample size for male caregivers is only 
179. In regards to caregiver-youth pairs, I find that, as hypothesized, female-female pairs 
produce the largest, significant effects, and find no evidence of transmission for female-male 
pairs in the stratified model (Table 2.11, Columns 7 and 8). Relatedly, there is no significant 
effect for male-female pairs or male-male pairs (Columns 4 and 5). Results from the interacted 
model find the largest and only significant effect amongst female-male pairs (Column 2). The 
strong relationships between same sex caregiver-youth pairs in the stratified model and female-
male pairs in the interacted model represent interesting dynamics to be further explored as a 
factor influencing policy and programmatic success moving forward.  
Lastly, I investigate the potential for transmission of discounting by the youth’s 
relationship to the caregiver. The results in Table 2.12 suggest the majority of the effect is driven 
by parent-child (0.337), grandparent-grandchild (0.527), and uncle/aunt-niece/nephew (0.529) 
relationships within the household. However, the interacted model identifies no significantly 
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different effects between the groups. Again, the majority (90 percent) of the youth-caregiver 
pairs represented such relationships, so there is more power to detect significant effects among 
these groups (indeed the point estimate in the other relation grouping is much smaller, and with 
fewer than 100 observations, is not statistically significant). Even so, it is interesting to discover 
that parent-child, grandparent-grandchild, and uncle/aunt-niece/nephew relationships are capable 
of influencing intergenerational transmission of discounting.  
Parental Socialization 
As theory suggests, effortful socialization by parents is indicative of whether or not and, 
perhaps, to what extent discount rates are transmitted from parent to child (Bisin and Verdier, 
2001). This implies socialization acts as a moderator for the relationship with caregivers who 
engage in more socialization realizing larger relationships between caregiver and youth 
discounting. I, therefore, test for an influential effect of caregiver socialization on youth’s 
discounting in this context. In the endline survey, youth were administered a social support 
module based on questions from Zimet et al.’s Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social 
Support (1988), which asked a variety of questions about their perceptions related to the social 
support they receive from friends and family.15 I create a revised version of the Perceived Social 
Support scale (PSSS) using only the four family-related support questions. Youth responses were 
given on a five-item Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5). For 
each of the four family-related scale items, the maximum score was 5, so the highest total value 
across items was 20. To create the miniature PSSS, I then divide by four to get an average PSSS 
score (see Table 2.13 for distributional analysis of the PSSS).  
                                                          
15For more information on this particular survey module, please see the publicly available youth survey 
instruments on the Transfer Project website at: https://transfer.cpc.unc.edu/?page_id=875.  
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For the analysis, I divide youth into two groups – those reporting high familial support, 
and those reporting low support – based on the median value of four and run the same IV 
regressions as before simply restricted to each group to compare effect sizes. The results 
provided in Table 2.14 do not provide evidence of caregiver socialization providing a consistent 
moderating effect. The coefficient for youth reporting the highest levels of perceived social 
support falls to 0.167 while the coefficient for youth reporting the lowest levels of support also 
falls but to 0.179. Specifically, if their caregivers’ discount rate increases one-point, this 
increases the future value youth with high support would need to be offered to induce them to 
wait by 1,670 MWK (almost 17% of the present value) and by 1,790 MWK (17.9% of the 
present value) for youth with low support, though neither of these effects are found to be 
significant. The results of this socialization analysis may be influenced by the measures used as 
the PSSS score is merely a proxy for actual socialization; the construction of PSSS module is 
subjective in nature, and simply reporting one received support from family does not necessitate 
it is the main caregiver providing this support. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study investigated the intergenerational transmission of discounting within the 
household using an IV approach and data from the Malawi SCTP. The results of this study 
generally support the notion of the intergenerational correlation of discounting within the 
household. The overall results suggest that discounting is malleable, rather than a constant 
component of one’s decision-making process. Both OLS and IV (which purge the estimates of 
bias due to unobserved household level heterogeneity) show at least a margninally significant 
relationship between caregivers’ discounting and that of youth in their household; the correlation 
in caregiver and youth discounting ranged from 0.169-0.251 depending on the model 
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specification (exclusive of results obtained using only treatment). This correlation fits well 
within the range (0.07-0.31) found by other studies in developed countries examining the 
intergenerational transmission of time preferences and time discounting (Webley & Nyhus, 
2006; Knowles & Postlewaite, 2005; Reynolds et al., 2009; Kosse & Pfieffer, 2012; Brown & 
van der Pol, 2015).  
Similar to previous studies, the correlation is found to be strongest for females and youth 
who have been in the household since baseline as well as for youth residing in households with a 
female caregiver. Moreover, I find that the effect is most salient for same sex caregiver-youth 
pairs while the effect is nonexistent for mixed gender caregiver-youth pairs except in the 
interacted model. Finally, I tested for the moderation effect of caregiver socialization, and find 
no evidence of caregiver’s intentional interaction with youth strengthening the correlation in 
discounting. Taken together, the overall results of this study highlight the potential for the 
intergenerational correlation in discounting within the household and suggest a way to influence 
the present-bias in youth.  
The main goal of this study was to provide evidence of a new channel capable of 
breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty above and beyond the direct reliance on the 
intergenerational correlation in human capital. While altering the relative value individuals place 
on the future compared to the present can lead to greater investments in education and healthcare 
due to the lower discounting of future payoffs in one’s individual cost-benefit analysis 
calculations, changes can manifest themselves in other ways that promote improved future well-
being including through increased savings and less risky sexual behaviors – all of which promote 
overall well-being and improved future outcomes. This provides policymakers new options for 
alleviating poverty across generations. The intergenerational correlation of discounting can 
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potentially be described as a ‘causal mediating process’ suggesting that any program that is able 
to decrease caregiver’s discounting is capable of also making youth living in the same household 
less myopic (Cook, 2014). This implies that while the analysis conducted in this study stems 
from a UCT program, the findings pertain more broadly and can be applied more generally to 
other poverty-reduction programs which are able to alter the first piece in the chain – caregiver’s 
discounting.   
While many researchers have studied individuals’ time discounting and its predictors, 
very few programs or interventions have been evaluated in terms of their ability to affect 
discounting. To date, only six studies have been conducted to assess the effects of different 
programs on time discounting and patience, and all but one found positive impacts. Luhrmann, 
Serra-Garcia & Winter (2015) study the effects of a financial literacy program randomly 
provided to a sample of German high school students and find that those provided with financial 
education were less likely to report making impulse purchases suggesting the program was able 
to decrease student’s present bias. Carvahlo, Prina & Sydnor (2016) similarly show that a 
program which randomized access to formal savings accounts for poor individuals in Nepal 
increased the treated group’s ability to delay gratification. The remaining studies evaluate large-
scale, cash transfer programs (two conditional, two unconditional) and find mixed results. 
Evidence from each of the UCT evaluations illustrate that these programs are able to decrease 
the discounting of caregivers in beneficiary households. Handa, Seidenfeld & Tembo (2012) find 
that Zambia’s Monze cash transfer program directly and indirectly influences recipients’ 
discount rates particularly as it works through one’s positive future outlook. Relatedly, Handa et 
al. (2014) show that Kenya’s cash transfer program targeted at poor households with orphaned 
and vulnerable children was also able to increase caregivers’ propensity to wait. They further 
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find these effects to be strongest for the program’s poorest households at baseline, and for those 
with access to credit (Handa, Seidenfeld & Tembo, 2012; Handa et al., 2014) Carvhalo’s (2010) 
study of Mexico’s PROGRESA, a conditional cash transfer, shows the program’s ability to 
influence participants’ impatience. Conversely, a study of Familias en Accion, Colombia’s 
conditional cash transfer program, finds no impact on time discounting or on a proxy measure for 
changes in discounting (Suarez & Cameron, 2016). Accordingly, more research is needed to 
understand whether cash transfers or other programming are best suited for changing discount 
rates, and whether these changes are lasting over time.  
This study’s high level of generalizability is also apparent in the population studied. 
While the sample comprised extremely poor individuals in rural Malawi, it is these exact traits 
that make the results applicable to similar populations in other national cash transfer programs 
throughout Africa. In particular, the eligibility criteria in the Malawi SCTP is similar to those 
used in the targeting of national cash transfer programs in Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. Even though this study is not directly measuring programmatic impacts, if the direct 
and indirect influence of such UCTs stem not from the cultural characteristics of the participants 
but rather from their ultra-poor status, then the results presented here are likely to have a high 
degree of external validity.  
While results from this study highlight new ways to think about how policies and 
programs aimed at reducing poverty affect behavior, there are a few limitations to consider when 
interpreting the results. First of all, there is concern over how the MRS and discount rate were 
calculated. Each of these terms is intended to correspond to the point at which an individual is 
indifferent between two consumption bundles. However, based on the intertemporal choice 
module used in this study, I do not necessarily obtain an individual’s indifference point. Rather, I 
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know where their switch point is, when they change from preferring the monetary value received 
today to preferring the future value. Therefore, all MRS and discount rate calculations are 
estimated using these values likely resulting in inflated values (upper bounds). Relatedly, the 
measures for assessing the moderation of caregiver socialization are imperfect. The survey 
module used to ascertain the level of socialization refers broadly to youth reporting their family 
provided support and assistance, rather than distinctly referring to their main caregiver. As such, 
the associated PSSS score for each youth likely contains measurement error and is a non-perfect 
measure of caregiver’s actual effort to interact with youth and impress their discounting. Lastly, 
in accordance with the DU model and previous research, this analysis relied on the key 
assumptions underpinning this theory which may not be realistic to explain actual human 
decisions and discounting. For instance, this study assumes that a person’s discounting is 
consistent across resources and consumption bundles. While the intertemporal choice task used 
to elicit time discounting from SCTP participants references monetary rewards, I cannot 
extrapolate to apply these same measures to other goods and behaviors reducing the external 
validity of the results to other domains. 
In summation, this study presented evidence of a strong intergenerational correlation in 
time discounting suggesting the potential for a new pathway for reducing myopia in extremely 
poor, rural populations ultimately resulting in breaking the cycle of poverty. In order to solidify 
this effect, more research is needed. Most importantly, research needs to move beyond this 
associational relationship in discounting between the generations and focus on identifying a more 
causal connection. To do so, more data is needed to establish temporal precedence, longer-term 
discounting, and to show changes over time. It would also be useful to obtain more accurate 
measures of discounting and socialization to generate more exact estimates of this phenomenon. 
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Understanding time discounting lends itself not only to comprehending how and why people 
make certain decisions, but also why poverty often continues to stronghold subsequent 
generations. Gaining this new view of individuals’ decision-making calculus enables 
policymakers to better tailor programs to achieve the greatest participation and, ultimately, 
realize the largest impact by influencing the future well-being of individuals. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 2.1. Baseline balance test for key household and caregiver characteristics 
 




Household size 1,597 5.78 5.81 5.75 0.74 
Per capita expenditure (Malawi Kwacha) 1,597 44,052.97 42,452.05 45,785.53 0.39 
No. livestock owned 1,597 1.18 1.20 1.15 0.82 
Caregiver characteristics 
Female caregiver 1,597 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.70 
Caregiver age 1,597 52.72 52.72 55.10 0.25 
Caregiver any school 1,597 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.97 
Caregiver widow 1,597 0.41 0.38 0.43 0.26 
Caregiver key variables 
Caregiver impatience - dichotomous 1,597 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.39 
Caregiver impatience - ordinal 1,597 6.29 6.25 6.32 0.18 
Caregiver marginal rate of substitution 1,597 3.78 3.63 3.93 0.33 
Caregiver discount rate 1,597 0.87 0.82 0.91 0.29 
NOTE: P-values are reported from Wald tests on the equality of means of Treatment and Control for each variable. 




Table 2.2. Comparison of key variables for the youth analytic sample by treatment arm 
      
 N All Control Treatment P-value of diff.  
Youth characteristics 
Male 1,728 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.86 
Age 1,728 17.44 17.51 17.35 0.10 
Currently Enrolled 1,728 0.57 0.52 0.62 0.03 
Grade Attainment 1,728 5.72 5.53 5.93 0.14 
Ever Married 1,728 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.33 
Youth key variables 
Youth impatience - dichotomous 1,728 0.34 0.32 0.36 0.41 
Will wait for 11,500 MWK 1,728 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.47 
Will wait for 13,000 MWK 1,728 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.66 
Will wait for 15,000 MWK 1,728 0.58 0.60 0.57 0.19 
Will wait for 17,000 MWK 1,728 0.61 0.62 0.60 0.28 
Will wait for 20,000 MWK 1,728 0.66 0.68 0.64 0.09 
Youth MRS 1,728 2.93 2.85 3.02 0.43 
Youth discount rate 1,728 0.91 0.89 0.94 0.47 
NOTE: Sample is restricted to youth interviewed at endline with consistent preferences throughout the 
intertemporal choice module who matched with caregivers interviewed in all study waves and likewise 
exhibited consistent preferences. P-values are reported from Wald tests on the equality of means of Treatment 






Table 2.3: Comparison of key variables for the analytic sample compared to eligible household youth not interviewed by 
treatment arm 









 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Youth Characteristics         
Male 0.52 0.52 0.83 0.56 0.53 0.48 -0.02 0.09 
Age (years) 14.25 17.60 0.00 14.20 17.45 0.00 0.15 0.68 
Currently enrolled in school 0.78 0.51 0.00 0.85 0.59 0.00 -0.08 0.01 
Suffer from chronic illness 0.06 0.05 0.28 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.06 
Ever been married 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.91 
Highest grade attended 4.39 5.62 0.00 4.61 5.94 0.00 -0.32 0.45 
Household Characteristics         
Caregiver ever attended school 0.34 0.38 0.07 0.38 0.37 0.48 0.01 0.63 
Caregiver female 0.85 0.85 0.98 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.00 0.85 
Caregiver age 53.08 53.51 0.43 55.77 55.36 0.64 -1.85 0.25 
Caregiver widow 0.40 0.37 0.15 0.39 0.41 0.11 -0.04 0.73 
Household members 0-5 years 0.77 0.71 0.17 0.75 0.68 0.05 0.04 0.78 
Household members 6-11 years 1.56 1.38 0.00 1.50 1.29 0.00 0.08 0.43 
Household members 12-17 years 1.42 1.60 0.00 1.41 1.60 0.00 0.01 0.98 
Household members 18-65 years 1.38 1.55 0.00 1.33 1.47 0.00 0.08 0.65 
Household members 65 and over 0.45 0.48 0.26 0.55 0.47 0.03 0.01 0.04 
Numbers of persons in household 5.58 5.72 0.20 5.54 5.51 0.77 0.21 0.86 
Note: Overall N for control is 2,200 (In study/non-attritors=1,240; Attritors=960). Overall N for treated is 1,946 (In study/non-attritors=1,085; 
Attritors=101). Each survey round up to three youth per household were included interviewed with replacement across the waves. Not interviewed refers to 
eligible youth who met the criteria to be interviewed based on the household roster but were not interviewed for some reason. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *** 









Table 2.4: Comparison of youth sample by consistency of time discounting responses by treatment arm  











 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Youth Characteristics         
Male 0.52 0.61 0.45 0.53 0.68 0.21 -0.07 0.60 
Age (years) 17.60 17.51 0.81 17.42 18.29 0.02 -0.78 0.03 
Currently enrolled in school 0.51 0.56 0.65 0.59 0.58 0.92 -0.02 0.03 
Suffer from chronic illness 0.05 0.07 0.60 0.05 0.03 0.68 0.04 0.76 
Ever been pregnant 0.30 0.19 0.27 0.28 0.40 0.59 -0.21 0.67 
Ever been married 0.09 0.05 0.29 0.07 0.03 0.22 0.02 0.45 
Highest grade attended 5.61 6.05 0.26 5.91 6.87 0.01 -0.82 0.28 
Household Characteristics         
Caregiver ever attended school 0.38 0.41 0.61 0.37 0.19 0.01 0.22 0.92 
Caregiver female 0.85 0.83 0.66 0.85 0.87 0.69 -0.04 0.90 
Caregiver age 53.39 57.02 0.29 55.16 62.13 0.01 -5.10 0.42 
Caregiver widow 0.37 0.37 0.95 0.41 0.45 0.64 -0.09 0.34 
Household members 0-5 years 0.71 0.78 0.74 0.68 0.61 0.80 0.17 0.63 
Household members 6-11 years 1.38 1.32 0.75 1.30 1.06 0.06 0.25 0.32 
Household members 12-17 years 1.61 1.56 0.79 1.61 1.39 0.27 0.17 0.99 
Household members 18-65 years 1.55 1.51 0.80 1.47 1.65 0.54 -0.13 0.52 
Household members 65 and over 0.47 0.68 0.18 0.47 0.55 0.45 0.13 0.97 
Numbers of persons in household 5.72 5.85 0.70 5.52 5.26 0.66 0.60 0.40 
Note: Overall N for control is 1,240 (In study/non-attritors=1,199; Attritors=41). Overall N for treated is 1,085 (In study/non-attritors=1,854; Attritors=31). 
Inconsistent responses include those youth you had two switch points or said they would wait for a lower future value (5,000 MWK) compared to the 






Figure 2.1. Proportion of youth willing to wait for each future value  
 













































































  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) (9) 
Caregiver's Discount Rate -0.073*** -0.092*** -0.096*** -0.098*** -0.094*** 0.094*** 0.450*** 0.169*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.072) (0.026) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Caregiver's MRS -0.018*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.025*** 0.025*** 0.121*** 0.045*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.020) (0.007) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
NOTE: Each column and row pairing represent a different OLS regression. All regressions control for a set of baseline characteristics including youth age, 
sex, schooling, caregiver age, sex, and schooling, any covariate shock in last 12 months, week of interview, TA of residence, and an indicator for SCTP 
treatment households. The key independent variables on shown as row headers, while dependent variables are listed as column headers. Variables for future 
values and impatience represent descriptive outcomes used to aid in simply describing the data, while the MRS and the discount rate are the main youth 
outcomes of interest. Numbers in the table show the coefficients obtained from OLS regression analyses. Standard errors, clustered at the level of 
randomization, are shown in parentheses below the coefficient. Wild bootstrapping p-values for the impact coefficient (1000 reps, H0=0) are shown in Row 








Table 2.6. First Stage Results Predicting Caregiver’s Discount Rate  
Instrument set: Treatment only 
Treatment, Baseline Prices X Treatment, & 
Lagged Non-Self Cluster Mean Discount Rate 









Baseline prices X Treatment 
-- X 
































F-test instruments (F-stat) 13.978 65.915 
F-test instruments (F-prob) 0.0008 0.0000 
Wild bootstrap F-test p-value 0.0070 0.0000 
Partial R2 for instruments 0.0083 0.0224 
Lagrange Multiplier p-value N/A 0.0659 
NOTE: Regressions also include controls for contemporaneous endline prices. Standard errors, clustered at the VC level, are 
shown in parentheses below the coefficient. F-statistics produced using clustered standard errors, not wild bootstrapping. *** 















Full Instrument Set 
(3) 
Caregiver Discount Rate 0.169*** 0.355 0.251* 
 (0.027) (0.258) (0.143) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.0000 0.2830 0.2580 
First variant Hausman p-value N/A 0.451 0.591 
Observations 1,728 1,728 1,728 
NOTE: The full instrument set includes random assignment to treatment, the interaction of treatment and baseline 
prices as well as the lagged non-self cluster mean of caregiver’s discounting. All regressions control for a set of 
baseline characteristics including youth age, sex, and schooling, caregiver’s age, sex, and schooling, whether the 
household experienced a covariate shock, and TA of residence. Regressions also controlled for week of interview 
to account for potential seasonality issues.  Standard errors, clustered at the level of randomization, are shown in 
parentheses below the coefficient. Wild bootstrapping p-values for the impact coefficient (1000 reps, H0=0). *** 







Tables for Subgroup Analyses 
Table 2.8. IV Estimates of the Relationship between Youth's and Caregiver's Discounting by Youth Sex  











Caregiver Discount Rate -0.337 0.064 0.336** 
 (0.528) (0.152) (0.158) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.6080 0.7720 0.0340 
Caregiver Discount Rate x Male 0.375 -- -- 
 (0.370) -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.4150 -- -- 
Observations 1,728 920 808 
NOTE: All models estimated using 2SLS. Those in column 1 are run with interactions terms in a single 
regression while those in columns 2 and 3 are run separately by youth sex. Instruments include random 
assignment to treatment (Column 1), and treatment, the interaction of treatment and baseline prices as 
well as the lagged non-self cluster mean of caregiver’s discounting (Columns 2 and 3). All regressions 
control for a set of baseline characteristics including youth age, sex, and schooling, caregiver’s age, sex, 
and schooling, whether the household experienced a covariate shock, and TA of residence. Regressions 
also controlled for week of interview to account for potential seasonality issues.  Standard errors, clustered 
at the level of randomization, are shown in parentheses below the coefficient. Wild bootstrapping p-values 







Table 2.9. IV Estimates of the Relationship between Youth's and Caregiver's Discounting by Youth Age 















































Caregiver Discount Rate 0.319 0.453** 3.652 0.247** -0.019 0.351** 0.178 -0.005 0.283* 0.023 0.156 -0.156 
 (0.243) (0.221) (7.935) (0.124) (0.249) (0.151) (0.134) (0.211) (0.165) (0.152) (0.228) (0.226) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.3020 0.0770 0.4320 0.1140 0.9510 0.1980 0.2630 0.9890 0.3400 0.9140 0.6450 0.6520 
Caregiver Discount Rate  
x Age 17-19 
0.119 0.091 0.683 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
(0.081) (0.097) (1.504) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.1970 0.3670 0.5330 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Caregiver Discount Rate 
 x Age 20-22 
0.127 0.096 1.026 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
(0.117) (0.137) (2.961) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.2850 0.5030 0.6000 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Observations 1,728 1,556 172 697 718 313 630 652 274 67 66 39 
 NOTE: All models estimated using 2SLS. Those in columns 1-3 are run with interactions terms in a single regression while those in columns 4-12 are run 
separately stratified by when youth entered the household and age groups. Regressions associated with columns 1, and 4-6 include the full analytical sample of 
youth while those for columns 2, and 7-9 include only youth who have resided in the household since baseline. Columns 3, and 10-12 are include only youth 
who have entered the household since baseline data collection. Instruments include random assignment to treatment (Columns 1-3), and treatment, the interaction 
of treatment and baseline prices as well as the lagged non-self cluster mean of caregiver’s discounting (Columns 4-12). All regressions control for a set of 
baseline characteristics including youth age, sex, and schooling, caregiver’s age, sex, and schooling, whether the household experienced a covariate shock, and 
TA of residence. Regressions also controlled for week of interview to account for potential seasonality issues. Standard errors, clustered at the village cluster 








Table 2.10. IV Estimates of the Relationship between Youth's and Caregiver's Discounting by Youth Age and Gender 































Caregiver Discount Rate 0.362 0.229 -0.032 -0.303 0.041 0.208 0.215 0.556*** 
 (0.452) (0.208) (0.154) (0.194) (0.136) (0.198) (0.205) (0.125) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.4940 0.3350 0.9060 0.2720 0.9080 0.2700 0.7140 0.0450 
Caregiver Discount Rate  
x Age 17-19 
0.019 0.225* -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 (0.104) (0.133) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.8490 0.1310 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Caregiver Discount Rate  
x Age 20-22 
0.147 0.082 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 (0.174) (0.170) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.3780 0.6280 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Observations 920 808 368 379 173 329 339 140 
NOTE: All models estimated using 2SLS. Those in column 1 are run with interactions terms in a single regression while those in columns 2 
and 3 are run separately by youth sex. Instruments include random assignment to treatment (Columns 1 and 2), and treatment, the interaction 
of treatment and baseline prices as well as the lagged non-self cluster mean of caregiver’s discounting (Columns 3-8). All regressions control 
for a set of baseline characteristics including youth age, sex, and schooling, caregiver’s age, sex, and schooling, whether the household 
experienced a covariate shock, and TA of residence. Regressions also controlled for week of interview to account for potential seasonality 
issues.  Standard errors, clustered at the village cluster level, are shown in parentheses below the coefficient. Wild bootstrapping p-values for 








Table 2.11. IV Estimates of the Relationship between Youth's and Caregiver's Discounting by Caregiver Sex and Caregiver-Youth 
Gendered Pairs 





Full Instrument Set 
 Males Females 

















Caregiver Discount Rate 0.365 0.241 0.190 0.148 -0.160 0.328** 0.446*** 0.113 
 (0.243) (0.264) (0.150) (0.210) (0.179) (0.153) (0.131) (0.197) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.2140 0.5100 0.3350 0.6420 0.5570 0.1660 0.0520 0.7160 
Caregiver Discount Rate x Female Caregiver -0.005 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 (0.108) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.9650 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Caregiver Discount Rate x Female-Male Pair -- 0.293*** -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 -- (0.079) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value -- 0.0030 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Caregiver Discount Rate x Male-Female Pair -- 0.182 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 -- (0.192) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value -- 0.3710 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Caregiver Discount Rate x Male-Male Pair -- 0.150 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 -- (0.234) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value -- 0.5740 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Observations 1,728 1,728 179 66 113 1,549 742 807 
NOTE: All models estimated using 2SLS. Those in column 1 are run with interactions terms in a single regression while those in columns 2 and 3 are 
run separately by youth sex. Instruments include random assignment to treatment (Columns 1 and 2), and treatment, the interaction of treatment and 
baseline prices as well as the lagged non-self cluster mean of caregiver’s discounting (Columns 3-8). Columns 3 and 5 restrict the sample by the sex of 
the caregiver. Columns 4, 5, 7, and 8restrict the sample by caregiver-youth gendered pairs. For example, Column 4 presents coefficients for female youth 
with male caregivers. All regressions control for a set of baseline characteristics including youth age, sex, and schooling, caregiver’s age, sex, and 
schooling, whether the household experienced a covariate shock, and TA of residence. Regressions also controlled for week of interview to account for 
potential seasonality issues.  Standard errors, clustered at the village cluster level, are shown in parentheses below the coefficient. Wild bootstrapping p-






Table 2.12. IV Estimates of the Relationship between Youth's and Caregiver's Discounting by Youth-Caregiver Relationship 















Caregiver Discount Rate 0.354 0.337** 0.527*** 0.529*** 0.029 
 (0.257) (0.134) (0.194) (0.139) (0.168) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.2740 0.1200 0.1120 0.1130 0.8990 
Caregiver Discount Rate x Grandchild 0.070 -- -- -- -- 
 (0.161) -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.6660 -- -- -- -- 
Caregiver Discount Rate x Niece/Nephew -0.012 -- -- -- -- 
 (0.204) -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.9920 -- -- -- -- 
Caregiver Discount Rate x Other Relation -0.019 -- -- -- -- 
 (0.242) -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.9480 -- -- -- -- 
Observations 1,728 1,017 567 45 99 
NOTE: All models estimated using 2SLS. Those in column 1 are run with interactions terms in a single regression while those in columns 2 -5 are run 
separately by youth’s relationship to the caregiver. Instruments include random assignment to treatment (Column 1), and treatment, the interaction of 
treatment and baseline prices as well as the lagged non-self cluster mean of caregiver’s discounting (Columns 2-5). All regressions control for a set of 
baseline characteristics including youth age, sex, and schooling, caregiver’s age, sex, and schooling, whether the household experienced a covariate 
shock, and TA of residence. Regressions also controlled for week of interview to account for potential seasonality issues. Standard errors, clustered at 
the village cluster level, are shown in parentheses below the coefficient. Wild bootstrapping p-values for the impact coefficient (1000 reps, H0=0). *** 







Table 2.13. Descriptive Statistics for Socialization Measures 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Median 
PSSS Index 1,728 15.40 3.62 16 
PSSS Score 1,728 3.85 0.91 4 
Family tries to help me 1,728 0.71 0.45  
I get support I need from family 1,728 0.63 0.48  
I can talk to my family about my problems 1,728 0.78 0.41  
Family will help me make decisions 1,728 0.71 0.46  
No. family members regularly interact with 1,728 6.99 5.24  









Table 2.14. IV Estimates of the Influence of Socialization on the Intergenerational Transmission of Time Discounting 





Full Instrument Set 
 (1) 
High PSSS (≥4) 
(2) 
Low PSSS (<4) 
(3) 
Caregiver Discount Rate 0.370 0.167 0.179 
 (0.259) (0.146) (0.225) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.2690 0.4680 0.5620 
Caregiver Discount Rate x High PSS Scale Score -0.049 -- -- 
 (0.077) -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.5460 -- -- 
Observations 1,728 950 778 
NOTE: All models estimated using 2SLS. Those in column 1 are run with interactions terms in a single regression while those in 
columns 2 and 3 are run separately by youth’s PSS scale score. Instruments include random assignment to treatment (Column 1), 
and treatment, the interaction of treatment and baseline prices as well as the lagged non-self cluster mean of caregiver’s discounting 
(Columns 2 and 3). All regressions control for a set of baseline characteristics including youth age, sex, and schooling, caregiver’s 
age, sex, and schooling, whether the household experienced a covariate shock, and TA of residence. Regressions also controlled for 
week of interview to account for potential seasonality issues. Standard errors, clustered at the village cluster level, are shown in 
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CHAPTER 3:  INCOME SHOCKS AND PARTNERSHIP FORMATION: EVIDENCE 
FROM MALAWI 
Introduction 
The average global temperature has been steadily increasing over the past few decades 
with the past three years being the hottest on record, and temperatures now a full degree 
(Celsius) higher than pre-industrial levels (Carty, 2017; NASA, n.d.). The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change expects an increase in the incidence of environmental disasters and the 
variability of rainfall and temperature (2013). Accordingly, global warming and its associated 
climate-related changes are increasingly straining agricultural societies across the globe as 
fluctuations in rainfall, temperature, and extreme weather events continuously reduce crop yields 
(Thornton et al., 2011; Dell, Jones & Olken, 2012; IPCC, 2014; Bernauer et al., 2015; Ray et al., 
2015; Rozenberg & Hallegatte, 2015; FAO, 2016; IMF, 2017; Carty, 2017). Currently 34% of all 
working individuals in low- and middle-income countries are employed in the agricultural sector 
(World Bank, 2018). In comparison, the agricultural sector employs approximately 55% in all of 
Sub-Saharan Africa with about 42% of total land area being devoted to agriculture in Sub-
Saharan Africa. As such, the Sub-Saharan Africa region is considered one of the most vulnerable 
regions in the world in regards to the effects of climate change as rain-fed crops account for over 
95% of all crop production (FAO, 2008; IPCC, 2014; Niang, et al., 2014; Bernauer et al.,2015; 
Rozenberg & Hallegatte, 2015; Serdeczny et al., 2016; Carty, 2017). More specifically, 
smallholder farms relying on subsistence agriculture are most at risk as they often lack the 
resources to cope with and recover from such weather-related shocks. For instance, adverse 
weather-related events such as droughts and floods can reduce household incomes, increase food 
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insecurity, result in livestock disease and death, and increase risks to human health through 
increased exposure to pathogens and the expansion of transmission zones for malaria, for 
example (IPCC, 2007, 2014; FAO, 2008, 2016). This trend in climate-related shocks and their 
associated impact on the livelihoods of individuals, particularly those in rural areas of Sub-
Saharan Africa, has induced researchers to pay more attention to such shocks and has led to the 
increased incorporation of weather-related shocks in research examining their impacts and 
influences on these vulnerable populations.  
Poor households, especially those without access to credit, are substantially burdened by 
the occurrence of negative shocks, and often resort to extreme coping mechanisms such as 
altering their food intake due to the inability to smooth consumption. Most of these coping 
strategies result in the household or some of its members being worse off than before the shock, 
and may even make the household more vulnerable to the next shock. Previous studies have 
found that households hit with negative shocks respond by reducing food diversity and caloric 
intake (Bhattacharya et al, 2003; Macani & Yang, 2009), removing children from school 
(Ferreira & Schady, 2009), working more jobs and/or longer hours (Kochar, 1995, 1999), selling 
assets including livestock (Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1993), and marrying off daughters (Corno & 
Voena, 2015; Gong, de Walque & Dow, 2015; Corno, Hildebrandt, & Voena, 2017; Hoogeveen, 
Van der Klaauw & Van Lomwel, 2011). This current study is specifically focused on households 
using marriage of a child as a coping strategy.  
Households which opt to marry off daughters as a coping mechanism often rely on child 
marriage (marriage of an individual under age 18) and bride price for help with consumption 
smoothing when they otherwise have few options (Lafraniere, 2005; Hoogeveen, Van der 
Klaauw & Van Lomwel, 2011; Corno & Voena, 2016; Corno, Hildebrandt, & Voena, 2017). 
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When a family marries off a daughter, they not only benefit by reducing the number of 
individuals in the household which factor into their resource allocations, but also by obtaining an 
inflow of income or assets in the form of a bride price from the groom’s family. This double gain 
usually provides the household with greater utility, at least in the immediate future, than 
supporting the human capital of their daughter or soliciting her to work on the family farm. Until 
the underlying determinants of child marriages are rectified, and households have another 
mechanism to use when faced with debilitating income shocks and poverty, child marriage is an 
issue that cannot be ignored (Batha, 2015). While marrying off a daughter may financially assist 
the family in the short-term, it has long-term complications for the daughter such as limiting her 
schooling and ultimately her economic opportunities, negatively affecting her health through 
early pregnancies, lower utilization of healthcare, and limited agency to discuss family planning 
strategies (Corno & Voena, 2016; Field & Ambrus, 2008; Jensen & Thornton, 2003).  
Relatedly, individuals are similarly induced to alter their behaviors due to shocks. 
Adolescent girls often bear the burden of such individual-level coping strategies and have been 
found to be more likely to engage in risky behaviors (Burke, Gong & Jones, 2011; Dinkelman, 
Lam & Leibbrandt, 2008; Robinson & Yeh, 2011). Transactional sexual relations are often 
viewed as an insurance mechanism for young girls against shocks; maintaining such a 
relationship affords girls a sense of financial stability in that their partners are able to provide 
school fees, cellphones, cash or other gifts when their family becomes unable to do so (Dunkle et 
al., 2004; Luke, 2003; Moore, Biddlecom & Zulu, 2007; Robinson & Yeh, 2011). However, 
transactional sexual relationships have been shown to be key contributing factors to the spread of 
HIV as girls often opt for older partners who are more able to provide gifts and favors. Older 
partners are also more likely to be infected, and transmission of HIV is increased as condoms use 
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is lower and because of girl’s lower agency in such relationships (Hallman, 2004; Haram, 1995; 
Leclerc-Madlala, 2003; LoPiccalo, Robinson & Yeh, 2012; Luke, 2003; Meekers & Calves, 
1997; Nzyuko et al., 1997; Poulin, 2007; UNAIDS, 2010).  
As mentioned, a wide body of literature has been generated in the recent decades 
exploring the link between negative shocks and various perceived negative outcomes and 
behaviors. While many studies have been conducted on these topics across the developing world, 
most focus exclusively on weather-related shocks such as rainfall and droughts (which remain 
relatively exogenous in nature) and economic outcomes (e.g., agriculture, income and wealth, 
migration, labor markets, and conflict) (e.g., Miguel, Satyanath & Sergenti, 2004; Dell, Jones & 
Olken, 2012; Thiede, 2014; Wodon, Liverani & Joseph, 2014; Bernauer , et al., 2015; Strobl & 
Valfort, 2015; Wodon, Liverani & Joseph, 2014; Anglewicz & Myroniuk, 2018). Although a few 
have ventured to look at the effects of shocks on sexual behaviors and partnership formation, 
they still limit their exploration of shocks to rainfall/drought and food insecurity – a by-product 
of rainfall/drought shocks (Burke, Gong & Jones, 2011; Hoogeveen, van der Klaauw & van 
Lomwel, 2011; Gong, de Walque & Dow, 2015, Corno & Voena, 2015; Corno, Hildebrandt & 
Voena, 2017). This narrow focus on weather-related shocks limits the scope of understanding of 
comprehensive dynamics as households face a variety of shocks, in response to which they may 
respond differently. Anglewicz & Myroniuk (2018) is one of the only studies known to the 
author that explores a wider range of shocks in their analysis of the effect of shocks on migration 
in Malawi, looking separately at what they classify as environmental/economic shocks (poor 
crop yield, changes in the price of grain, and damage to houses du to fire or flood) and family 




Therefore, this paper seeks to add to the growing body of literature on the effect of 
shocks on behaviors at the household- and individual-level by providing empirical evidence of 
how shocks influence partnership formation, with a specific focus on marriage. I use data from 
the Marriage Transitions in Malawi (MTM) project which follows a cohort of never married 
youth at baseline, over a three-year period, from 2007 to 2009, in rural Malawi. The study 
targeted youth aged 13 to 26 at baseline that would likely transition into marriage over the course 
of the project, and collected substantial information on youths’ relationships, sexual activity, as 
well as experience of shocks. Exploiting the longitudinal nature of the study, I look primarily at 
the likelihood of getting married or engaged to be married for both males and females based on 
the experience of various types of negative shocks the previous year. Further, I examine whether 
there are differences between those in tribes ascribing to matrilineal compared to patrilineal 
lineage systems using models with village fixed effects (FEs) and individual FEs. In matrilineal 
systems, husbands typically move into the wife’s village and bride price is a rare practice. In 
patrilineal systems, wives move into their husband’s village and a bride price is commonly 
exchanged. Therefore, shocks should differentially affect individuals based on their lineages 
system. Overall, I do find evidence of the lineage system strongly influencing the relationship 
between shocks and marriage outcomes. Patrilineal females are more likely to get married in the 
face of a shock as compared to matrilineal females, suggesting that both shocks and lineage 
systems play a role in household decision-making in regards to youths’ marriage outcomes. 
Conversely, the opposite is true for males – they are more likely to get married if they are from 
matrilineal households when faced with a shock, as compared to patrilineal households. To 
provide supplemental evidence, I additionally examine the likelihood of entering into 
transactional sexual relationships and dating partnerships. Similar trends are found for those 
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beginning both types of relationships after their household experiences a shock. For each 
analysis, I look at differences by in-school status at baseline as this is one of the most significant 
individual-level determinants of marriage over the panel period. Associations for marriage are 
strongest for out of school females while those for transactional sexual relationships are stronger 
for those in school.  
Child marriage, a common practice in much of the world, disproportionately affects girls 
and has been shown to limit their productive capabilities and increase their risks for HIV, 
maternal mortality, and intimate partner violence (IPV) (for instance, Nour, 2006; UNICEF, 
2013; Steiner, Yager & Lee, 2017; Wodon et al., 2017).16 Unfortunately, scant evidence exists 
identifying potential means to reduce the prevalence of such unions. Accordingly, the results 
from this study aim to fill a gap related to this dearth of knowledge by providing suggestive 
evidence of probable pathways to reduce the incidence of child marriage. Specifically, the 
evidence indicates that programs intended to help households cope with losses suffered due to 
negative shocks may have implications which extend beyond consumption smoothing to affect 
youth transitions. As such, it is hoped that the findings in this paper inspire future research 
efforts as well as programs aimed at reducing the incidence of child marriage via household 
economic strengthening.  
Marriage in Malawi 
Marriage in Malawi is near universal. The majority of the population (approximately 
98%) gets married at some point in their life with most first marriages occurring before the age 
of 20 for females (Reniers, 2003; DHS, 2004; Palamuleni, 2011; Batha, 2015; Cherchye et al., 
                                                          
16Child marriage is defined as marrying before the age of 18 (UNICEF, 2017).  
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2016). A UNFPA survey (2012) found that over half of Malawi’s girls were married before the 
age of 18, and subsequently ranked the country eighth out of the twenty countries with the 
highest rates of child marriage. More recently, UNICEF’s 2016 State of the World’s Children 
report touts that 46% of all marriages in Malawi from 2008-2014 involved a girl aged 18 or 
younger. Even though Malawi has started the process of annulling child marriages and passed 
the Marriage, Divorce, and Family Relations Bill in 2015 making the legal age of marriage 18, 
this problem is not likely to disappear any time soon. It is difficult to disseminate such policy 
information and enforce it in rural areas, and these changes do not necessarily apply to 
customary marriages which are often outside the scope of the government’s purview. Overall, 
marriages in Malawi tend to be predominantly monogamous relationships. While polygyny is not 
illegal, it is rarely practiced. Moreover, marriage tends to be relatively local with partners being 
selected from within the same village in 45% of marriages or the same district in another 25% of 
marriages (Sear, 2008). In fact, on average, most partners reside within 5 km of each other prior 
to marriage (Batha, 2015; Kapulula, 2015; Cherchye et al., 2016).  
Malawi again tops the charts with one of the highest divorce rates in all of Africa at 40-
65% (Cherchye et al., 2016). Such high rates are mostly a factor of the predominance of 
matrilineal societies in the country. Existing most prevalently in the Southern region, these 
matrilineal communities are characterized by uroxilocal residence after marriage whereby the 
husband moves to live with or near the bride’s family (Phiri, 1983; Berge et al., 2014; Kapulula, 
2015; Chae, 2016). Additionally, the tradition of bride price is less common in these societies, 
and landholdings, inheritance, and lineage all pass through the woman’s family so that the 
woman seemingly has more power – at least by proxy of the men in her bloodline. Thus, 
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marriages among these groups are seen as less formal making the process of divorce relatively 
easy as the transaction costs are much lower (Reniers, 2003).  
Conversely, the Northern region is comprised of primarily patrilineal tribes observing the 
tradition of bride price and practicing virilocal residence after marriage where the couple lives 
with or near the husband’s family (Phiri, 1983; Palamuleni, 2011; Berge et al., 2014; Chae, 
2016). In patrilineal societies, a marriage is considered customarily valid once the bride price has 
been fully paid (Mwambene, 2005). As such, divorce rates in this region tend to be lower as the 
bride’s family must repay this gift at the dissolution of the marriage. Moreover, the husband and 
his family have full domain over the family’s landholdings and the rights to the children from the 
union. The combination of such factors encourages women to stay with their husbands in 
patrilineal societies.  
The Central region of Malawi serves as a mixing ground for these two societies whereby 
both matrilineal and patrilineal systems are observed. Home to the largest ethnic group in 
Malawi, the Chewa, the Central region is often thought to be mostly matrilineal in nature 
(Palamuleni, 2011). However, due partly to the increased interaction with other tribes in the 
region, this delineation has become less clear with the traditional systems of the Chewa people 
resembling patrilineal societies more and more over the years. Over the past few decades, Chewa 
men have found ways to circumvent the strict matrilineal customary marriage rules by engaging 
in cross-cousin marriages, selecting a wife from within their own village, or striking a deal with 
the wife’s family to move to the husband’s village after an initial period of uxorilocal (Phiri, 
1983). In fact, the National Statistics Office (2010) reported that while Salima, the main district 
of the current study in the Central region, is majority matrilineal, only about 57% of households 
are matrilineal and practice uxorilocal residence whereas 36% are matrilineal but subscribe to 
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virilocal residence. The remaining 7% of the population in this district follow strictly patrilineal 
traditions. As such, while the Northern and Southern regions each maintain relatively strict 
adherence to their formal lineage systems, changes are blurring the lines among the various 
tribes residing in the Central region.  
Conceptual Framework 
Household decision making in the developing country context is often modeled in the 
economics literature according to the household production functions developed and detailed by 
Strauss & Thomas (1995) and Behrman & Deolalikar (1988), for example. Such models posit 
that decision making is a function of the household’s productive capabilities subject to their 
budget constraints. As such, they make decisions in the interest of maximizing their utility. 
Additionally, Corno & Voena (2016) present their own formulation of a theoretical model aimed 
at depicting how bride price and child marriage act as consumption smoothers in the presence of 
rainfall shocks for credit constrained households. This paper takes insights gleaned from both 
sets of economic models to situate the present study.  
Specifically, the decision to marry off daughter, i, in household, h, is a function of the 
household characteristics, Xh, (including current income levels), characteristics of the daughter 
(son), Xi, (including age and schooling), and the expected bride price, bih:  
𝑀𝑖ℎ = 𝑓(𝑋ℎ, 𝑋𝑖ℎ, 𝑏𝑖ℎ, 𝑣ℎ, 𝑣𝑖ℎ) 
Bride price itself is typically a function of the daughter’s characteristics as well as other 
exogenous characteristics, vh: 
𝑏𝑖ℎ = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖ℎ, 𝑣ℎ) 
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In regards to this present study, shocks enter into this model through their effect on 
household income – a factor present within Xh. The direction of influence on the decision-
making process depends upon the underlying traditional lineage system of the household. In fact, 
Corno and Voena (2016), using data from Tanzania, find that shocks occurring during a 
woman’s teenage years significantly increase the probability she gets married before age 18, and 
this effect is found to be largest in communities with the highest average bride price. Similarly, 
Corno, Hildebrandt, and Voena (2017) conduct a comparative analysis of the differing effects of 
shocks on marriage by the direction of marriage payments (i.e., bride price versus dowry) and 
find that droughts increased the incidence of marriage and child marriage in bride price societies 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and decreased the incidence for dowry-based societies in India. 
Conversely, for sons, the financial burden imposed by negative shocks operates in the opposite 
direction since their family is tasked with paying a bride price. Therefore, the influence of their 
household’s lineage system on marriage decisions should work in reverse compared to females.   
As discussed, the Central region of Malawi boasts a diverse population composed of 
individuals representing a variety of tribes ascribing to various land tenure, inheritance, and 
lineage systems. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that each group reacts differently to the 
presence of negative income shocks. Following the results of Corno, Hildebrandt, and Voena 
(2017), for patrilineal households, the shock should encourage households to marry off their 
eldest, single daughter in order to receive the bride price as a means of smoothing their 
consumption, and also to reduce the size of the household effectively increasing the household’s 
budget by freeing up resources which would otherwise be devoted to her schooling, healthcare, 
food, etc. For matrilineal households, conversely, it is expected that households would be less 
likely to marry off their daughters since bride price is not a widely followed practice in these 
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societies. These households receive no immediate financial gain from the marriage, and, in fact, 
may effectively reduce their budget constraint if the girl contributes to household labor/income 
generation or due to the household providing a plot of land and/or housing to the new couple.  
Relatedly, one can consider the decision to engage in a transactional sexual relationship 
as a coping mechanism for experiencing a negative shock; however, this would typically be an 
individual decision for the female youth as opposed to a household-level decision unless the 
youth received pressure from their family. In this instance, transactional sex is a function of 
household-level characteristics (especially lineage system and income), as well as individual-
characteristics of the youth and exogenous characteristics: 
𝑇𝑆𝑖ℎ = 𝑓(𝑋ℎ, 𝑋𝑖ℎ, 𝑣𝑖ℎ) 
Again, there are likely discrepancies in reactions between the lineage systems. Due to the 
underlying principles in patrilineal societies, female adolescents residing in such households are 
often seen as wielding less agency and are more often commoditized as her parents essentially 
sell her at marriage at which point she becomes her husband’s property. Therefore, transactional 
relationships lend themselves more readily to women in these communities. Female youth in 
matrilineal societies have relatively more status as inheritance works through their bloodline and 
they are not sold into marriage; thus, they may not be as willing to engage in such relationships, 
which effectively diminish their power. Studies by Ranganathan et al. (2017) and Stoebenau et 
al. (2016) lend support to this notion. The first study looks at transactional sex and women’s 
agency and relays the commonly held belief among young women that having their own 
financial resources greatly improves their bargaining power within sexual relationships and 
allows them to be more financially independent. The latter study reiterates the three underlying 
paradigms emerging from the literature for engaging in such a relationship – for basic needs, for 
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improved social status, and for expressions of love. It could easily be argued that a woman in a 
matrilineal society, in essence, already has a higher social status due to her land rights and 
inheritance compared to those in a patrilineal society, and, similarly, has resources to her name 
which could improve her bargaining power in relationships.  
MTM Project and Study Design 
This study makes use of a unique, public dataset from the MTM project conducted by 
researchers at the World Bank.17 The project aimed to understand the links between 
socioeconomic status, sexual experiences, and the formation and dissolution of relationships for 
adolescents in rural Malawi over a three-year time period (Beegle & Poulin, 2017).   
The MTM project followed a cohort of youth in Salima district who were never-married 
at baseline to map their trajectory into relationships and adulthood. The choice of Salima as the 
study site stemmed from the diversity ethnic groups in the region as well as the high rates of HIV 
infection as a result of the surging HIV/AIDS epidemic (Beegle & Poulin, 2017). Within Salima, 
the data were collected from a stratified random sample of approximately 1,200 never married 
core respondents. The research team first randomly selected 60 enumeration areas (EAs) out of a 
total of 215 in the district, then randomly chose 20 core respondents – 10 males and 10 females – 
from each EA fitting their age eligibility criteria to ensure both that respondents were never 
married and that approximately half would enter into marriage within the three-year study 
period.18  
                                                          
17See https://www.marriage-malawi.com/ for more information on the project and to access data.  
18Using data from the Second Integrated Household Survey (IHS2), the study implementers determined 
the typical age at first marriage in the region and used this to identify the target age range for males (18-
25) and females (15-21) in their study. See Table B.1 in Appendix for the breakdown of the target sample 
and actual sample comparisons.  
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Household surveys and core respondent interviews were administered each year from 
2007 to 2009 with additional partnership interviews conducted six months after each of the first 
two household surveys for a select subsample of core respondents. Core respondents were also 
given HIV tests at various points throughout the study to confirm their status. Additionally, the 
study team administered 74 community-level surveys to identify socioeconomic and cultural 
characteristics of the broader communities. To ensure a high quality of data, and due to the 
nature of migration with new marriages, the research team tracked youth as they moved into new 
households to maintain them in the dataset. Even so, only a little over 85 percent of baseline core 
respondents were re-interviewed at both follow-up rounds resulting in a final, balanced panel 
comprising 1,003 individuals.19 
Data  
Sample 
This current paper will make use of data collected through the main household and core 
respondent surveys: the baseline survey conducted July-September 2007, the midline survey 
from July-September 2008, and the endline survey in July-September 2009. The balanced panel 
of core respondents from all survey rounds is composed of 1,003 individuals – 528 females aged 
13 to 23 at baseline and 475 males aged 14 to 26 at baseline. As mentioned, while there was 
approximately 15% attrition, those lost in follow-up resemble those remaining in the sample in 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics so differential attrition biasing results is not a 
concern (Beegle & Poulin, 2017). See Appendix Table B.2 for details of the attrition analysis for 
this study. 
                                                          
191,090 were reinterviewed at round 2 and 1,048 were reinterviewed in round 3. The principal 
investigators report that there is no evidence of differential attrition (Beegle & Poulin, 2017).  
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Tables B.3-B.5 in the Appendix display how this cohort of youth compares to those in 
nationally representative samples from the 2004 National Survey of Adolescents (NSA) and the 
2004 Second Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) in Malawi, respectively.20 Generally, it 
appears that the MTM sample is fairly comparable to both the NSA and IHS2 on a variety on 
individual and household level characteristics including household socioeconomic status and 
sexual behavior. These samples do appear to differ in regards to their sociodemographic 
characteristics, such as tribe and religion, however, this is to be expected based on geography; 
tribes in Malawi mostly occupy distinct regions with the exception of the Central region (the 
focus of this present study), where there is more diversity. On the whole, these comparisons 
suggest the households in this current study mostly resemble the average Malawian household. 
The few differences are slight so the results from this paper could be generalizable to the other 
rural areas in the country.  
Measures 
In each of the three main survey rounds, core respondents reported their current marital 
status and responded to a variety of questions aimed at eliciting information about current and 
newly formed relationships. Specifically, youth were asked if they currently had a 
boyfriend/girlfriend, had made a promise to marry, or had other sexual partners. Various 
questions pertaining to why the relationship began and/or ended, characteristics of the partner 
(including age and education differences), and, if married or engaged to be married, details 
                                                          
20The NSA survey, part of the Next Generation Project conducted by the NSO and international 
collaborators, was administered to youth aged 12-19 in order to understand their risk factors for HIV 
infection and pregnancy (Munthali et al., 2006). The World Bank, IFPRI, and NSO have conducted 
various iterations of the IHS over the years. The IHS2 is a population-level survey intended to create a 
holistic view of household poverty (NSO, 2004). 
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surrounding the marriage and wedding were also included. From these survey questions, I 
created binary indicators for marriage, transactional sex, and bride price along with continuous 
variables for the value of bride price offered or accepted and partner age and education 
differentials.  
Transactional sex is typically defined as giving or receiving money or gifts in exchange 
for sex but differs from prostitution and commercial sex work as it is not seen as a profession or 
primary income generating activity. Therefore, I create this variable by combining responses to 
multiple survey questions. Specifically, when asked about current relationships and how they 
began, if respondents stated that the relationship started because they wanted gifts, money, or 
they needed assistance, it is coded as a transactional sexual relationship. Although Poulin (2007) 
argues that money is commonly exchanged in all types of premarital relationships in Malawi, she 
goes on to describe how it is widely accepted that the exchange of money or gifts is a clear 
agreement between the couple that sexual relations will ensue. Therefore, I add those individuals 
who reported ever receiving gifts or money from their partners as engaging in transactional sex 
as I feel her argument substantiates rather than refutes the definition of a transactional sexual 
relationship. I am concerned with females, in particular, engaging in potentially risky sexual 
relations out of a perceived economic necessity. It is plausible that a female might not have 
accepted the gifts from her partner and, subsequently, may have waited to engage in sexual 
relations if she had no economic need or desire for the gifts.  Furthermore, since some youth 
were already actively engaged in a such relationships at the time of the baseline survey, I create 
the transactional sex indicator only for newly established relationships to maintain temporal 
precedence in the analysis. 
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Respondents were also asked about the promise of a payment of a bride price. Married 
youth were asked whether there was a promise of gifts (either in cash or in-kind) that their family 
received from (or paid to) their spouse’s family prior to marriage. The promised gifts were 
reported in Kwacha as well as number of livestock. For ease of comparison, I monetized the 
value of the livestock using average costs reported in November 2015 from the endline 
evaluation of the Malawi SCTP (Salima district sample) (Handa et al., 2016). Once an average 
price was obtained, I used the all item monthly rural consumer price index from the Malawi 
National Statistics Office (NSO) to deflate the November 2015 values back to 2008 and 2009 
values depending on survey round.21 
For the shock variables, I used household-level self-reported shock data obtained via the 
household survey. In each round, households were asked whether they had experienced 16 
different shocks in the past year, and thereafter were asked to self-rank the top three most severe 
negative shocks. Additional information was given for each of the three most severe shocks 
including month and year of the shock, though not used in this analysis. Each survey questioned 
households about their experience of 15 inherently negative shocks which can be broadly 
categorized as either covariate (community-level, exogenous) or idiosyncratic (household-level, 
more often endogenous) shocks.  Covariate shocks include: i.) lower crop yields due to drought 
or floods, ii.) crop disease or crop pests, iii.) large fall in sale prices for crops, iv.) large rise in 
price of food. Idiosyncratic shocks include: i.) livestock died or were stolen, ii.) household non-
agricultural business failure, iii.) loss of salaried employment or non-payment of salary, iv.) end 
of regular assistance, aid, or remittances from outside the household, v.) illness or accident of 
                                                          





household member, vi.) death of household head, vii.) death of working member of household, 
viii.) death of other family member, ix.) breakup of the household, x.) theft, xi.) dwelling 
damaged or destroyed. Households were also asked about a birth in the household, but this shock 
is excluded from my analysis due to the ambiguity of its influence. I also categorize shocks 
based on whether they relate to an economic shock (related to agriculture, livestock, household 
business, cash flows, theft, or damage) or family shock (death or illness of family members, or 
breakup of the household). Economic shocks are those which directly affect a household’s 
income and/or assets while a family shock may similarly affect those, but likely to a lesser 
extent. These family shocks may also produce more of a psychological response from household 
members, which may influence the coping mechanisms used to recover from them. Table 3.1 
shows the number and proportion of youth in the analytic sample whose households reported 
experiencing each type of shock at baseline and midline.22   
Lastly, following my hypothesis that associations will differ based on the traditional 
lineage system one belongs to, I create a binary indicator for matrilineal households. To create 
this variable, I use youths’ reported tribe and, in accordance with the literature’s assessment of 
which lineage system tribes in Malawi ascribe to, separate them into matrilineal or patrilineal 
(Palamuleni, 2011; Berge et al., 2014). See Table B.6 in the Appendix for a breakdown of tribes 
by lineage system. 
                                                          
22Since my analysis uses lagged shocks (as described in the following section), shocks reported at baseline 





The basic estimation strategy for this paper is a linear probability model (LPM) using a 
balanced panel of youth surveyed at baseline and both of the follow-up rounds.23 Equation 1 
shows the basic OLS specification: 
(1)       𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑/𝐸𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑖ℎ𝑣𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑣𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑚𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑣 ∗ 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑣𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑚𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑣 +
𝜃𝑿𝑖ℎ𝑣 + 𝛾𝒁ℎ𝑣𝑡 + 𝛿𝑣 + 𝜇ℎ + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝑖ℎ𝑣𝑡 
In this equation, the probability of individual, i, from household¸ h, in village, v, entering into 
marriage or an engagement is modeled as a function of the contemporaneous shock, 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑣𝑡 , 
time-invariant (𝑿𝑖ℎ𝑣) individual level characteristics including age at baseline, sex, whether they 
were attending school at baseline, and whether they have a disability24, along with a vector of 
household characteristics, 𝒁ℎ𝑣𝑡, including an indicator for whether the household belongs to a 
matrilineal lineage system, 𝑚𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑣, and baseline values of household size, the household’s wealth 
index25, whether the youth’s father or mother ever attended school, and an indicator for whether 
the household was labor constrained.26 Additionally, I include 𝛿𝑣 village-level time invariant 
characteristics. I run two different versions of this specification – one in which I use village-level 
                                                          
23Results using the unbalanced panel are consistent with those obtained using the balanced panel and are 
available in the Appendix (Tables B.7-B.10). 
24These are typically minor disabilities defined as having difficulty walking or sweeping. Since women 
are often caretakers of the home, being able to sweep and/or walk to collect water or firewood may 
increase their desirability in the marriage market. Conversely, the inability to undertake such activities 
may reduce their marriage prospects. 
25The wealth index was created using principal component analysis based on a household’s assets (e.g., 
radio, phone, lantern, axe, bed) and dwelling characteristics (e.g., electrified, latrine, permanent roof) at 
baseline.  
26A household is defined as labor constrained if they have a dependency ratio of greater than 3. The 
dependency ratio is the number of those under 18, over 64, or in the prime age range but unable to work, 
divided by the number of able-bodied individuals aged 19-64 in the household. 
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control variables including an indicator for whether the village has its own market and a distance 
index (composed of the village’s distance to key services, a paved road, and Salima center) as 
measures of village isolation and development, and one in which I use village FEs. I prefer the 
model inclusive of the village FEs as it should account for any unobserved, time-invariant 
characteristics of the village which may affect how a household responds to a shock and the 
decision into or away from marriage. This should leave only the differentiation due to household 
characteristics, including the lineal nature of the village, to influence my results. However, 
including village FEs should reduce if not completely remove the potential influence of any 
covariate shocks as these occur at the village level and should, theoretically, affect all households 
in the broader community.  
Given the hypothesized differences in direction and magnitude of effects based on 
lineage system, 𝛽1 represents the coefficient of interest for patrilineal households while 𝛽2 
corresponds to the difference in effect for matrilineal households above and beyond that in 
patrilineal households. In other words, the full effect for matrilineal households is represented by 
𝛽1 + 𝛽2. Standard errors are clustered at the EA level. Finally, as behavioral dynamics are likely 
to differ by sex, I run analyses separately for both females and males.   
While shocks (both covariate and idiosyncratic) are plausibly exogenous, Equation 1 may 
still present identification concerns. Contemporaneous shocks do not allow for clear temporal 
precedence to be established between the explanatory variable and outcome variable. 
Additionally, there is likely a lag between the household experiencing the shock and the 
household implementing coping strategies. Moreover, given the nature of marriage in these 
villages, youth that marry likely change households either moving in with their spouse’s family 
or starting their own household. This results in contemporaneous shocks being insufficient for 
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predicting marriage as this specification would use data regarding shocks for the new household 
not the youth’s parents’ household which is the relationship of interest. A straightforward 
approach to address these concerns is to use lagged shocks in lieu of contemporaneous shocks. 
Lagged shocks will also be independent of future time-varying omitted variables (𝜔𝑡) assuming 
there is no serial correlation. Therefore, equation 2 presents the improved LPM model: 
(2)       𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖ℎ𝑣𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑣(𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑚𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑣 ∗ 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑣(𝑡−1)) + 𝛽3𝑚𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑣 + 𝜃𝑿𝑖ℎ +
𝛾𝒁ℎ𝑣𝑡 + 𝛿𝑣 + 𝜇ℎ + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝑖ℎ𝑣𝑡 
where the shocks are now lagged. While equation 2 accounts for time varying endogeneity, it 
does not address potential time-invariant household level endogeneity. These issues will be 
further discussed in later sections.  
Identical analyses will be run to examine how shocks influence youth’s involvement in 
less formal partnership formation including transactional sexual relationships and dating 
relationships. Moreover, only about one third of the entire youth cohort ever marries by the final 
survey round limiting the ability to run further analyses looking at effects on bride price and 
marriage quality (measured in terms of age and education differentials). Instead, I present 
descriptive comparisons in an attempt identify trends in the data and contextualize the main 
analysis findings.  
Results 
Descriptive Results 
The analytic sample consists of female youth aged 13 to 23 and males aged 14 to 26 at 
baseline. A little over half of all females were attending school at the time of the baseline survey 
while only about a third of males were in school. Since males are older, on average, this could be 
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reflective of more males completing their desired amount of education by the data collection start 
date. Similarly, three-quarters of the males reported being sexually active prior to baseline while 
only about one-third of females reported the same. The majority of youth are of Chewa tribal 
descent (64%), a tribe which typically practices matrilineal traditions. Furthermore, marriage 
outcomes were not uncommon among study youth. As mentioned, about one third married while 
half got either married or engaged between 2007 and 2009 with more females (58%) entering 
such relationships as compared to males (46%).27 Figure 3.1 graphically depicts this difference 
by comparing the probability of marriage or engagement over time by gender. Of the females 
that got married or engaged, 96% belong to matrilineal households while only 4% belong to 
patrilineal households. For males, 95% from matrilineal households got married or engaged and 
5% from patrilineal households, See Table 3.2 for a summary of the proportion of youth by 
lineage system getting married or engaged in each survey round.28 Moreover, 22% of females 
engaged in new transactional sexual relationships by 2009. In addition, there was no lack of 
shocks. Almost 90% of all households reported at least one negative shock at baseline, and, on 
average, households experienced three shocks. Table 3.3 provides a full comparison of 
individual and household characteristics for males and females at baseline.29   
                                                          
27I include engagements along with marriages in my outcome variable because engagements are often the 
first step to marriage. Additionally, youth may not have had ample time between survey rounds to 
officially enter into marriage as it may take some time to find a suitable partner and finalize negotiations 
with both families and village leaders, as necessary. In Malawi, engagements are typically bound with an 
official celebration sanctioned by the village chief and attended by both partners’ family members and 
close friends (Siyabu, 2011). Therefore, engagements serve as a cue for marriages to come.  
28Even though MTM youth were never-married at baseline, some were engaged. These individuals are 
kept in the sample since engagements can vary over time (i.e., youth may end an engagement before 
marriage, or they may be engaged to different people from round one compared to in round two). 
29While the significance of the difference between genders is reported, I would not expect these two 
groups to be equally balanced on every observable characteristic given that the study sample was 
randomized at the EA level and stratified by age and gender.    
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Determinants of Youth Marriage 
Before adding in shocks and the interaction terms, I run a preliminary LPM analysis of 
the determinants of marriage/engagement based on baseline characteristics. Table 3.4 shows that 
currently attending school is found to be a protective factor, regardless of gender, as it 
significantly reduces the likelihood of marriage by about 40 pp for females and about 20 pp for 
males, on average. Figure 2 further illustrates this trend by comparing the likelihood of marriage 
by in-school status for males and females. Furthermore, age is predictive of marriage for youth 
as each additional year is associated with a 4.6 pp increase in the probability of being married or 
engaged, and females are about 4 pp more likely to get married or engaged. Additionally, a 
household’s baseline wealth index has relatively little predictive power for males’ marriage 
outcomes and is insignificant for females’ outcomes, though father’s education is a significant 
predictor of marriage for females.30 Furthermore, the number of other male youth in the 
household aged 14-26 or female youth in the household aged 13-23 (the prime age range for 
getting married in this context) has no predictive ability in determining whether youth marry or 
get engaged.   
Effect of Negative Shocks on Youth Marriage 
Building on the analysis above, Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present the results from the analysis 
looking at the relationship between lagged shocks and marriage outcomes for females and males, 
respectively. For each of these tables, Column 1 reports estimates from the analysis using a LPM 
model with village level control variables, the results in column 2 are from the LPM model using 
village FEs, and columns 3-6 repeat the aforementioned analyses by in-school status at baseline 
                                                          
30This null effect of wealth on marriage remains consistent whether using the continuous wealth index or 
the poorest quintile or quartile compared to everyone else. In this case, a household’s assets may not be a 
good proxy for income, and it is likely the latter is the key influencer in marriage decisions. 
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as schooling was found to be a protective factor in the analysis above. Additionally, each panel 
presents coefficients from a different regression using various definitions of shocks as identified 
in the panel header. In particular, Panel A examines the effect of experiencing any negative 
shock, Panel B disaggregates the effect of a shock by covariate and idiosyncratic shocks, and 
Panel C differentiates the effect between economic and family shocks. I also test effects 
including interactions between the shock subtypes but find my results to be qualitatively similar 
to those excluding the interactions so only present that latter (see Table B.11 in the Appendix for 
results from these models).31 The results in both Tables 3.5 and 3.6 strongly follow the a priori 
hypotheses; it appears that reporting a negative shock in the prior year is significantly associated 
with an increased likelihood of marriage for females in patrilineal societies, and a lower 
likelihood for those in matrilineal societies, and the opposite is true for males, though most 
results are not found to be significant for males. Also, for females, results are strongest for those 
out of school. Since the coefficients are similar between the models using village controls and 
village FE, I will discuss only those from the models using the latter for the remainder of the 
paper. Specifically, any negative shock reported the period before is associated with an increased 
likelihood of marriage for females in patrilineal societies by 38 pp while the influence on 
marriage in matrilineal societies is only about 5 pp, on average (Table 3.5, Panel A, Column 2). 
More specifically, the likelihood of marriage for girls in patrilineal households increased from 
31% to 69%, and from 41% to 46% for those in matrilineal households. The strength of the 
relationship increases to about 61 pp (from 44% to 101%) and 2 pp (from 57% to 59%), 
respectively, for those out of school at baseline (Table 3.5, Panel A, Column 6). Not surprisingly, 
the majority of these relationships appear to be driven by economic shocks with family shocks 
                                                          
31Specifically, I test one model with covariate shocks, idiosyncratic shocks and the interaction between 
them, and another model with economic shocks, family shocks, and the interaction between the two. 
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providing little to no explanatory power (Panel C). Correspondingly, the coefficients mostly 
trend in the opposite direction for males, though few are statistically significant (Table 3.6). This 
is not unexpected given that males may be better able to smooth their consumption by increasing 
their paid labor, delaying marriage until they have accumulated a sufficient bride price, or 
marrying early. A few surprising results of note for males appear in the out of school sample 
experiencing economic shocks; the estimates suggest that those in patrilineal households are 
actually more likely to get married or engaged while those in matrilineal households are less 
likely to do so.   
As mentioned earlier, the results from the LPM model based on equation 2 could be 
biased due to household-level time invariant endogeneity. There is some dispute in the 
economics community regarding whether idiosyncratic shocks are actually exogenous. If not, 
there may be some factor at the household level that affects both the propensity for a household 
to experience shocks as well as their decisions to marry off daughters. For instance, if a 
household is characterized by risk aversion its members may be less likely to engage in 
behaviors that increase the odds of a family member getting ill or dying (e.g., treating their water 
or seeking treatment for an illness), and, similarly, may engage in behaviors that reduce the 
likelihood of the daughter getting married such as not encouraging her to engage in early sexual 
initiation (often seen as preparation for marriage).To address this, I run an individual FE model 
according the following specification: 
(3)       𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖ℎ𝑣𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑣(𝑡−1) + 𝛽2(𝑚𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑣 ∗ 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘ℎ𝑣(𝑡−1)) + 𝜃𝑿𝑖ℎ + 𝛾𝒁ℎ𝑣𝑡 +
𝜋𝑖 + 𝜇ℎ + 𝜔𝑡 + 𝑖ℎ𝑣𝑡 
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where 𝜋𝑖 denotes the individual FE. While the introduction of the individual-level FEs should 
eliminate endogeneity due to individual and household level unobserved characteristics, there 
may not be enough variation within individuals by lineage system to detect an effect with this 
model. Since there were only 48 households in which more than one youth were surveyed, and 
youth move households for various reasons throughout the course of the study, including when 
they enter into marriage, a household FE model is not possible with this data. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 
present results from the individual FE model for females and males, respectively. There are no 
clear trends materializing using this new specification, and the results on the whole suggest no 
associations. In an attempt to further clarify these results, I present a summary table of means by 
sex and in-school status in Tables 3.9 and 3.10. These tables show, for example, that this FE 
analysis is not highly powered to detect effects for all subgroups, particularly in patrilineal 
households, as sample sizes are very small.  There are only 75 females and 87 males in 
patrilineal households, and the number decreases when disaggregating by in-school status (Table 
3.9 and 3.10, Columns 4 and 7). Moreover, it appears the variation in getting married or engaged 
for youth in patrilineal households is larger between waves one and two than between the two 
follow-up rounds. Whereas for youth in matrilineal households, there is still a fairly sizeable 
increase between these latter rounds. The use of lagged shocks results in the models being 
identified off the change in marriage between waves two and three, precisely when the increase 
in marriage rates is larger in matrilineal households. For out of school females, for example, the 
proportion getting married or engaged increases 25 pp between round one and two for matrilineal 
girls (Table 3.9 Column 3, Rows 1 to 2) and 50 pp for patrilineal girls (Column 4, Rows 1 to 2). 
Comparatively, the change between round two and three for matrilineal girls is 13 pp while there 
is no change for patrilineal girls (Rows 2 to 3). Table 3.9, Column 6, Row 2 to 3 shows girls 
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matrilineal households who were in school at baseline exhibit similar changes between the two 
final waves while Column 10, Row 2 to 3 shows there is actually a decrease for girls in 
patrilineal households. This table helps explain the null and sometimes reverse relationships 
produced by the FE model shown in Tables 3.7 and 3.8.  
Overall, the results from Tables 3.5-3.8 suggest that even with small samples, there is still 
enough variation within villages between matrilineal and patrilineal households for the village 
FE model to produce results for all groups. Unfortunately, the individual-level FE model is 
overly restrictive and the variation is reduced such that the model produces null results for 
patrilineal households. Therefore, while the remainder of the paper presents results from both 
models, the village FE model is my preferred model as it maintains some of that variation, and, 
assuming all shocks are plausibly exogenous, still produces unbiased estimates. 
Effect of Negative Shocks on Transactional Sexual Relationships 
To provide supplemental evidence to support the hypothesis that negative shocks are 
indeed inducing behavior changes in regards to partnership formation, I next analyze outcomes 
of transactional sexual relationships. As mentioned, this information is only available for females 
so males are excluded from this analysis. Table 3.11 shows the results for both the LPM models 
(columns 1-6) as well as the FE model (columns 7-9).  
When analyzing the relationship between shocks and engaging in transactional sexual 
relationships, the results align with the a priori hypotheses for any negative shock and economic 
shocks. Panels A and C indicate that females in patrilineal societies are more likely to engage in 
such relationships (14.5 pp) while those in matrilineal societies are less likely to do so (-5 pp). 
As discussed, females in patrilineal societies are more commoditized which may propel them 
into such relationships more frequently than those in matrilineal societies. Unlike results from 
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the marriage analysis, however, these effects are driven by females in school who may be more 
likely to need small gifts to cover school fees and uniform expenses to stay in school. Moreover, 
transactional relationships are likely seen as a relatively ‘quick fix’ for an economic problem, 
and are, therefore, likely to be induced by the first instance of a shock (i.e., a shock between 
rounds one and two). As mentioned above, results from the FE model are identified off only the 
variation in outcomes between rounds two and three which is likely why there are no consistent 
results in Table 3.11.  
Since it is often difficult to disentangle the truth about transactional sexual relationships 
(they may not be correctly reported), I also test for the relationship between shocks and whether 
or not female youth obtained new boyfriends with whom they were sexually active. I use this as 
a proxy to support the transactional sex results. I find that experiencing a negative shock the 
period before increased the likelihood of beginning in a relationship for females in patrilineal 
households by 41.5 pp and by only 6.6 pp for those in matrilineal households (see Table 3.12 
Panel A, Column 2). Again, the results are slightly stronger for those in patrilineal households 
experiencing negative economic shocks (42.9 pp), and strongest for those out of school at 
baseline (66 pp – see Panel C, Column 6). Given that transactional relationships are likely 
underreported, and not all of the newly formed dating partnerships are purely transactional in 
nature, use these results to form an upper and lower bound of the true relationship. Therefore, the 
estimated relationship between any negative shock and transactional sexual relationships for 
females in patrilineal societies is an increased probability of between the bounds of 14.5 and 41.5 
pp. For matrilineal females, the estimated likelihood of engaging in these relationships after a 
negative shock falls between the bounds of -5 and 6.6 pp implying there may, in fact, be no 
association for these households.  
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Comparisons of Bride Price and Marriage Transfers 
While it was the intention of this paper to follow Corno, Hildebrandt & Voena’s (2017) 
analysis of the effect of shocks on bride price amounts, there are few reports of bride price for 
married youth (either from lack of reporting or lack of bride price transactions in their 
marriages). Fewer than 20% of ever married or engaged youth report any bride price – 20% of 
females and 8% of males. Instead, I draw comparisons on the reported mean amounts in Malawi 
Kwacha (MWK) across various subgroups. Table 3.13 provides this comparison of means for 
those that both reported a transfer at marriage and reported an amount (cash and in-kind). Each 
panel corresponds to a different subgroup: Panel A is all females, Panel B is just those females in 
matrilineal households, and Panel C is females in patrilineal households. This table shows 
evidence of the average transfer amount differing significantly between females in households 
who experienced shocks and those who did not with the total bride price exchanged in the former 
group being smaller than in the later. The sample sizes are fairly small (total N=170), especially 
for those from patrilineal households (N=6) deeming the information purely suggestive, but 
illustrative of the hypothesized influence of shocks on household decision-making in regards to 
youths’ marriage outcomes.  
The community level surveys provide some additional contextual information regarding 
the practice of bride price. Of those communities that trace one’s descent solely through their 
father, 71% also reported bride price to be a common practice. When descent works through the 
mother, only 55% of communities reported commonly engaging in bride price transactions at 
marriage. Similarly, 73% of the communities who primarily transfer land through the father and 
59% of those that transfer land through the mother report bride price being a common practice. 
The proportion of those communities with more matrilineal characteristics (i.e., descent and land 
 
93 
transfer through the mother) reporting practicing bride price is somewhat surprising but seems to 
align with the overall trend towards virilocal residence in Malawi (Phiri, 1983).  
Of the 74 communities included in the study, bride price is reported to be a common 
practice in 55% with the average bride price being 6,939 MWK (or roughly US$10) within those 
communities. The mean values in Panels A and B closely align with this community averages. 
When considering all communities regardless of the commonality of bride price, the average 
community-level bride price falls to 3,979 MWK (US$5). Overall, the findings suggest shocks 
may be a defining factor in the value that is offered/accepted in marital agreements. 
Unfortunately, few females in patrilineal societies responded to this subsection of questions, 
which is a function of being a small proportion of the sample and an even smaller portion of the 
followed cohort that entered into marriage. Even so, these findings bode well for future analyses 
examining bride price differences in different lineage societies as a result of shocks.  
Assessment of Marriage Quality 
Another interesting facet of marriage unions is the perceived quality of the marriage as 
measured by age and education differentials; larger disparities have been found to align with 
increased odds of IPV and lower bargaining power for females (UNICEF, n.d.). Again, the small 
sample sizes prohibit a multivariate analysis, but Table 3.14 presents averages for those youth 
getting married or engaged over the course of the project. The average age of marriage for 
females in this sample is 17 years, qualifying over half of all females’ marriages child marriages. 
This is compared to an average age of marriage for males of 21 years. On average, females 
appear to be marrying older men with over 60% reporting an age gap of 5 or more years with 
their spouse. Such an age-disparate relationship is found to increase the incidence of HIV 
infection in young women as well as the likelihood of experiencing IPV (for example, see 
 
94 
Nydegger et al., 2017 and Schaefer et al., 2017). In regards to education gaps, females, on 
average, are one level behind their partners in terms of educational attainment. This implies that 
females with a primary education are marrying males with a secondary level education, on 
average, which can imply power differentials within the household in regards to decision making 
and overall agency. Overall, there are few differences in marriage quality based on in-school 
status, but similar statistics are presented for females in each of these groups in Table 3.15. On 
the whole, both the age gap and education gap among males and their partners is substantially 
lower – all of the means significantly differ from those of females. Taken together, these results 
imply that the females in the sample are marrying older, more educated males outside of the 
MTM sample which, as mentioned, heightens their risk of both HIV infection and IPV, as well 
as other related risks.  
Discussion 
These results suggest that shocks likely play a role in both a household’s decision-making 
as well as an individual’s decision-making when it comes to their youths’ partnership formation. 
The direction of the effect depends most prominently on the type of shock as well as the 
traditional lineage system to which the household belongs. Females are more likely to get 
married or engaged after a negative shock with the relationship being significantly stronger for 
females in patrilineal households compared to those in matrilineal households. Similarly, the 
influence of shocks is stronger for those out-of-school, compared to those who were in-school at 
baseline. The reverse is true for males with larger magnitudes being realized for those in 
matrilineal households and in school at baseline. While any negative shock boasts significant 
influences on marriage outcomes, it is specifically the economic shocks which produce the 
largest influence in all instances.  
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The results from this current study, though larger in magnitude, are comparable in terms 
of the direction of the effect, and the differentials based on the practice of bride price. As 
discussed, Corno, Hildebrandt & Voena (2018) similarly study the effects of shocks on marriage, 
focusing exclusively on droughts and find that draughts increase the hazard into marriage for 
girls in bride price societies by 3% and decrease the hazard by 4% in dowry societies. They 
likewise find discrepancies in bride price amounts based on shocks. Relatedly, Corno & Voena 
(2015) find that in Tanzania (a country whose tribes traditionally practice the custom of bride 
price), experiencing a drought (as measured by a one standard deviation in rainfall) at the age of 
18 is associated with 9.3 pp increase in the probability of marriage for females. They also do not 
find any significant effect for males. Lastly, Hoogeveen, van der Klaauw & van Lomwel (2011) 
show that idiosyncratic shocks related to a household’s livestock wealth are highly predictive of 
marriage while rainfall shocks have a positive though nonsignificant effect on the marriage of a 
daughter in Zimbabwe. Specifically, they find that if a household loses two cows due to an 
unexpected event (e.g., theft), the likelihood that their daughter gets married increases 22%. 
However, all of these studies restrict their analyses to only examine rainfall- and livestock-
related shocks which potentially limits their understanding of the use of child marriage as a 
household coping strategy. 
Similar trends are realized for females engaging in transactional sexual relationships with 
females in patrilineal households being 14.5 pp more likely to engage in such relationships while 
the likelihood of those in matrilineal households reduces by 5 pp. Results of a similar magnitude 
have been found in other studies examining the influence of shocks on risky sexual behavior. 
LoPiccalo, Robinson & Yeh (2012) as well as Robinson & Yeh (2011) find that sex workers in 
Western Kenya increasingly engage in risky behaviors (i.e., unprotected sex and anal sex) with 
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clients in response to health shocks – illness of herself or a household member – by about 20%. 
These acts earn premiums over basic encounters with clients, so are a way for sex workers to 
directly influence their income after experiencing a shock. Similarly, Gong, de Walque & Dow 
(2015) find that negative shocks (defined by food insecurity) in Tanzania increased sexually 
transmitted infections by 36% and resulted in unmarried women being three times more likely to 
report having been paid for sex, and married women reporting higher rates of extramarital sex. 
Likewise, Burke, Gong & Jones (2014) show that rainfall-related income shocks explain up to 
20% of the variation in HIV prevalence across 19 African countries. They go on to test whether 
transactional sexual relationships are driving this increase in disease prevalence and find that 
shocks increased non-spouse sexual partnerships by 10-20%. The similarities in effect sizes 
amongst different populations and in different contexts lends support to the overall effect on 
transactional sexual relationships found here.  
One importation difference being that this paper examines the differential influence on 
shocks by in-school status and I find the influence of negative shocks is stronger for individuals 
in school. It is understandable that females in school, when their households are hit with a 
negative shock, may scramble to find the means to pay for school fees, uniforms, materials, cell 
phones, etc. (Calves et al., 1996; MacPhail & Campbell, 2001; Kaufman & Stavrou, 2002). One 
oft used manner of procuring such things outside of the household while maintaining in-school 
status, is through transactional sexual relationships in which the male partner provides monetary 
or in-kind gifts in exchange for partnership and, most often, sex (Hunter, 2002; Luke, 2003; 
Poulin, 2007). Those who were already out of school, would not likely be in a similar bind, and 
might be more likely to opt into marital arrangements following a negative shock and skip over 
the transactional relationship as a coping mechanism. While the association between shocks and 
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transactional sexual relationships provides supportive evidence of individual coping 
mechanisms, it also provides supplemental evidence to suggest an overall trend towards 
partnership formation, more broadly, as a general coping mechanism undertaken by households 
and individuals alike. Therefore, the results from both the transactional relationship and dating 
analyses may be biased downwards.  
Since sexual activity and behaviors are often viewed as taboo subjects in many 
developing countries, it has proven difficult to disentangle the intricacies of sexual relationships 
to identify their true prevalence or nature (e.g., transactional v. non-transactional). Therefore, it 
is likely that there is underreporting of such relationships in the current data (Luke & Kurz, 
2002; Moore, Biddlecome & Zulu, 2007). Accordingly, I attempt to identify an upper bound by 
examining the relationship between a negative shock and obtaining a boyfriend within the 
following year. The results here are stronger, as expected, than relying solely on reported 
transactional relationships. With regards to beginning a relationship with a boyfriend after a 
shock, both any negative shock and any negative economic shock produce significant results and 
follow the same general pattern as before; females are more likely to enter into them with the 
strongest relationship exhibited for those in patrilineal households and out of school as compared 
to their matrilineal and in school counterparts. Although no a priori hypotheses for dating 
relationships existed, it is possible that finding a partner to date is simply the first step in forming 
a relationship with a future spouse. As such, I would expect to see stronger relationships for 
dating outcomes as compared to marriage outcomes. Relatedly, dating relationships may serve as 
a proxy for transactional relationships as the latter are often underreported. As such, taking the 
difference in the coefficients produced from the model looking at transactional sex and those 
from the model looking at having a boyfriend suggest the true magnitude of the relationship with 
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severe negative shocks falls somewhere between 14.5-41.5 pp for females in patrilineal 
households and -5 to 6.6 pp for females in matrilineal households.  
While the results are promising, this study is not without a few limitations. First, 
researchers have concerns about the accuracy of reports of relationships as studies have found 
respondents are more likely to fail to report marriages or relationships that were short or 
unsuccessful as compared to those that were longer or current (Reniers, 2008; Boileau et al., 
2009; Chae, 2016). Relatedly, the classification of specific partnerships as marriage has similarly 
been found to change over time with those that have ended, where a cash or in-kind bride price 
was never exchanged, or those which did not produce children being less likely to be considered 
a marriage after the fact (Van de Walle, 1993; Chae, 2016). As such, there may be under- or mis-
reporting of relationships in this data. However, the structure of the MTM project, specifically in 
regards to the youth cohort all being never-married at baseline, proves encouraging to reduce 
such occurrences.  
Another measurement concern stems from the blending of the traditional lineage systems 
and customs in Malawi, especially in the Central region. As discussed, this region boasts the 
most diversity out of all the regions both in terms of tribes and lineage systems. Because of that, 
societies have begun to exhibit norms and customs of other nearby societies which makes it more 
difficult to disentangle which practices a household actually follows. This could easily be fixed 
in the future by obtaining more detailed information in surveys relating to marriage in this 
region. For the current study, however, the inclusion of village level FEs should help in netting 
out the consistent community-level differences, leaving the tribe/lineage system of the household 




This paper aimed to fill the gaps in the literature that looks at the relationship between 
shocks and behaviors by expanding the definition of shocks used, focusing on a population of 
rural youth in Malawi, and examining impacts on a more comprehensive array of outcomes from 
sexual behavior to bride price. Moreover, little is known about how to effectively reduce the 
incidence of child marriages across the globe. The results of this paper add to the literature on 
safe transitions to adulthood by providing suggestive evidence of a potential pathway through 
which child marriages may come about. While more data is needed to flesh out some of the 
nuances in regards to lineage systems in Malawi as well as influences on bride price and 
marriage quality, this study provides a starting point for understanding the decision-making 
process for households in rural Malawi. Future research is also needed to determine other types 
of potential programs that would prove beneficial to combating the existence of child marriage, 
age- and education-discrepant marriages, and the reliance on bride price as a coping mechanism. 
It is doubtful that policies such as the Marriage, Divorce, and Family Relations Bill will provide 
enough of a deterrent to the continuation such practices. Therefore, this paper also reinforces the 
need for policies or programs to be put in place to help smooth consumption for households, 
especially those most affected by negative, specifically economic, shocks so they refrain from 
engaging in risky coping strategies. To date only 11 empirical studies meeting systematic review 
quality standards have been published examining interventions’ effects on child marriage, with 
only six finding positive effects in increasing the age at marriage or reducing the proportion of 
child marriages (Kalamar, Lee-Rife & Hindin, 2016). Of those programs that were found to be 
effective, most were economic interventions that focused on reducing the vulnerability of 
households or on removing barriers related to schooling. Results from these studies lend support 
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to the role of cash transfer programs, both unconditional and conditional, in reducing the 
incidence of child marriage as such programs have, on the whole, succeeded in helping 
households cope with shocks and increasing schooling outcomes, especially for girls (for 
example, de Janvry, et al., 2006; Aguila, Kapteyn & Perez-Arce, 2017; Lawlor, Handa & 
Seidenfeld, 2017; World Bank, 2017; Uchiyama, 2018). This study corroborates the finding that 
one mechanism to reduce child marriage is to provide economic support to vulnerable 
households as a means of smoothing consumption and enabling them to better safeguard against 
negative shocks. Future research can continue to fill this knowledge gap by assessing which type 
of program is best suited and most cost-effective for reducing child marriage as a means of 
coping after negative shocks.   
 
101 
Tables and Figures 




 All Male Female P-
value 
of diff. 
All Male Female P-
value 
of diff. 
Negative shock 1,003 0.90 0.91 0.88 0.08 0.90 0.92 0.89 0.07 
Covariate shock 1,003 0.73 0.79 0.69 0.00 0.87 0.90 0.84 0.00 
Drought/Flood* 1,003 0.51 0.57 0.45 0.00 0.67 0.71 0.63 0.00 
Crop disease* 1,003 0.42 0.49 0.35 0.00 0.22 0.19 0.25 0.02 
Large drop in crop 
prices* 
1,003 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.43 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.71 
High price of 
food* 
1,003 0.41 0.43 0.38 0.12 0.68 0.69 0.67 0.41 
Idiosyncratic shock 1,003 0.76 0.79 0.74 0.07 0.68 0.66 0.70 0.18 
Illness of family 
member† 
1,003 0.37 0.40 0.34 0.09 0.36 0.39 0.34 0.07 
Death of family 
member† 
1,003 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.80 0.35 0.32 0.38 0.08 
Household bus. 
failure* 
1,003 0.19 0.22 0.16 0.02 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.25 
Death of 
livestock* 
1,003 0.42 0.43 0.41 0.69 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.63 
Loss of paid 
employment* 
1,003 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.99 
End of 
aid/remittances* 
1,003 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.34 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.09 
Household 
breakup† 
1,003 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.71 
Theft* 1,003 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.84 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.36 
Dwelling 
damaged* 
1,003 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.90 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.02 
Economic shocks 1,003 0.84 0.87 0.82 0.06 0.89 0.91 0.87 0.03 
Family shocks 1,003 0.54 0.56 0.52 0.12 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.38 
Note: Each of the covariate and idiosyncratic shocks also fall under the category of either economic or family shocks. 
*Denotes economic shocks †Denotes family shocks. Bold denotes significance at the alpha=0.05 level. P-values are 
reported from Wald tests on the equality of means of Treatment and Control for each variable. Standard errors are 





































Table 3.2. Summary statistics of marriage and engagement for youth by sex and lineage system 
    




All  Matrilineal Patrilineal All Matrilineal Patrilineal 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
Round One (2007) 0.23 229 0.22 117 0.23 114 0.12 3 0.24 112 0.24 106 0.21 6 
Round Two (2008) 0.40 398 0.43 226 0.43 216 0.40 10 0.36 172 0.37 163 0.31 9 
Round Three (2009) 0.52 523 0.57 302 0.58 292 0.40 10 0.47 224 0.47 210 0.38 11 
Observations 3,009 1,584  1,509 75 1,425 1,338 87 










Table 3.3.  Comparison of core respondent characteristics for analytic sample at baseline  
 N All Male Female P-value of diff. 
Youth Characteristics 
Age 1,003 18.42 20.35 16.68 0.00 
Currently in school 1,003 0.44 0.31 0.56 0.00 
Highest education level      
Preprimary 1,003 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.18 
Primary 1,003 0.69 0.65 0.72 0.02 
Secondary  1,003 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.54 
University  1,003 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.16 
Training college 1,003 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Ever had sex 1,003 0.56 0.76 0.38 0.00 
# sex partners ever 560 2.56 3.22 1.35 0.00 
Had sex last 12 months 1,003 0.39 0.52 0.28 0.00 
# sex partners last 12 months 386 1.50 1.71 1.15 0.00 
Ever gave birth (or fathered child for males) 1,003 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.49 
Household Characteristics 
Tribe 
Yao 1,003 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.71 
Chewa 1,003 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.50 
Other 1,003 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.64 
Religion      
Christian 1,003 0.65 0.66 0.64 0.33 
Muslim 1,003 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.17 
Religion, other 1,003 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.73 
No religion 1,003 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Father any schooling 1,003 0.79 0.81 0.78 0.17 
Mother any schooling 1,003 0.84 0.85 0.82 0.26 
Household size 1,003 6.37 6.45 6.30 0.32 
Own their home 1,003 0.81 0.84 0.79 0.07 
Home electrified 1,003 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.72 








Permanent roofing - not grass 1,003 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.55 
Piped water source 1,003 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.80 
Pump/protected spring source 1,003 0.62 0.64 0.61 0.29 
Unprotected well/spring/reservoir 1,003 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.28 
Other water source 1,003 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.94 
Flush toilet 1,003 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.32 
Latrine style toilet 1,003 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.99 
Has no toilet 1,003 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.64 
Demographic Composition 
# age 0-5 1,003 0.76 0.70 0.82 0.05 
# age 6-11 1,003 1.09 1.07 1.10 0.70 
# age 12-17 1,003 1.43 1.18 1.65 0.00 
# age 18-23 1,003 1.13 1.51 0.78 0.00 
# age 24-64 1,003 1.73 1.75 1.72 0.55 
# age 65+ 1,003 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.74 
# females aged 13-23 1,003 1.14 0.69 1.53 0.00 
# males aged 14-26 1,003 1.18 1.79 0.64 0.00 
Total # siblings 1,003 1.27 1.39 1.17 0.02 
Total # male siblings 1,003 0.51 0.62 0.42 0.00 
Total # female siblings 1,003 0.51 0.62 0.42 0.00 
Dependency ratio 990 1.54 1.18 1.88 0.00 
Labor constrained (dep. ratio >3) 1,003 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.00 
Note: Bold denotes significance at the alpha=0.05 level. P-values are reported from Wald tests on the equality of means of 










Table 3.4. LPM results of the baseline determinants of marriage/engagement for balanced panel by sex 
 Dependent Variable: Marriage/engagement 
 Females Males 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Matrilineal 0.008 0.022 0.0002 0.007 
 (0.059) (0.065) (0.057) (0.064) 
Age (years) 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.049*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
In school -0.407*** -0.393*** -0.227*** -0.197*** 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.035) (0.040) 
Have disability 0.038 0.053 -0.019 -0.017 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.049) (0.055) 
Household size -0.001 -0.005 0.010 0.013* 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Wealth index 0.005 0.003 -0.040** -0.041 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.026) 
Father any schooling 0.098*** 0.081** 0.037 0.043 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.040) (0.044) 
Mother any schooling 0.023 0.006 -0.041 0.004 
 (0.035) (0.042) (0.049) (0.057) 
Labor constrained 0.0001 -0.016 -0.103 -0.115 
 (0.031) (0.035) (0.079) (0.090) 
No. females aged 13-23 0.01     
 (0.021)     
No. males aged 14-26   0.00386  
   (0.0386)  
Village controls X -- X -- 
Village FE -- X -- X 
Observations 1,584 1,584 1,425 1,425 
R-squared 0.230 0.277 0.109 0.173 
Note: Coefficients are from LPM models run separately for males and females. All controls are included in the 
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Table 3.5. LPM estimates for balanced panel of relationship between shocks and 
marriage/engagement for females 
       
 Dependent variable: Married/engaged 
 Total In school Out of school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Any negative shock             


























Panel B: Covariate and idiosyncratic shocks        




















































Panel C: Economic and family shocks        




















































Village controls X -- X -- X -- 
Village fixed effects -- X -- X -- X 
Observations 1,056 1,056 588 588 468 468 
Note: Each column-panel pair represents a separate analysis. All regressions use lagged shocks and 
control for youth age, whether the youth has a disability, and whether the household is matrilineal as 
well as baseline household characteristics including household size, wealth index, parents’ schooling, 
and whether the household is labor constrained. Additionally, the first two columns also control for 
youth’s in-school status. Standard errors clustered at the EA level are shown in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.6. LPM estimates for balanced panel of relationship between shocks and 
marriage/engagement for males 
       
 Dependent variable: Married/engaged 
 Total In school Out of school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Any negative shock             


























Panel B: Covariate and idiosyncratic shocks        




















































Panel C: Economic and family shocks        




















































Village controls X -- X -- X -- 
Village fixed effects -- X -- X -- X 
Observations 950 950 290 290 660 660 
Note: Each column-panel pair represents a separate analysis. All regressions use lagged shocks and 
control for youth age, whether the youth has a disability, and whether the household is matrilineal 
as well as baseline household characteristics including household size, wealth index, parents’ 
schooling, and whether the household is labor constrained. Additionally, the first two columns also 
control for youth’s in-school status. Standard errors clustered at the EA level are shown in 




Table 3.7. Individual-level FE estimates for balanced panel of relationship between shocks and 
marriage/engagement for females 
    
 Dependent variable: Married/engaged 
 Total In school Out of school 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Any negative shock       












Panel B: Covariate and idiosyncratic shocks     
























Panel C: Economic and family shocks      
























Observations 1,056 588 468 
Note: Each column-panel pair represents a separate analysis. All regressions use lagged shocks and 
control for youth age, whether the youth has a disability, and whether the household is matrilineal 
as well as baseline household characteristics including household size, wealth index, parents’ 
schooling, and whether the household is labor constrained. Additionally, the first two columns also 
control for youth’s in-school status. Standard errors clustered at the EA level are shown in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.8. Individual-level FE estimates for balanced panel of relationship between 
shocks and marriage/engagement for males 
    
 Dependent variable: Married/engaged 
 Total In school Out of school 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Any negative shock       












Panel B: Covariate and idiosyncratic shocks     
























Panel C: Economic and family shocks      
























Observations 475 145 330 
Note: Each column-panel pair represents a separate analysis. All regressions use lagged shocks and 
control for youth age, whether the youth has a disability, and whether the household is matrilineal 
as well as baseline household characteristics including household size, wealth index, parents’ 
schooling, and whether the household is labor constrained. Additionally, the first two columns also 
control for youth’s in-school status. Standard errors clustered at the EA level are shown in 









Table 3.9. Summary statistics of marriage and engagement for female youth by lineage system, and in-school status 




Out of School In School 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
Round One (2007) 0.22 117 0.36 85 0.36 84 0.17 1 0.11 32 0.12 30 0.11 2 
Round Two (2008) 0.43 226 0.61 143 0.61 140 0.67 4 0.28 83 0.27 76 0.37 7 
Round Three (2009) 0.58 302 0.73 173 0.74 169 0.67 4 0.44 129 0.45 123 0.32 6 
Observations   1,584   702   684   18   882   825   57 
 
 
Table 3.10. Summary statistics of marriage and engagement for male youth by lineage system, and in-school status 
               
           
 Males 
           
 
All 
Out of School In School            





Matrilineal Patrilineal            


















N            
Round One (2007) 0.24 112 0.29 95 0.29 92 0.20 3 0.12 17 0.11 14 0.21 3            
Round Two (2008) 0.36 172 0.45 149 0.45 141 0.53 8 0.16 23 0.17 22 0.07 1            
Round Three (2009) 0.47 221 0.59 194 0.59 186 0.53 8 0.19 27 0.18 24 0.21 3            
Observations   1,425   990   945   45   435   393   42            
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Table 3.11. LPM and Individual FE estimates for balanced panel of relationship 
between shocks and transactional sex for females  
 Dependent variable: Transactional sexual relationship 
 LPM Model  
 Total In school Out of school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Any negative shock             


























Panel B: Covariate and idiosyncratic shocks        




















































Panel C: Economic and family shocks        




















































Village controls X -- X -- X -- 
Village fixed effects -- X -- X -- X 
Observations 1,036 1,036 578 578 458 458 
Note: Each column-panel pair represents a separate analysis. All regressions use lagged shocks and 
control for youth age, whether the youth has a disability, and whether the household is matrilineal 
as well as baseline household characteristics including household size, wealth index, parents’ 
schooling, and whether the household is labor constrained. Additionally, Columns 1, 2, and 7 also 
control for youth’s in-school status. Standard errors clustered at the EA level are shown in 




Table 3.11. LPM and Individual FE estimates for balanced panel of relationship between 
shocks and transactional sex for females (cont.) 
 Dependent variable: Transactional sexual relationship 
 FE Model 
 Total In school Out of school 
 (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Any negative shock     












Panel B: Covariate and idiosyncratic shocks 

























Panel C: Economic and family shocks  
























Village controls -- -- -- 
Village fixed effects -- -- -- 
Observations 1,036 578 458 
Note: Each column-panel pair represents a separate analysis. All regressions use lagged shocks and 
control for youth age, whether the youth has a disability, and whether the household is matrilineal as 
well as baseline household characteristics including household size, wealth index, parents’ schooling, 
and whether the household is labor constrained. Additionally, Columns 1, 2, and 7 also control for 
youth’s in-school status. Standard errors clustered at the EA level are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.12. LPM and Individual FE estimates for balanced panel of relationship between 
shocks and dating for females 
 Dependent variable: Dating relationship 
 LPM Model  
 Total In school Out of school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Any negative shock             












(Any negative shock)  












Panel B: Covariate and idiosyncratic shocks        




















































Panel C: Economic and family shocks         





















































Village controls X -- X -- X -- 
Village fixed effects -- X -- X -- X 
Observations 1,088 1,088 605 605 483 483 
Note: Each column-panel pair represents a separate analysis. All regressions use lagged shocks and 
control for youth age, whether the youth has a disability, and whether the household is matrilineal as 
well as baseline household characteristics including household size, wealth index, parents’ schooling, 
and whether the household is labor constrained. Additionally, Columns 1, 2, and 7 also control for 
youth’s in-school status. Standard errors clustered at the EA level are shown in parentheses. *** 




Note: Each column-panel pair represents a separate analysis. All regressions use lagged shocks 
and control for youth age, whether the youth has a disability, and whether the household is 
matrilineal as well as baseline household characteristics including household size, wealth 
index, parents’ schooling, and whether the household is labor constrained. Additionally, 
Columns 1, 2, and 7 also control for youth’s in-school status. Standard errors clustered at the 
EA level are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 3.12. LPM and Individual FE estimates for balanced panel of relationship 
between shocks and dating for females (cont.) 
 
 Dependent variable: Dating relationship 
 FE Model 
 Total In school Out of school 
 (7) (8) (9) 
Panel A: Any negative shock       






(Any negative shock)  






Panel B: Covariate and idiosyncratic shocks 




























Panel C: Economic and family shocks 




























Village controls  --  -- --  
Village fixed effects  -- --  -- 




Table 3.13. Bride price differences by gender, shocks, and lineage system 
   
        














  (1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (3a) (3b) (3c) 
Panel A: Females - total           
Total bride price - monetized (MWK) 5,615.84 9,088.75 4,779.30 0.00 8,640.05 4,654.66 0.00 
Panel B: Females in matrilineal households          
Total bride price - monetized (MWK) 5,597.52 8,435.27 4,909.58 0.01 8,106.05 4,788.32 0.01 
Panel C: Females in patrilineal households          
Total bride price - monetized (MWK) 6,116.67 30,000.00 1,340.00 0.00 30,000.00 1,340.00 0.00 
Note: Bold denotes significance at the 5% level. P-values are reported from Wald tests on the equality of means of Treatment and Control 
for each variable. Standard errors are clustered at the EA level. Limited bride price information was reported even for those that had a new 
marriage during the study period. Sample sizes for the different panels are as follows: Panel A: N=170; Panel B: N=164; Panel C: N=6.   
 
 










Table 3.14: Comparison of marriage quality for all married/engaged youth 
 N All Male Female P-value of diff. 
Age at marriage 342 18.94 21.42 17.46 0.00 
How old was your spouse when you got married? 148 22.05 18.88 23.57 0.00 
Age gap with spouse 144 3.21 -2.42 5.77 0.00 
Age gap with spouse > 5 years 144 0.43 0.00 0.63 0.00 
Highest level of education 486 2.28 2.27 2.28 0.91 
What is the highest level of schooling your spouse attained?      
     Primary education 148 0.66 0.83 0.57 0.00 
     Secondary education 148 0.28 0.13 0.36 0.00 
     Tertiary education 148 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.16 
Education gap with spouse 130 0.58 0.11 0.84 0.00 
What is the highest level of schooling your PTM/chitomelo attained?      
     Primary education 250 0.56 0.66 0.47 0.00 
     Secondary education 250 0.34 0.28 0.40 0.04 
     Tertiary education 250 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.06 
Education gap with PTM/chitomelo 250 0.70 0.36 1.03 0.00 
Note: PTM = promise-to-marry or fiancé. Chitomelo = Chewa word for fiancé. Bold denotes significance at the alpha=0.05 level. 
P-values are reported from Wald tests on the equality of means of Treatment and Control for each variable. Standard errors are 









Table 3.15: Comparison of marriage quality for all married/engaged females by in-school status 






Age at marriage 214 17.46 17.65 17.03 0.03 
How old was your spouse when you got married? 100 23.57 23.83 23.21 0.67 
Age gap with spouse 99 5.77 5.40 6.26 0.32 
Age gap with spouse > 5 years 99 0.63 0.61 0.64 0.77 
Highest level of education 641 1.28 1.15 1.50 0.00 
What is the highest level of schooling your spouse attained?      
     Primary education 100 0.57 0.62 0.50 0.24 
     Secondary education 100 0.36 0.28 0.48 0.04 
     Tertiary education 100 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.82 
Education gap with spouse 85 0.15 0.18 0.11 0.63 
What is the highest level of schooling your PTM/chitomelo attained?      
     Primary education 127 0.47 0.59 0.17 0.00 
     Secondary education 127 0.40 0.28 0.71 0.00 
     Tertiary education 127 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.23 
Education gap with PTM/chitomelo 113 2.19 2.02 2.34 0.16 
Note: PTM = promise-to-marry or fiancé. Chitomelo = Chewa word for fiancé. Bold denotes significance at the alpha=0.05 level. 
P-values are reported from Wald tests on the equality of means of Treatment and Control for each variable. Standard errors are 
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CHAPTER 4: ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POVERTY: EVIDENCE FROM THE 
FIELD 
Introduction  
 Standard economic explanations of the shortsightedness displayed by individuals living 
in poverty include liquidity constraints and the urgency to meet immediate needs. The 
consequences of this myopia and their related behaviors help explain the persistence of poverty 
among individuals over time and across generations. However, insights from the psychology of 
poverty could further our understanding about why those living under severe material 
deprivation make decisions that effectively perpetuate their economic condition. This line of 
reasoning proposes that poverty affects economic choices through its influence on psychological 
states—stress and affect—as well as through the psychological toll of scarcity (Mullainathan & 
Shafir, 2013; Haushofer & Fehr, 2014). Material deprivation and its immediate correlates such as 
exposure to disease, crime, and violence cause negative affect and chronic or ‘toxic’ stress, and 
these psychological states then exert an additional and separate effect on forward looking 
behavior and time discounting. 
 Economists as far back as the 19th century recognized the idea that economic decisions, 
particularly those involving intertemporal choice, may be influenced by psychological factors. 
John Rae (1834), among others, described the factors inhibiting the ‘effective desire of 
accumulation’ to include impulse control, visceral influences and emotion, as well as the habit of 
prudence and reflection. More recent reviews of intertemporal choice have continued to highlight 
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the importance of emotion and current psychological states on behavior, citing evidence on these 
relationships from laboratory studies conducted by psychologists (Frederick et al., 2002; 
Lowenstein, 2000).  The psychological consequence of poverty is further manifested through the 
phenomenon of scarcity, which creates a mindset that draws attention to the immediate shortage 
and away from long-term considerations (Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013). For those in extreme 
poverty for whom food or water is scarce, all available resources, mental and physical, are 
devoted to addressing this immediate need to the neglect of other concerns. This extreme focus 
or ‘tunneling’ is not a behavior that only affects the poor.  
 Regardless of income, the combination of scarcity and negative affect may overburden 
the mind and lead to lower cognitive performance and sub-optimal decision-making. Recent 
results from laboratory-based experiments have shown that both rich and poor individuals 
perform similarly on cognitive and impulse control tests when presented with manageable 
scenarios (i.e., low stress, low cost) (Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir & Zhao, 2013). However, when 
the hypothetical scenarios become insurmountable (e.g., the proposed costs in the scenario 
exceeded real life budgets), poorer individuals scored much worse than richer individuals on 
these same tests. Similar studies highlight how the level of one’s initial resource endowment 
encourages tunneling behavior of participants. After randomly assigning participants to differing 
levels of available time, guesses, and budgets, participants were asked to perform a variety of 
tasks which involved multiple rounds of play with resources from a later round being eligible for 
borrowing at high interest rates in earlier rounds. The results revealed participants assigned to 
lower endowments performed worse than participants randomly assigned to higher endowments 
due to the low resource group’s tunneling on the current task at the expense of future 
consequences (Shah, Mullainathan & Shafir, 2012). Specifically, compared with the more 
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resource rich individuals, the resource poor individuals were more likely to borrow resources, 
and to do so at high interest rates, which ultimately led to reduced performance. Results from 
such studies lend support to the notion that it is not simply the lack of financial resources 
associated with being in poverty that causes lower performance and near-sighted decision-
making, instead it is due to the focus on scarcity and the stress associated with it stemming from 
everyday situations faced by those living in poverty. Otherwise, as the lab experiments show, 
both rich and poor individuals perform similarly on these cognitive and impulse tests in the 
absence of external or internal stressors.   
 A few studies have used exogenous variation in income to study the link between poverty 
and psychological states such as affect and subjective well-being (SWB). A lump-sum cash 
transfer (as compared to predictable monthly transfer) to poor individuals provided by the non-
governmental organization Give Directly in Kenya increased SWB and happiness relative to a 
randomly-assigned control group, though the stress hormone, cortisol, was only affected in the 
group receiving larger transfers (Haushofer & Shapiro, 2016). Qualitative evidence from four 
cash transfer programs in Sub-Saharan Africa also report positive effects of the programs on the 
psychosocial well-being of beneficiaries (Attah et al., 2016). A review of 25 quantitative studies 
that report on the effect of poverty on psychological well-being revealed that 18 demonstrated 
positive and significant effects of poverty alleviation on aspects of psychological well-being or 
stress (Haushofer & Fehr, 2014).  
 Despite the growing evidence linking poverty to psychological states, the evidence on the 
link between psychological states and economic decisions is limited to laboratory settings. 
Pharmacological elevation of the stress hormone cortisol increased time discounting among 
 
130 
males aged 18-35 in a study in Amsterdam (Cornelisse et al., 2013), and negative affect (induced 
through film clips) also reduced time discounting among individuals aged 18-63 in the US 
(Lerner, Li &Weber, 2013). There is no evidence outside the lab setting on these relationships. 
Are the economic decisions of the poor really influenced by their psychological state, or do these 
decisions simply reflect liquidity constraints and related financial circumstances? If they do, this 
provides an additional explanation for the behaviors that seemingly lead to poverty traps and the 
perpetuation of poverty.  
We address this question using secondary data from two longitudinal randomized-control 
trials (RCTs) that were conducted by the Transfer Project to evaluate the impact of national cash 
transfer programs in Malawi and Zambia. Both programs reach a large number of extremely poor 
beneficiaries and are implemented by the Social Welfare Departments of the respective 
governments. As part of these two evaluations, we administered a module on intertemporal 
choice, savings and SWB to the main respondent, typically the designated beneficiary of the cash 
transfer. Both programs had positive impacts on various dimensions of SWB including positive 
affect, subjective future well-being, worrying about food and (in Malawi only) perceived stress. 
Most importantly, these psychological states predict the decision to save money or to wait for 
future money. For example, happiness leads to an increase of between 5 and 9 percentage points 
in the likelihood of waiting for future money in both programs. Most results are robust across the 
two programs despite their very different target groups, strengthening the argument that they are 
due to the underlying consequences of deep poverty rather than the uniqueness of the 
demographic characteristics of the study participants. These results add to the scant evidence 




The Malawi Social Cash Transfer Program  
Program Design 
The Malawi SCTP, an unconditional cash transfer program targeted to ultra-poor, labor-
constrained households in Malawi, is administered by the Ministry of Gender, Children and 
Social Welfare.32 The program began as a pilot in the Mchinji district in 2006, and was expanded 
to an additional eight districts by 2009, and further expanded starting in 2014. Beneficiary 
households receive bimonthly payments of varying amounts depending on household size and 
the number of primary and secondary school-aged children in the home.  By endline, the average 
monthly per capita transfer amount received by beneficiary households was equivalent to 
US$1.25 a month or about US$60 per household annually. Payments are made in cash every 
other month through a local pay-point manager to the main beneficiary, and there are no 
conditions to receive the money. Payments represent approximately 20 percent of pre-program 
consumption for beneficiary households. The overarching objective of the SCTP is to reduce 
extreme poverty and hunger, and to increase school enrollment among the ultra-poor. 
Study Design 
A cluster-randomized, longitudinal study consisting of a baseline and two follow-up 
surveys was designed to assess the impact of the SCTP.33 Our present study uses data from the 
                                                          
32The Operations Manual of the SCTP defines ultra-poor as a household that is unable to meet the most 
basic urgent needs, including food and essential non-food items such as soap and clothing, while labor 
constrained refers to a household with a dependency ratio (ratio of ‘fit to work’ to ‘not fit to work’) of 
more than three or with no individuals who are fit to work. An individual who is considered not fit to 
work is someone under the age of 18, over the age of 64, or within the age range 18 to 64 but suffering 
from a chronic illness or disability or is otherwise unable to work (Handa et al. 2014). 
33Survey instruments were reviewed for ethical considerations and approved by the UNC-CH Institutional 




baseline survey conducted mid-2013, the first follow-up survey conducted in late 2014 through 
early 2015, and the final follow-up survey conducted in late 2015. The SCTP study consisted of 
both quantitative and qualitative components. The household questionnaire, the main survey 
instrument, covered a comprehensive list of topics including household composition, 
consumption, health, education, economic activity, time, and SWB, among others.  The study 
was designed around the Government of Malawi’s plans to extend and expand coverage of the 
SCTP starting in 2014. Two districts, Salima and Mangochi, were chosen for the evaluation 
study to align the evaluation with the expansion plans. Randomization took place at multiple 
levels within these two districts starting with TAs down to VCs. Two TAs were randomly 
selected in each district to participate in the study. Based on a targeting procedure instituted by 
the ministry, eligibility lists in each VC in the study sites were created. The study team randomly 
assigned numbers to the VCs in each TA using the random number generator in Excel and sent 
the lists to the ministry. Once baseline data collection was complete, the District Commissioner’s 
Office in each district conducted a public coin toss to determine whether the top or bottom half 
of the randomly ordered list would enter the program first, with the rest comprising a delayed-
entry group. The coin toss thus determined the treatment group and resulted in 14 clusters being 
assigned to treatment with the remaining 15 assigned to the delayed-entry control arm.34  
Power for the study was calculated based on the three key program objectives – 
consumption, school enrollment and child nutritional status – using intra-class correlation 
                                                          
Research in Social Sciences and Humanities (UNC IRB Study No. 12-2496; Malawi NCST Study No. 
RTT/2/20). 
34Control households were not aware they were receiving the transfer at a later date. The study team 
additionally checks for anticipation effects in the control group at endline right before these households 
were scheduled to start receiving payments and found no effects. 
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estimates from the most recent Malawi Demographic and Health Survey for nutrition, and the 
Malawi Integrated Household Survey for consumption and schooling. Per these calculations, a 
sample size of 3,500 households in 29 VCs was necessitated, or an average of 121 households 
per VC. The final sample size was 3,531 households – 1,678 in treatment VCs. Since limited 
financial resources prevented the inclusion of all households in program districts at once, the 
final ethically feasible study sample represents approximately 47 percent of all eligible 
households from the four TAs. For additional details on the sampling procedure and power 
calculations to determine optimal sample size, see the publicly available study baseline report 
(Handa et al. 2014).  
The Zambia Child Grant Program 
Program Description 
The Zambia CGP was started as a demonstration project by the Zambian Ministry of 
Community Development, Mother and Child Health in 2010 in the districts of Kalabo, Kaputa, 
and Shangombo. These districts are in the remotest parts of Zambia (along the border of Angola 
on the West and Democratic Republic of Congo in the North-East) and among the most deprived 
districts in the country. The CGP targeted any household with a child under 5 years of age.35 
Recipient households received approximately US$12 per month irrespective of household size, 
an amount deemed sufficient to purchase one meal a day for an average sized household for one 
month. Payments were made in cash every other month through a local pay-point manager to the 
caregiver of the focal child, and there were no conditions to receive the money. Payments 
                                                          
35While the eligibility criteria for the CGP targeted households with children under age 5, the evaluation 
targeted those with children under age 3 at baseline so they would remain eligible for the program 
throughout the entirety of the initial study period (3 years). 
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represent approximately 27 percent of pre-program consumption for beneficiary households. The 
overarching objective of the CGP was to reduce extreme poverty and improve the health and 
nutrition of children. 
Study Design 
Similar to the SCTP, the evaluation for the CGP was a conducted as a multi-site RCT. This 
design was ethically feasible given that the program was still in pilot phase and due to financial 
constraints, not all eligible households within pilot districts could be reached. The evaluation 
consisted of a baseline survey in October-November 2010 and follow-up surveys conducted 24-, 30-, 
and 36-months after baseline.36,37 The first payments to beneficiaries began in January 2011. The 
CGP study consisted of both quantitative and qualitative components with the household 
questionnaire again serving as the main, comprehensive survey instrument.  
As in Malawi, the randomization process was conducted publicly by the government. In the 
first stage, 30 Community Welfare Assistance Committees (CWACs) per district were randomly 
selected by lottery to participate in the study—this process was conducted by the provincial and 
district social welfare officers at the ministry headquarters in Lusaka in June 2010. After the 
CWACs were randomly selected, the ministry targeted all eligible households within them, which 
resulted in a list of more than 100 eligible households within each CWAC. Of these eligible 
households, 28 were randomly sampled from each CWAC and were included in the study. This 
                                                          
36The Zambia CGP evaluation study included an additional round collected at 48-months but are excluded 
from this present study for comparability since some of the individuals would have graduated from the 
program by the 48-month follow-up.  
37Survey instruments were reviewed for ethical considerations and approved by the American Institutes 




resulted in a final sample of 2,519 households. After baseline, the Ministry’s Permanent Secretary 
conducted a public coin flip to determine which half of a randomly ordered list of CWACs would be 
assigned to treatment and which to the delayed control arm. See the publicly available baseline 
report of the study for additional details on the study design, sampling procedure and instruments 
(Seidenfeld, et al. 2011). 
Measures 
For each study, we estimate the impact of the cash transfer on two economic decisions 
that involve self-control and long-term planning. The first is whether or not the respondent had 
saved any cash in the last thirty days for an emergency or to buy something special in the future. 
The second is a hypothetical intertemporal choice task where the respondent was asked if s/he 
would wait one month and take a future (higher) amount if she were to receive $X today. The 
higher amounts ranged from one to four times the value of the current amount. Since a large 
proportion of respondents never waited for any future value, we use a dichotomous indicator of 
whether the respondent ever chose to wait for future money. As mentioned, this subset of 
questions was hypothetical in nature meaning respondents were not incentivized and no 
monetary rewards were exchanged.  While there is a debate in the literature over the merit of 
hypothetical versus incentivized choice modules, studies have found both types lead to similar 
responses, and hypothetical questions afford researchers the additional advantage of testing a 
broader range of values across a larger sample (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Delavande et al., 
2011; Harrison et al., 2002; Harrison et al., 2007; Holt & Laury, 2002; Johnson & Bickel, 2002; 
Kirby, 1997). Researchers must remain within their budget constraint, so incentivizing such tasks 
necessitates smaller sample sizes and lower future value ranges as the costs associated with 
paying out the rewards can quickly add up. Conversely, with hypothetical tasks, researchers are 
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provided the opportunity to sample more individuals and use a much larger spread of future 
values. Since reviews show that preferences and discount rates stemming from each type are 
similar, it follows that the use of such hypothetical questions for this study is reasonable and that 
the responses are valid and believable. 
The psychological variables we use are broken down into those that measure the 
respondent’s stress and those that measure their affect and SWB. The former group consists of a 
stress index created using variations of the Cohen’s Perceived Stress Scale (PSS) (Cohen, 
Kamarck and Mermelstein 1983) (10-item scale in Zambia, 4-item scale in Malawi38), and a 
dichotomous variable denoting whether or not the respondent reported worrying about having 
enough food for their family over the recall period. To ascertain respondent’s affect and general 
feelings of well-being, we look at whether they believe their life will be better one year from the 
date of the interview, whether they reported generally feeling happy, and their score on a quality 
of life scale. The quality of life scale is an 8-item module in which respondents were asked how 
strongly they agreed or disagreed with eight positive statements about their life. This module was 
not administered in Zambia so is only used as an additional measure in the Malawi analysis. Full 
details and the definition of all variables used in the analysis are provided in the Appendix C.  
Malawi SCTP 
The SCTP baseline evaluation report tested for balance across all primary indicators plus 
variables that were thought to be important determinants of the primary indicators such as age, 
education, and marital status of the main beneficiary. Of the 350 indicators tested, 10 were 
                                                          
38Of the full 10-item Cohen’s PSS, only 4-items were included in all three waves of the Malawi SCTP 
survey. Even though all 10 items were administered in both follow-up rounds, we only use the 4-item 
scale for study so as to compare the same items over time. 
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statistically different at baseline (including the main respondent being currently 
separated/divorced, per capita food specific expenditures, and percent of children who suffered 
from a fever in the past two weeks) though the magnitude of all differences was small. The 
analytical sample for this article is restricted to the panel of respondents who responded to the 
questions on intertemporal choice, affect, and savings in each round. Across the three survey 
waves, 2,659 households had the same respondent for the individual module on preferences and 
affect. Table 4.1 Panel A shows baseline balance tests for seven key variables for this restricted 
panel that are likely to be important determinants of the outcomes considered in this article. 
None of the means of these seven variables are statistically different across study arms. 
Similarly, Table 4.1 Panel B shows baseline balance tests on the analytical sample for the six 
outcomes analyzed in this article for which we have baseline data. Again, none of the means for 
these outcomes are statistically different across study arms at baseline among the analytical 
sample.  
Attrition 
Overall attrition in the SCTP over the three rounds was about 6.5%. The publicly 
available endline evaluation report investigates attrition by testing for similarities at baseline 
between (1) treatment and control groups for panel households only (differential attrition) and 
(2) all households at baseline and the remaining households at follow-up (overall attrition) 
(Handa et al., 2016). These results show that there was no differential attrition (so balance was 
preserved across the two arms), but there was a small difference in the composition of 
households remaining in the sample over time. Panel A of Table 4.2 shows results from attrition 
analysis of the same set of seven key indicators reported earlier for the analytical sample. 
Column (8) of this table shows that there is no differential attrition. Panel B reports the same 
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analysis for the six outcomes that we measured at baseline and confirms that there is no 
differential attrition for these outcomes.  
Zambia CGP 
We use data from the evaluation of the Zambia CGP which comprised 2,519 households, 
approximately half of whom were randomly assigned to control status. Approximately 80 
percent of households (1,983 households) maintained the same survey respondent over all four 
waves and comprise the analytical sample that we use. The aforementioned baseline evaluation 
report tested for balance across all primary indicators in the study plus variables that were 
thought to be important determinants of the primary indicators such as age, education and marital 
status of the main beneficiary and showed strong balance (Seidenfeld et al., 2011). The analytic 
sample for this article is restricted to the panel of respondents who responded to the questions on 
intertemporal choice, affect, and savings in each round. We further dropped the 1 percent of 
respondents who were males. Table 4.3 Panel A shows baseline balance tests for seven key 
variables for this restricted panel that are likely to be important determinants of the outcomes 
considered in this article. None of the means of these seven variables are statistically different 
across study arms. Similarly, Table 4.3 Panel B shows baseline balance tests on the analytical 
sample for four outcomes analyzed in this article for which we have baseline data. None of the 
means for these outcomes are statistically different across study arms at baseline among the 
analytical sample. 
Attrition 
Attrition over the three periods was less than 6 percent, and primarily driven by 
households in Kaputa, where the drying up of Lake Cheshi forced households that relied on the 
lake for fishing and farming to move as they followed the edge of the lake.  This problem 
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affected treatment and control households equally. The publicly available 36-month evaluation 
report investigates attrition by testing for similarities at baseline between (1) treatment and 
control groups for panel households only (differential attrition) and (2) all households at baseline 
and the remaining households at the follow-up (overall attrition) (American Institutes for 
Research, 2014). These results show that there was no differential attrition (so balance was 
preserved across the two arms), but there was a small difference in the composition of 
households remaining in the sample, specifically, slightly fewer households in Kaputa than at 
baseline. Table 4.4 reports attrition analysis of the same set of key indicators reported earlier for 
the analytical sample used here. Column (8) of this table shows that there is no differential 
attrition—none of the means are different across the two arms. Panel B of Table 4.4 reports the 
same analysis for the four outcomes that we had measured at baseline, and this confirms that for 
these four outcomes there is no differential attrition.  
Methods 
For both studies, we use the same essential statistical methodology in the analyses. First, 
we identify the average effect of treatment (the cash transfer) on individuals’ time discounting, 
propensity to have any cash savings, and psychological indicators. For outcomes with baseline 
information we estimate difference-in-difference (DD) models, pooling all follow-up waves to 
generate an average treatment effect over the three (Zambia) or two (Malawi) follow-up waves.39 
For variables which were not collected at baseline, we present single difference estimates using 
the pooled follow-up (post-intervention) data.  
(1) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑇𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
                                                          
39Due to potential seasonality issues with the timing of various follow-up rounds of data collection (i.e., 
some during the lean season, some in harvest season), we choose to present only ATEs for each program 
to account for these differences. 
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Equation (1) shows our basic empirical specification where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 denotes the individual, time-
specific outcome of interest and 𝛽1 – the coefficient on the indicator for receiving the transfer 
(Ti) in the post periods (Pt) – signifies the average effect of the cash transfer. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of 
controls measured at baseline including the main respondent’s age, gender (Malawi only, all 
respondents are female in Zambia), education, and district/TA of residence. We then looked at 
whether the treatment effect on savings and time discounting operated through the psychological 
states by adding each psychological variable to the models. All standard errors are clustered at 
the VC (Malawi) or CWAC (Zambia) level; in Malawi we also implement the wild bootstrap 
(Cameron, Gelbach & Miller, 2008) to account for the fact that we only have 29 clusters. 
 Finally, we report the direct effect of the psychological measures on economic decisions 
controlling for the potential endogeneity of these measures using two approaches. Simply using 
the psychological variables to predict economic decisions fails to account for endogeneity at the 
individual level. There is likely some factor affecting both the main respondent’s psychological 
state as well as their decision to save or ever wait for a future payment. To address this 
endogeneity, we instrument the psychological variables (equation 2a), and use the fitted values to 
predict the economic decisions (equation 2b): 
(2a)                     𝑃𝑠𝑦𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
(2b)  𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿1𝑃𝑠𝑦𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡̂ + 𝛾1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 
We exploit the random assignment to treatment as our instrument. This approach is only used 
when the treatment has no direct effect on the economic outcomes after controlling for the effect 
of the psychological variables (see below), in other words, when the instrument satisfies the 
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exclusion restriction, and when treatment is shown to strongly predict the psychological 
variables (produces an F-statistic larger than 10). 
Our second and preferred approach is a FE model, which controls for time invariant 
unobserved differences across respondents. The essential relationship is illustrated in equation 
(3) where 𝜈𝑖 represents the time invariant source of endogeneity.  
(3)    𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑠𝑦𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖 
The key assumption for the FE model to deliver unbiased estimates is that the joint determination 
of psychological states and economic decisions emanate from an individual characteristic that is 
fixed over time. In the FE estimation, when there is baseline information we use data from four 
waves in Zambia and three waves in Malawi. When there is no baseline information, the FE 
estimates use post-treatment data and thus show the average difference (change) in the post-
treatment periods only.   
Results 
Malawi SCTP 
First, we identify the average effect of treatment (the cash transfer) on individuals’ time 
discounting, propensity to have any cash savings, and psychological indicators. For outcomes 
with baseline information we estimate DD models, pooling all follow-up waves to generate an 
average treatment effect over the two follow-up periods. For savings, which was only collected 
at endline, we present single difference estimates using the pooled follow-up (post-intervention) 
data. We find that the respondents in the treatment group are 8.6 pp more likely to ever be 
willing to wait for a future payout compared to those in the control group (Table 4.5, column 2), 
and treatment is associated with a 16 pp increase in the probability that an individual had any 
savings at endline (Table 4.5, column 1). Furthermore, we see highly significant treatment 
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effects for all of the psychological variables (Table 4.5, columns 3-7). Program beneficiaries are 
less stressed and more optimistic about their lives currently and projected in the following year. 
Specifically, receipt of the transfer, on average, increases individuals’ score on the four-item PSS 
(where 1 is the most stressed and 20 is the least stressed) by a little over one point, increases their 
likelihood of not worrying about having enough food by 21 pp, increases the likelihood of 
generally feeling happy as well as believing life will be better in one year by 19 pp, and increases 
the score on the quality of life scale by about half a point (Kilburn et al., 2018). Thus, the 
induction of an exogenous variation in income has noted improvements in respondents’ levels of 
stress, affect, and economic decisions related to intertemporal choice.  
Next, we looked at whether the treatment effect on savings and time discounting operates 
through the psychological states by adding each psychological variable to the models in columns 
(1) and (2) of Table 4.5—these are shown in Table 6.  For both savings (Panel A) and 
willingness to wait (Panel B), we find only a partial mediating effect. For savings, the strongest 
mediation pathway is through ‘never worrying about food’ (Panel A, column 2) where the 
treatment effect decreases from 16 pp to 13.3 pp, or about 17 percent. The effect on waiting for a 
future payment, on the other hand, was most influenced by the quality of life scale which 
reduced the impact of treatment from an 8.5 pp increase in likelihood to a 5.8 pp increase, a 
reduction of 32 percent (Table 4.6, Panel B, column 11). However, in all of the regressions 
shown in Table 4.6, the psychological variables have a statistically significant predictive ability 
for the economic decisions. For example, generally feeling happy and thinking life will be better 
in a year is associated with an increase in the likelihood of waiting for future money by 5.1 pp 
and 7.3 pp respectively, and an increase in the likelihood of saving money by 4.7 pp and 5.9 pp, 
respectively. Interestingly, when all potential psychological mediators are included in the same 
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regression, some of the effects disappear. For instance, generally feeling happy and quality of 
life scale score are no longer shown to be significant predictors of saving money; rather, this 
behavior is most influenced by the stress scale, not worrying about food, and believing life will 
be better in a year (Column 6). Relatedly, willingness to wait for money is predicted by not 
worrying about food, believing life will be better in a year, and the quality of life scale score with 
the latter boasting the strongest influence (Column 12). 
Stronger causal estimates of stress and affect on the economic decisions using IV and FE 
are shown in Table 4.7. We omitted savings from these analyses for two reasons. First, the 
treatment indicator is not a valid instrument for the psychological variables because it continues 
to have a direct effect on savings even after controlling for the psychological variables in Panel 
A of Table 4.6. Second, savings was only collected at the second follow-up and so cannot be 
used in the fixed-effects analysis, which requires at least two periods of data.  
Results from the IV analysis in column (2) of Table 4.7 confirm that all five 
psychological measures have a significant effect on time discounting. The FE analyses in column 
(1) of Table 4.7 generally confirm these results as well, with four of the five psychological 
indicators displaying a significant relationship with time discounting, the exception being not 
worrying about food. Point estimates are large; a 1.22 change in the 4-item Cohen Stress Scale 
(the program effect reported in Table 4.5) increases the likelihood of waiting for future money by 
11.7 pp, a 19 percent increase over the baseline mean of 62 percent.  
Zambia CGP 
The CGP had a strong impact on the economic decision to save, increasing the likelihood 
of holding any savings in the last 30 days by 18 pp, representing a doubling of the baseline 
savings rate (Table 4.8, column 1) (Natali et al., 2016). In contrast to the SCTP however, the 
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CGP did not affect the propensity to wait for future money (Column 2). The CGP did affect 
several dimensions of SWB such as whether or not the beneficiary worried about food in the past 
four weeks, generally felt happy, or felt life would be better in one year (Natali et al., 2018). The 
CGP had no effect on the ten-item PSS (Hjelm et al., 2017). 
Results in Panel A of Table 4.9 suggest that even though there are strong effects of the 
cash transfer on savings and psychological states, the latter explain very little of the direct effect 
of the cash on savings. When the psychological variables are added to the regressions predicting 
savings, the treatment dummy variable continues to be highly statistically significant and its 
effect reduced by only 1-2 pp. For example, adding the variable ‘not worried about food in the 
last four weeks’ to the regression reduced the treatment effect from 17.8 pp to 15.8 pp (Table 
4.9, Panel A, Column 2). On the other hand, three of the four psychological variables are 
predictive of the savings decisions: stress, worrying about food and ‘life will be better in 1 year’.  
Panel B in Table 4.9 introduces the psychological variables to the regressions predicting 
time discounting. As there was no treatment effect on this indicator, these estimates primarily 
serve to demonstrate the importance of psychological states in the intertemporal choice decision. 
Results are consistent with those from Panel A: three of the four psychological indicators are 
statistically significant predictors of the probability of waiting for future money, the exception 
this time being whether the respondent was worried about food. The estimates in column 8 of 
Panel B indicate that generally feeling happy leads to a 9 pp increase in the likelihood of waiting 
for future money, an 11 percent increase over the baseline mean. 
Stronger evidence on the causal effects of the psychological indicators on economic 
decisions is provided in Table 4.10 where we use individual FE and IV to control for unobserved 
factors that simultaneously determine psychological states and economic decisions. Results in 
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Panel A of Table 4.9 show that the treatment indicator is not a valid instrument for the 
psychological variables in the savings regression, and is a valid instrument only in columns (7) 
and (9) in Panel B. On the other hand, for all psychological indicators we have multiple waves of 
data and can therefore use FE estimation to eliminate unobserved (time-invariant) individual 
heterogeneity from the regressions. In the case of happiness and stress, we only have post-
treatment data, so the FE estimates measure change in the post-intervention time-period only.  
Similar to the results from Malawi, psychological states are highly predictive of 
economic decisions. All four indicators are statistically significant determinants of savings 
(column 1, Table 4.10). For time discounting, five out of the six coefficients estimated are 
statistically significant in the hypothesized direction. What is interesting is that stress and 
happiness are statistically significant in the FE models. Since these are only measured post-
intervention, they indicate that differences along psychological dimensions continue to influence 
economic decisions several years after program initiation rather than simply a difference that 
occurs due to an initial jump in affect or stress brought about by the initial enrollment in the cash 
transfer.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Insights on the psychology of poverty propose a feedback loop whereby poverty leads to 
negative emotion and stress, which in turn influence economic behaviors, leading to sub-optimal 
decisions that effectively perpetuate poverty. Our results from government poverty alleviation 
programs in Malawi and Zambia support this theory and are consistent with results from 
laboratory settings demonstrating that psychological well-being influences intertemporal choice 
(Shah, Mullainathan & Shafir, 2012; Mani et al., 2013; Gennetian & Shafir, 2015). Both 
programs had an impact on various dimensions of psychological well-being, including positive 
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affect, subjective future well-being, worrying about food, and (in Malawi only) stress. More 
interesting, however, is the finding that these psychological states were predictive of the decision 
to save money or to wait for money in the future. For example, results from the FE models 
showed that feeling happy led to an increase of between 5.6 and 8.5 pp in the likelihood of 
waiting for future money, and a 5.1 pp increase (in Zambia only) in the likelihood of saving 
money. Particularly important is the fact that results were consistent across the two programs 
despite the fact that the demographic profiles of beneficiaries were starkly different. The typical 
CGP beneficiary is notably younger than in the Malawi SCTP, with an average age of 29 
compared to 58 in the SCTP, and virtually all are women as the grant is targeted towards 
caregivers of children under the age of five years. Other contrasting features of the two samples 
are that three-fourths of beneficiaries in the CGP are married compared to just half in the SCTP, 
and average household size is about one person larger than in the SCTP (5.5 versus 4.5 people). 
However, the average consumption level of the two beneficiary groups was the same at less than 
50 cents per person per day. This further strengthens the argument that the relationships shown 
here are due to the underlying consequence of chronic and abject poverty, rather than the 
uniqueness of the demographic features of the study participants, which can be a concern in 
laboratory studies. 
While results from this study highlight new ways to think about how policies and 
programs aimed at reducing poverty affect behavior and psychological states which, in turn, 
affect poverty, there are a few limitations to consider when interpreting the results. First of all, 
there is concern over how successful the PSS is when used in developing country contexts as the 
scale has not been validated with such populations (Hjelm et al., 2017). As such, we may not be 
obtaining an accurate measure of stress for these individuals. Biomarkers (e.g., measuring 
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salivary cortisol levels) are increasingly being used in research to ascertain an individual’s stress 
levels, and may produce a more accurate measure (Djuric, et al., 2008). Unfortunately, such data 
was unavailable to us during this study, but could prove useful as additional measures to be used 
in future research. Moreover, a few of our key variables were only collected in one (Malawi) or 
two (Zambia) follow-up waves so we do not have baseline values. Therefore, our causal 
inference relies on the assumption of equivalence at baseline across treatment and controls 
groups within each study. However, Tables 1 and 3 show balance of key characteristics at 
baseline across treatment arms, so we feel this limitation is diminished.  
The precise mechanism through which stress and negative emotion influence 
intertemporal behaviors such as saving and time discounting in a field setting is still not clear. 
Results from the laboratory suggest that stress may weaken cognitive function and cause 
individuals to fall back on heuristics or habitual behavior, such as current consumption 
(Gennetian & Shafir, 2015). Poverty-related stress may also weaken the immune system through 
increased exposure to latent viral infection, which itself can impede cognitive capacity and 
inhibit forward-looking behavior (Aiello et al., 2006). Negative affect can also have a direct 
impact on impulse control and the ability to delay gratification (Loewenstein, 1996). 
Understanding the underlying mechanisms in a field setting remains a key issue on the research 
agenda. This in turn can improve the design of various poverty interventions, including cash 
transfer programs, to address both the financial and behavioral consequences of poverty that lead 
to poverty traps. If programs can relieve stress, worry, and negative affect, it seems they will be 
able to, subsequently, alter one’s economic decision-making to make them more future-oriented 





Table 4.1. Malawi SCTP baseline balance tests for key individual and household characteristics 
 
N All Control Treatment 
P-value of 
difference 
Panel A. Key explanatory variables      
Respondent female 2,659 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.33 
Respondent age 2,659 56.89 56.08 57.77 0.46 
Respondent any school 2,659 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.77 
Widow 2,659 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.52 
Household size 2,659 4.53 4.55 4.50 0.81 
Per capita expenditures (Kwacha) 2,659 44,052.97 42,452.05 45,785.53 0.39 
Number of livestock owned 2,659 1.18 1.20 1.15 0.82 
Panel B. Key outcomes      
Ever waits for payment 2,659 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.76 
Generally feel happy 2,659 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.72 
Life better in 1 year 2,659 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.95 
Quality of life scale (out of 8) 2,659 2.23 2.26 2.19 0.58 
Low stress index (out of 20) 2,659 6.00 5.89 6.12 0.67 
Not worried about food 2,659 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.73 
Notes: P-values are reported from Wald tests on the equality of means of Treatment and Control for each variable. 









Table 4.2. Malawi attrition analysis of selected indicators at baseline 






















Panel A. Key explanatory variables      
Respondent female 0.70 0.85 0.01 0.79 0.83 0.41 -0.09 0.20 
Respondent age 54.50 56.30 0.58 61.19 58.17 0.42 -6.69 0.26 
Respondent any school 0.35 0.32 0.66 0.30 0.34 0.64 0.05 0.66 
Widow 0.42 0.41 0.83 0.50 0.44 0.48 -0.08 0.54 
Household size 4.00 4.64 0.01 3.29 4.59 0.00 0.71 0.16 
Per capita expenditures (Kwacha) 51,533.84 43,020.33 0.23 65,148.46 45,520.7
9 
0.01 -13,614.62 0.17 
No. of livestock owned 0.76 1.35 0.03 1.47 1.38 0.89 -0.71 0.25 
Panel B. Key outcomes         
Generally feel happy 0.23 0.19 0.55 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.15 
Life better in 1 year 0.58 0.53 0.32 0.56 0.53 0.60 0.02 0.83 
Quality of life scale (out of 8) 
(out of 8) 
2.37 2.26 0.42 1.98 2.19 0.06 0.39 0.08 
Low stress scale (out of 20) 
1=most stressed/20=least stressed 
6.62 6.00 0.23 5.57 6.16 0.15 1.05 0.21 
Not worried about food 0.18 0.15 0.39 0.14 0.15 0.84 0.04 0.51 
Ever waits for payment 0.59 0.62 0.50 0.59 0.61 0.76 0.00 0.99 
Observations 172 1,726 1,853 101 1,577 1,678   
Notes: Bold denotes differences that alpha=0.05 level. P-values are reported from Wald tests on the equality of means of 










Table 4.3. Zambia CGP baseline balance tests for key individual and household characteristics 
 
N All Control Treatment 
P-value of 
difference 
Panel A. Key explanatory variables      
Respondent age 2,519 29.53 29.15 29.92 0.20 
Respondent any school 2,519 0.71 0.70 0.73 0.41 
Married 2,519 0.74 0.72 0.75 0.53 
Separated/Divorced/Widowed 2,519 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.30 
Household size 2,519 5.68 5.62 5.73 0.52 
Per capita expenditures 2,519 39.60 38.72 40.49 0.50 
Owned chickens 2,519 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.75 
Panel B. Key outcomes      
Holding any savings 2,519 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.51 
Ever waits for payment 2,519 0.79 0.77 0.80 0.41 
Not worried about food  2,519 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.93 
Life better in 1 year 2,519 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.85 
Notes: P-values are reported from Wald tests on the equality of means of Treatment and Control for each 









Table 4.4. Zambia attrition analysis of selected indicators at baseline 





















Panel A. Key explanatory variables      
Respondent age 30.20 29.58 0.56 31.39 29.91 0.11 -1.19 0.43 
Respondent any school 0.79 0.70 0.01 0.79 0.74 0.16 0.00 0.95 
Married 0.75 0.71 0.35 0.69 0.74 0.43 0.05 0.45 
Sep./Div./Wid. 0.20 0.17 0.48 0.22 0.14 0.10 -0.02 0.67 
Household size 5.66 5.63 0.90 5.71 5.76 0.85 -0.05 0.88 
Per capita expenditures 38.32 39.60 0.69 40.83 41.57 0.85 -2.51 0.61 
Owned chickens 0.37 0.43 0.15 0.33 0.44 0.02 0.04 0.45 
Panel B. Key outcomes         
Holding any savings 0.20 0.16 0.24 0.19 0.18 0.95 0.01 0.81 
Ever waits for payment 0.71 0.78 0.09 0.74 0.82 0.09 0.04 0.57 
Never worry about food  0.79 0.87 0.35 0.93 0.87 0.36 -0.14 0.19 
Life better in 1 year 0.61 0.52 0.15 0.49 0.50 0.67 0.12 0.07 
Observations 126 1,133 1,259 121 1,139 1,260   
Notes: Bold denotes differences at the alpha=0.05 level. P-values are reported from Wald tests on the equality of means of 









Table 4.5. Effects of the Malawi SCTP on savings, intertemporal choice, and psychological states 
 
Any 










in 1 year 
Quality of 
life scale 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 





 (0.03) (0.05) .54) (0.04) .04) (0.07) (0.11) 















Observations 2,641 7,833 7,977 7,976 7,977 7,746 7,977 
R-Squared 0.080 0.015 0.091 0.056 0.048 0.064 0.109 
Mean of dep. var. 0.03 0.62 6.00 0.15 0.18 0.53 2.23 
F-stat. 13.54 9.21 17.14 17.73 13.42 53.93 25.27 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. All regressions control for a set of baseline characteristics including age and 
schooling of the respondent, and TA of residence. Standard errors, clustered at the village cluster level, are shown in parentheses 
below the coefficient. Wild bootstrapping p-values for the impact coefficient (1000 reps, H0=0) are shown in row 2. Dependent 
variable means are averaged across Treatment and Control at baseline except for any savings which uses endline Control means. 









Table 4.6 The mediating effects of psychological states on savings and intertemporal choice in 
Malawi 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Any savings  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment effect  0.146*** 0.133*** 0.154*** 0.151*** 0.145*** 0.114*** 
  (0.026) (0.023) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.023) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Low stress index (4-item) 0.011*** 
(0.002) 
    0.004** 
(0.002) 
 Not worried about food  0.123*** 
(0.026) 
   0.111*** 
(0.027) 
Generally feels happy   0.047*** 
(0.013) 
  0.010 
(0.017) 





















Observations 2,641 2,641 2,641 2,585 2,641 2,585 
R-Squared 0.090 0.102 0.084 0.088 0.090 0.112 
Panel B. Dependent variable: Ever waits  
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Treatment effect  0.074 
(0 
0.072 0.077 0.072 0.058 0.051 
 ( .050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) (0.047) (0.048) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.146 0.149 0.141 0.190 0.243 0.341 
Low stress index (4-item) 0.008*** 
(0.003) 
    -0.001 
(0.004) 
Not worried about food  0.058*** 
(0.018) 
   0.032* 
(0.016) 
Generally feels happy   0.051*** 
(0.015) 
  -0.014 
(0.022) 





















Observations 7,833 7,833 7,833 7,606 7,833 7,606 
R-Squared 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.021 0.026 0.028 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. All regressions control for a set of baseline 
characteristics including age and schooling of the respondent, and TA of residence. Standard errors, 
clustered at the village cluster level, are shown in parentheses below the coefficient. Wild bootstrapping 





Table 4.7 The effects of psychological states on intertemporal choice in Malawi 
 Willing to Wait for Future Money 
VARIABLES FE N IV N F-stat. for instrument 
 (1)  (2)   

























Notes: Each column and row pair present coefficients from a separate regression. Standard errors, clustered at the village 
cluster level, are shown below the coefficients in parentheses. IV regressions control for a set of baseline characteristics 










Table 4.8 Effects of the Zambia CGP on savings, intertemporal choice, and psychological states 
 
Any 











in 1 year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment effect  0.178*** 0.012 0.542 0.198*** 0.072*** 0.150** 













Observations 7,789 7,819 3,953 7,844 3,944 7,823 
R-Squared 0.071 0.026 0.012 0.072 0.022 0.068 
Mean of dep. 
var. 
0.166 0.848 29.57 0.196 0.818 0.505 
F-stat. 30.87 7.931 5.078 41.34 8.723 30.10 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. All regressions control for a set of baseline characteristics 
including age and schooling of the respondent, and district of residence. Standard errors, clustered at the 
CWAC level, are shown in parentheses below the coefficient. Dependent variable means are averaged across 
Treatment and Control at baseline except for columns (3) and (5) which use endline Control means. *** 








Table 4.9 The mediating effects of psychological states on savings and intertemporal choice in 
Zambia 
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Any Savings  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment effect  0.157*** 0.158*** 0.161*** 0.163*** 0.128*** 
 (0.028) (0.036) (0.029) (0.034) (0.028) 
Low stress index (10-item) 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
   0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Not worried about  0.101*** 
(0.015) 
  0.085*** 
(0.022) 


















Observations 3,951 7,789 3,942 7,770 3,936 
R-Squared 0.068 0.082 0.057 0.084 0.083 
Panel B. Dependent Variable: Ever Waits  
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Treatment effect  0.047*** 0.016 0.043*** 0.008 0.039** 
 (0.016) (0.040) (0.014) (0.040) (0.016) 
Low stress index (10-item) 0.003* 
(0.001) 
   0.001 
(0.001) 
Not worried about food  -0.010 
(0.008) 
  -0.014 
(0.013) 


















Observations 3,952 7,819 3,943 7,802 3,938 
R-Squared 0.030 0.026 0.042 0.027 0.046 
Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. All regressions control for a set of 
baseline characteristics including age and schooling of the respondent, and district of 




Table 4.10 The effects of psychological states on savings and intertemporal choice in Zambia 
 Any savings Willing to Wait for Future Money 
VARIABLES FE N FE N IV N 
F-stat for 
instrument 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   




3,952    











3,943    







Notes: Each column and row pair presents coefficients from separate regressions. Standard errors, 
clustered at the CWAC level, are shown below the coefficients in parentheses. IV regressions control for 
a set of baseline characteristics including age, schooling of respondent, and district of residence.  *** 
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APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL TABLES FROM CHAPTER 2 
















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Caregiver's Discount Rate -0.073*** -0.092*** -0.096*** -0.098*** -0.094*** 0.094*** 0.450*** 0.169*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.072) (0.026) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Treatment 0.080* 0.079* 0.039 0.038 0.008 -0.002 -0.055 -0.048 
 (0.044) (0.046) (0.037) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.167) (0.063) 
Youth's age -0.014** -0.017*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.019*** 0.019*** 0.094*** 0.037*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.027) (0.010) 
Youth male -0.186*** -0.193*** -0.142*** -0.110*** -0.064*** 0.063*** 0.382*** 0.192*** 
 (0.033) (0.039) (0.033) (0.029) (0.023) (0.022) (0.109) (0.044) 
Youth enrolled in school 0.019 0.010 -0.015 -0.030 -0.021 0.020 0.085 0.025 
 (0.022) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.107) (0.039) 
Caregiver age 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Caregiver female 0.016 0.031 0.009 0.001 -0.016 0.014 0.049 0.007 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.026) (0.029) (0.035) (0.034) (0.150) (0.049) 
Caregiver any schooling 0.039 0.034 -0.014 -0.024 -0.016 0.016 0.061 0.012 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.124) (0.045) 
Any covariate shock 0.018 0.106*** 0.070** 0.048 0.046 -0.049 -0.244 -0.096* 
 (0.032) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.034) (0.034) (0.154) (0.053) 
Observations 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 
R-Squared 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,728 
Notes: Each column and row pairing represent a different OLS regression. All regressions control for a set of baseline characteristics including youth age, 
sex, and schooling, caregiver age, sex, and schooling, week of interview, any covariate shock, TA of residence, contemporaneous community level prices, 
and an indicator for SCTP treatment households. The key independent variables on shown as row headers, while dependent variables are listed as column 
headers. Variables for future values and impatience represent descriptive outcomes used to aid in simply describing the data, while the MRS and the 
discount rate are the main youth outcomes of interest. Numbers in the table show the coefficients obtained from OLS regression analyses. Standard errors, 
clustered at the level of randomization, are shown in parentheses below the coefficient. Wild bootstrapping p-values for the impact coefficient (1000 reps, 
























 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Caregiver's Discount Rate -0.018*** -0.023*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.025*** 0.025*** 0.121*** 0.045*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.020) (0.007) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Treatment 0.083* 0.083* 0.042 0.041 0.010 -0.005 -0.066 -0.053 
 (0.044) (0.047) (0.038) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.168) (0.063) 
Youth's age -0.014** -0.017*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.019*** 0.019*** 0.094*** 0.037*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.027) (0.010) 
Youth male -0.186*** -0.193*** -0.142*** -0.111*** -0.064*** 0.064*** 0.384*** 0.192*** 
 (0.033) (0.039) (0.033) (0.029) (0.023) (0.022) (0.109) (0.044) 
Youth enrolled in school 0.018 0.009 -0.015 -0.030 -0.021 0.020 0.085 0.025 
 (0.022) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.107) (0.039) 
Caregiver age 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Caregiver female 0.016 0.031 0.009 0.001 -0.016 0.014 0.048 0.006 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.026) (0.029) (0.035) (0.034) (0.150) (0.049) 
Caregiver any schooling 0.039 0.034 -0.014 -0.024 -0.016 0.016 0.061 0.012 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.124) (0.045) 
Any covariate shock 0.018 0.106*** 0.070** 0.048 0.046 -0.049 -0.243 -0.096* 
 (0.032) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.034) (0.034) (0.155) (0.054) 
Observations 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
R-Squared 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,728 1,728 
Notes: Each column and row pairing represent a different OLS regression. All regressions control for a set of baseline characteristics including youth age, 
sex, and schooling, caregiver age, sex, and schooling, week of interview, any covariate shock, TA of residence, contemporaneous community level prices, 
and an indicator for SCTP treatment households. The key independent variables on shown as row headers, while dependent variables are listed as column 
headers. Variables for future values and impatience represent descriptive outcomes used to aid in simply describing the data, while the MRS and the 
discount rate are the main youth outcomes of interest. Numbers in the table show the coefficients obtained from OLS regression analyses. Standard errors, 
clustered at the level of randomization, are shown in parentheses below the coefficient. Wild bootstrapping p-values for the impact coefficient (1000 reps, 








Table A-3. First Stage Results Predicting Caregiver’s MRS (N=1,728) 
Instrument set: Treatment only 
Treatment, Baseline Prices X Treatment & NS 
Cluster Mean MRS 









Baseline prices X Treatment 
-- X 
































F-test instruments (F-stat) 11.694 54.801 
F-test instruments (F-prob) 0.0019 0.0000 
Wild bootstrap F-test p-value 0.0070 0.0000 
Partial R2 for instruments 0.0071 0.0214 
Lagrange Multiplier p-value N/A 0.0848 
NOTE: The lagged difference refers to the difference in caregiver’s MRS between waves. Standard errors, clustered at the VC level, are shown in 







Table A-4. OLS and IV Estimates of the Relationship between Youth’s and Caregiver’s MRS at 
Endline 








Full Instrument Set 
(3) 
Caregiver MRS 0.121*** 0.195 0.185* 
 (0.021) (0.199) (0.108) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.0010 0.4450 0.2580 
Hausman test p-value N/A 0.699 0.779 
Observations 1,728 1,728 1,728 
NOTE: Instruments include random assignment to treatment (Column 2), and treatment, the interaction of 
treatment and baseline prices as well as the lagged non-self cluster mean of caregiver’s discounting (Column 3). 
All regressions control for a set of baseline characteristics including youth age, sex, and schooling, caregiver’s 
age, sex, and schooling, whether the household experienced a covariate shock, TA of residence. Regressions also 
controlled for week of interview to account for potential seasonality issues.  Standard errors, clustered at the level 
of randomization, are shown in parentheses below the coefficient. Wild bootstrapping p-values for the impact 




Table A-5. IV Estimates of the Relationship Between Youth’s and Caregiver’s MRS by Youth Sex 











Caregiver MRS -0.388 0.077 0.232** 
 (0.479) (0.110) (0.116) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.4610 0.6230 0.2140 
Caregiver MRS x Male 0.323 -- -- 
 (0.292) -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.2810 -- -- 
Observations 1,728 920 808 
NOTE: All models estimated using 2SLS. Those in column 1 are run with interactions terms in a single 
regression while those in columns 2 and 3 are run separately by youth sex. Instruments include random 
assignment to treatment (Column 1), and treatment, the interaction of treatment and baseline prices as 
well as the lagged non-self cluster mean of caregiver’s discounting (Columns 2 and 3). All regressions 
control for a set of baseline characteristics including youth age, sex, and schooling, caregiver’s age, sex, 
and schooling, whether the household experienced a covariate shock, and TA of residence. Regressions 
also controlled for week of interview to account for potential seasonality issues.  Standard errors, clustered 
at the level of randomization, are shown in parentheses below the coefficient. Wild bootstrapping p-values 










Table A-6. IV Estimates of the Relationship between Youth's and Caregiver's MRS by Youth Age 



















All Youth In household since baseline 






























Caregiver MRS 0.182 0.287* 2.452 0.150 0.036 0.253** 0.082 0.035 0.211* -0.040 0.084 -0.017 
 (0.191) (0.170) (4.733) (0.097) (0.187) (0.101) (0.108) (0.163) (0.112) (0.114) (0.172) (0.189) 
Wild boot. p-value 0.4480 0.1510 0.3870 0.2000 0.8910 0.1510 0.5190 0.8740 0.2760 0.7740 0.7550 0.9600 
Caregiver MRS  
x Age 17-19 
0.062 0.045 0.326 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 (0.049) (0.057) (0.748) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wild boot. p-value 0.2550 0.4450 0.5160 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Caregiver MRS  
x Age 20-22 
0.066 0.051 0.435 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 (0.067) (0.078) (1.249) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wild boot. p-value 0.3350 0.5300 0.5820 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Observations 1,728 1,556 172 697 718 313 630 652 274 67 66 39 
 NOTE: All models estimated using 2SLS. Those in columns 1-3 are run with interactions terms in a single regression while those in columns 4-12 are run 
separately stratified by when youth entered the household and age groups. Regressions associated with columns 1, and 4-6 include the full analytical sample 
of youth while those for columns 2, and 7-9 include only youth who have resided in the household since baseline. Columns 3, and 10-12 are include only 
youth who have entered the household since baseline data collection Instruments include random assignment to treatment (Columns 1-3), and treatment, the 
interaction of treatment and baseline prices as well as the lagged non-self cluster mean of caregiver’s discounting (Columns 4-12). All regressions control 
for a set of baseline characteristics including youth age, sex, and schooling, caregiver’s age, sex, and schooling, whether the household experienced a 
covariate shock, and TA of residence. Regressions also controlled for week of interview to account for potential seasonality issues. Standard errors, clustered 
at the village cluster level, are shown in parentheses below the coefficient. Wild bootstrapping p-values for the impact coefficient (1000 reps, H0=0). *** 










Table A-7. IV Estimates of the Relationship between Youth's and Caregiver's MRS by Youth Age and Gender 
 































Caregiver MRS 0.284 0.229 -0.039 -0.158 -0.0002 0.103 0.052 0.372*** 
 (1.508) (0.208) (0.120) (0.153) (0.089) (0.147) (0.143) (0.097) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.5890 0.5480 0.8280 0.4360 0.9950 0.5620 0.8180 0.0670 
Caregiver MRS x Age 17-19 -0.003 0.225* -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 (0.084) (0.133) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.9010 0.1270 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Caregiver MRS x Age 20-22 0.092 0.082 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 (0.106) (0.170) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.4530 0.6830 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Observations 920 808 368 379 173 329 339 140 
NOTE: All models estimated using 2SLS. Those in column 1 are run with interactions terms in a single regression while those in columns 2 
and 3 are run separately by youth sex Instruments include random assignment to treatment (Columns 1 and 2), and treatment, the interaction 
of treatment and baseline prices as well as the lagged non-self cluster mean of caregiver’s discounting (Columns 3-8). All regressions control 
for a set of baseline characteristics including youth age, sex, and schooling, caregiver’s age, sex, and schooling, whether the household 
experienced a covariate shock, and TA of residence. Regressions also controlled for week of interview to account for potential seasonality 
issues.  Standard errors, clustered at the village cluster level, are shown in parentheses below the coefficient. Wild bootstrapping p-values for 










Table A-8. IV Estimates of the Relationship between Youth's and Caregiver's MRS by Caregiver Sex and Caregiver-Youth Gendered 
Pairs 





Full Instrument Set 
   Male Caregiver Female Caregiver 

















Caregiver MRS 0.209 0.154 0.142 0.155 -0.133 0.237** 0.312*** 0.112 
 (0.189) (0.201) (0.107) (0.169) (0.131) (0.114) (0.094) (0.141) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.3750 0.5680 0.2770 0.6040 0.4820 0.1750 0.0610 0.5820 
Caregiver MRS x Female Caregiver -0.006 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 (0.070) -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.9340 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Caregiver MRS x Female-Male Pair -- 0.136*** -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 -- (0.043) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value -- 0.0120 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Caregiver MRS x  Male-Female Pair -- 0.063 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 -- (0.111) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value -- 0.5800 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Caregiver MRS x Male-Male Pair -- 0.108 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 -- (0.140) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value -- 0.5090 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Observations 1,728 1,728 179 66 113 1,549 742 807 
NOTE: All models estimated using 2SLS. Those in column 1 are run with interactions terms in a single regression while those in columns 2 and 3 are run 
separately by youth sex. Instruments include random assignment to treatment (Columns 1 and 2), and treatment, the interaction of treatment and baseline 
prices as well as the lagged non-self cluster mean of caregiver’s discounting (Columns 3-8). Columns 3 and 5 restrict the sample by the sex of the caregiver. 
Columns 4, 5, 7, and 8 restrict the sample by caregiver-youth gendered pairs. For example, Column 4 presents coefficients for female youth with male 
caregivers. All regressions control for a set of baseline characteristics including youth age, sex, and schooling, caregiver’s age, sex, and schooling, whether 
the household experienced a covariate shock, and TA of residence. Regressions also controlled for week of interview to account for potential seasonality 
issues.  Standard errors, clustered at the village cluster level, are shown in parentheses below the coefficient. Wild bootstrapping p-values for the impact 








Table A-9. IV Estimates of the Relationship between Youth's and Caregiver's MRS by Youth-Caregiver Relationship 















Caregiver MRS 0.197 0.248** 0.381** 0.367*** 0.029 
 (0.195) (0.108) (0.150) (0.115) (0.121) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.4200 0.1480 0.1330 0.2200 0.8640 
Caregiver MRS x Grandchild 0.039 -- -- -- -- 
 (0.089) -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.6640 -- -- -- -- 
Caregiver MRS x Niece/Nephew -0.028 -- -- -- -- 
 (0.137) -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.8610 -- -- -- -- 
Caregiver MRS x Other Relation 0.014 -- -- -- -- 
 (0.149) -- -- -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.9300 -- -- -- -- 
Observations 1,728 1,017 567 45 99 
NOTE: All models estimated using 2SLS. Those in column 1 are run with interactions terms in a single regression while those in columns 
2 -5 are run separately by youth’s relationship to the caregiver. Instruments include random assignment to treatment (Column 1), and 
treatment, the interaction of treatment and baseline prices as well as the lagged non-self cluster mean of caregiver’s discounting (Columns 
2-5). All regressions control for a set of baseline characteristics including youth age, sex, and schooling, caregiver’s age, sex, and 
schooling, whether the household experienced a covariate shock, and TA of residence. Regressions also controlled for week of interview 
to account for potential seasonality issues. Standard errors, clustered at the village cluster level, are shown in parentheses below the 









Table A-10. IV Estimates of the Influence of Socialization on the Relationship between Youth’s 
and Caregiver’s MRS 





Full Instrument Set 
 (1) 
High PSS (≥4) 
(2) 
Low PSS (<4) 
(3) 
Caregiver MRS 0.203 0.136 0.075 
 (0.200) (0.101) (0.670) 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.4300 0.3850 0.7470 
Caregiver MRS x High PSS Score -0.033 -- -- 
 (0.047) -- -- 
Wild bootstrap p-value 0.5110 -- -- 
Observations 1,728 950 778 
NOTE: All models estimated using 2SLS. Those in column 1 are run with interactions terms in a single regression 
while those in columns 2 and 3 are run separately by youth’s PSS scale score. Instruments include random assignment 
to treatment (Column 1), and treatment, the interaction of treatment and baseline prices as well as the lagged non-self 
cluster mean of caregiver’s discounting (Columns 2 and 3). All regressions control for a set of baseline characteristics 
including youth age, sex, and schooling, caregiver’s age, sex, and schooling, whether the household experienced a 
covariate shock, and TA of residence. Regressions also controlled for week of interview to account for potential 
seasonality issues. Standard errors, clustered at the village cluster level, are shown in parentheses below the 






APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL TABLES FROM CHAPTER 3 











13 0 1 14 0 1 
14 0 27 15 0 1 
15 60 124 17 0 15 
16 180 154 18 60 82 
17 180 120 19-20 180 223 
18 120 84 21-22 300 201 
19-21 60 87 23-25 60 63 
23 0 1 26 0 1 
Total 600 598 Total 600 587 
Note: Actual sample is the sample from the baseline survey collected in summer 






Table B.2. Attrition analysis of key indicators at baseline 
 Male Female Difference 
 Attritors Non-attritors P-value Attritors Non-attritors P-value Col(1)-Col(4) P-value 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Youth Characteristics         
Age 20.42 20.35 0.78 17.13 16.68 0.05 3.29 0.00 
Currently in school 0.25 0.31 0.32 0.49 0.56 0.32 -0.24 0.00 
Highest education level         
Preprimary highest level 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Primary highest level 0.57 0.65 0.19 0.61 0.72 0.06 -0.04 0.61 
Secondary highest level 0.36 0.28 0.16 0.33 0.26 0.22 0.03 0.71 
University highest level 0.01 0.01 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.01 0.32 
Training college highest level 0.01 0.01 0.61 0.01 0.00 0.33 -0.01 0.76 
Ever had sex 0.75 0.76 0.72 0.30 0.38 0.25 0.44 0.00 
# sex partners ever 3.02 3.22 0.58 1.48 1.35 0.44 1.55 0.00 
Had sex last 12 months 0.49 0.52 0.55 0.26 0.28 0.77 0.23 0.01 
# sex partners last 12 months 1.43 1.71 0.04 1.22 1.15 0.56 0.21 0.12 
Ever gave birth (or fathered child 
for males) 
0.06 0.06 0.84 0.03 0.05 0.40 0.03 0.20 
Household Characteristics         
Tribe         
Yao 0.27 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.35 0.13 0.03 
Chewa 0.44 0.65 0.00 0.55 0.63 0.19 -0.11 0.12 
Other 0.29 0.17 0.02 0.30 0.18 0.01 -0.01 0.82 
Religion         
Christian 0.57 0.66 0.14 0.67 0.64 0.62 -0.09 0.21 
Muslim 0.29 0.22 0.27 0.19 0.26 0.20 0.10 0.10 
Other 0.11 0.10 0.76 0.12 0.11 0.83 -0.01 0.90 
None 0.03 0.01 0.41 0.03 0.00 0.17 -0.00 0.95 
Father any schooling 0.85 0.81 0.17 0.83 0.78 0.26 0.02 0.65 
Mother any schooling 0.82 0.85 0.31 0.73 0.82 0.13 0.09 0.20 
Household size 6.23 6.46 0.41 6.29 6.30 0.97 -0.06 0.88 
Wealth index (based on assets) 0.34 -0.08 0.00 0.34 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.97 
Own their home 0.74 0.84 0.02 0.71 0.79 0.19 0.03 0.73 
Home electrified 0.25 0.11 0.01 0.26 0.12 0.01 -0.02 0.77 
# of rooms in home 3.33 3.21 0.48 3.00 2.96 0.81 0.33 0.13 
Permanent roofing - not grass 0.46 0.30 0.01 0.43 0.32 0.13 0.03 0.73 
Water Source         
Piped water source 0.35 0.19 0.00 0.32 0.20 0.07 0.04 0.65 
Pump/protected spring 
source 
0.54 0.64 0.10 0.54 0.61 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Unprotected 
well/spring/reservoir 








Other water source 0.01 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.01 0.32 
Toilet         
Flush toilet 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.36 0.01 0.64 
Latrine style toilet 0.85 0.80 0.33 0.78 0.80 0.72 0.06 0.25 
Has no toilet 0.05 0.16 0.00 0.12 0.15 0.43 -0.06 0.21 
Shocks         
Any negative shock 0.85 0.91 0.06 0.86 0.88 0.58 -0.01 0.86 
Any covariate shock 0.71 0.78 0.10 0.68 0.69 0.87 0.03 0.69 
Any idiosyncratic shock 0.66 0.79 0.01 0.70 0.74 0.54 -0.03 0.66 
Demographic Composition of 
Household 
        
# age 0-5 0.64 0.70 0.55 0.78 0.82 0.77 -0.15 0.29 
# age 6-11 0.93 1.07 0.20 0.96 1.10 0.26 -0.03 0.83 
# age 12-17 1.11 1.18 0.54 1.67 1.65 0.93 -0.56 0.00 
# age 18-23 1.60 1.51 0.38 0.84 0.78 0.63 0.76 0.00 
# age 24-64 1.69 1.75 0.60 1.61 1.72 0.32 0.08 0.54 
# age 65+ 0.36 0.24 0.09 0.28 0.23 0.57 0.09 0.30 
# females aged 13-23 0.67 0.69 0.82 1.57 1.53 0.73 -0.89 0.00 
# males aged 14-26 1.99 1.79 0.06 0.71 0.64 0.57 1.28 0.00 
Total # siblings 1.27 1.39 0.50 1.26 1.17 0.67 0.01 0.96 
Total # male siblings 0.69 0.62 0.58 0.52 0.42 0.35 0.17 0.34 
Total # female siblings 0.69 0.62 0.58 0.52 0.42 0.35 0.17 0.34 
Dependency ratio 0.99 1.18 0.03 1.77 1.88 0.54 -0.79 0.00 
Labor constrained (dep. ratio >3) 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.97 -0.11 0.01 
Community Characteristics         
Distance/isolation index -0.28 -0.29 0.93 -0.33 -0.28 0.73 0.05 0.77 
Market in community 0.59 0.51 0.20 0.55 0.51 0.54 0.04 0.61 
Observations 109 475 584 70 528 298   









Table B.3. Comparison of sample characteristics in the NAS and the MTM  
 
 Females Males 
 NSA MTM p-value of NSA MTM p-value of 
  (N = 1,055) (N = 395) diff. (N = 1,126) (N = 275) diff. 
Ever attended school  0.95 0.98 0.016 0.97 0.97 0.852 
Currently attending  0.57 0.57 0.806 0.70 0.49 0.000 
Highest level completed1       
No schooling  0.05 0.02 0.016 0.03 0.03 0.852 
Preprimary  0.05 0.00 0.000 0.03 0.02 0.547 
Primary  0.72 0.73 0.757 0.75 0.69 0.120 
Secondary  0.23 0.25 0.558 0.22 0.24 0.551 
Higher/Tertiary  0.00 0.00 0.317 0.00 0.01 0.454 
Tribe       
Yao 0.12 0.18 0.003 0.15 0.22 0.023 
Chewa 0.40 0.63 0.000 0.34 0.62 0.000 
Other 0.47 0.19 0.000 0.50 0.16 0.000 
Religion       
Christian 0.85 0.63 0.000 0.84 0.64 0.000 
Muslim 0.11 0.24 0.000 0.12 0.26 0.000 
Other 0.04 0.11 0.000 0.02 0.09 0.005 
None 0.00 0.00 0.978 0.01 0.01 0.681 
Household characteristics       
Household size 6.41 6.26 0.274 6.43 6.83 0.052 
Father any schooling 0.59 0.63 0.238 0.64 0.64 0.945 
Mother any schooling 0.50 0.65 0.000 0.51 0.67 0.001 
Home electrified 0.14 0.13 0.562 0.13 0.13 0.846 
Number of rooms 3.23 2.98 0.004 3.34 3.20 0.173 
Owns home 0.83 0.79 0.123 0.84 0.82 0.507 
Water source       
Piped 0.16 0.21 0.102 0.14 0.21 0.011 
Pump/protected spring 0.31 0.60 0.000 0.33 0.59 0.000 
Unprotected source  0.37 0.19 0.000 0.39 0.17 0.000 
Other 0.15 0.00 0.000 0.15 0.01 0.000 
Toilet       
Flush 0.08 0.05 0.031 0.05 0.03 0.036 
Latrine 0.83 0.80 0.215 0.89 0.83 0.033 
No toilet 0.09 0.15 0.001 0.05 0.15 0.000 
Sexual activity status        
Ever sex not last 12 mos.  0.75 0.71 0.410 0.66 0.47 0.000 
Had sex in last 12 mos. 0.25 0.29 0.410 0.34 0.53 0.000 
# lifetime partners 1.48 1.38 0.185 2.55 3.08 0.015 
# partners last 12 mos. 3.00 1.10 0.000 5.37 1.60 0.016 
Ever had live birth  0.82 0.04 0.000 0.72 0.02 0.000 
Note: To ease individual-level comparisons, the MTM sample was restricted to individuals aged 13-19 to 
better align with the NSA sample of youth aged 15 to 19. Bold denotes statistical significance at the 5 % level 
or better. N’s in the NSA are weighted. ¹ Among the reduced sample who have ever attended school.  Males 




Table B.4. Comparison of schooling characteristics of youth aged 15-25 in the IHS2 and  
the MTM 
 Females Males 
 MTM IHS2 IHS2  MTM IHS2 IHS2  
   Central   Central 
  (N = 598) (N = 3,743) (N = 1,488) (N = 585) (N = 3,684) (N = 1,442) 
Highest level completed1     
Preprimary  0.01 0.12 0.13 0.01 0.09 0.11 
Primary  0.71 0.67 0.66 0.64 0.54 0.56 
Secondary  0.27 0.20 0.19 0.29 0.35 0.32 
Higher/Tertiary  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 
  
Note: To ease individual-level comparisons, the IHS2 sample was restricted to females aged 15-21 and males 
aged 18-25 and then further limited to only those adolescents in the Central region. IHS2 age groups are limited 
to females ages 15 to 21 and males age 18 to 25. Ns and mean values are weighted.  Bold denotes statistical 
significance at the 5 % level or better. ¹ Never attended/pre-school category in IHS2 is ambiguous.  Prompt on 
questionnaire codes 0 as pre-school while data set codes 0 as none.  Assumption is that 0 corresponds to pre-
school or none. 
 
 
Table B.5. Comparison of household-level characteristics in the IHS2 and the MTM  
 MTM IHS2 IHS2  IHS2 
   Central Restricted 
 (N = 1,183) (N = 7,427) (N = 2,930) (N = 4,414) 
Household characteristics     
Household size 6.35 5.46 5.65 6.47 
Home electrified 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.13 
Number of rooms 3.10 2.78 2.77 3.11 
Owns home 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.81 
Permanent roof 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.40 
Water source     
Piped 0.22 0.25 0.20 0.28 
Pump/protected spring 0.61 0.44 0.39 0.42 
Unprotected 
well/spring/reservoir/lake 0.17 0.31 0.41 0.30 
Toilet     
Flush 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 
Latrine 0.80 0.82 0.80 0.83 
No toilet 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.10 
  
Note: To ease individual-level comparisons, the IHS2 sample was restricted to females aged 15-21 and 
males aged 18-25 and then further limited to only those adolescents in the Central region. A final IHS2 
comparison sample was created by restricting the full sample to include only households containing at 
least one adolescent within the MTM sample age ranges since it is likely household characteristics 
differ between those with and without adolescents. IHS2 means and N’s are weighted. Bold denotes 





Table B.6.  Breakdown of tribes by traditional lineage system 
















Table B.7. LPM estimates for unbalanced panel of relationship between shocks and 
marriage/engagement for females 
       
 Dependent variable: Married/engaged 
 Total In school Out of school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Any negative 
shock             



























Panel B: Covariate and idiosyncratic shocks        






















































Panel C: Economic and family shocks        






















































Village controls X   X   X   
Village fixed effects  X   X   X 
Observations 1,088 1,088 605 605 483 483 
Note: Each column-panel pair represents a separate analysis. All regressions use lagged shocks and 
control for youth age, whether the youth has a disability, and whether the household is matrilineal as 
well as baseline household characteristics including household size, wealth index, parents’ schooling, 
and whether the household is labor constrained. Additionally, the first two columns also control for 
youth’s in-school status. Standard errors clustered at the EA level are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 





Table B.8. LPM estimates for unbalanced panel of relationship between shocks and 
marriage/engagement for males 
       
 Dependent variable: Married/engaged 
 Total In school Out of school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Any negative 
shock             



























Panel B: Covariate and idiosyncratic shocks        





















































Panel C: Economic and family shocks        




















































Village controls X   X   X   
Village fixed effects  X   X   X 
Observations 998 998 302 302 696 696 
Note: Each column-panel pair represents a separate analysis. All regressions use lagged shocks and 
control for youth age, whether the youth has a disability, and whether the household is matrilineal as 
well as baseline household characteristics including household size, wealth index, parents’ schooling, 
and whether the household is labor constrained. Additionally, the first two columns also control for 
youth’s in-school status. Standard errors clustered at the EA level are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table B.9. LPM estimates for unbalanced panel of relationship between shocks and 
transactional sexual relationships for females 
       
 Dependent variable: Transactional sexual relationship 
 Total In school Out of school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Any negative shock             



























Panel B: Covariate and idiosyncratic shocks        




















































Panel C: Economic and family shocks        




















































Village controls X   X   X   
Village fixed effects  X   X   X 
Observations 1,067 1,067 594 594 473 473 
Note: Each column-panel pair represents a separate analysis. All regressions use lagged shocks and 
control for youth age, whether the youth has a disability, and whether the household is matrilineal as 
well as baseline household characteristics including household size, wealth index, parents’ schooling, 
and whether the household is labor constrained. Additionally, the first two columns also control for 
youth’s in-school status. Standard errors clustered at the EA level are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 





Table B.10. LPM estimates for unbalanced panel of relationship between shocks and dating 
relationships for females 
       
 Dependent variable: Dating relationship 
 Total In school Out of school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Any negative shock             



























Panel B: Covariate and idiosyncratic shocks        




















































Panel C: Economic and family shocks        




















































Village controls X   X   X   
Village fixed effects  X   X   X 
Observations 1,088 1,088 605 605 483 483 
Note: Each column-panel pair represents a separate analysis. All regressions use lagged shocks and 
control for youth age, whether the youth has a disability, and whether the household is matrilineal as 
well as baseline household characteristics including household size, wealth index, parents’ schooling, 
and whether the household is labor constrained. Additionally, the first two columns also control for 
youth’s in-school status. Standard errors clustered at the EA level are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 




Table B.11. LPM estimates for balanced panel of relationship between shocks and 
marriage/engagement for females - extended 
 Dependent variable: Married/engaged 
 Total In school Out of school 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Any negative 
shock             


























Panel B: Covariate and idiosyncratic shocks        
















































































Panel C: Economic and family shocks        

















































































Village controls X -- X -- X -- 
Village fixed effects -- X -- X -- X 
Observations 1,056 1,056 588 588 468 468 
Note: Each column-panel pair represents a separate analysis. All regressions use lagged shocks and control for 
youth age, whether the youth has a disability, and whether the household is matrilineal as well as baseline 
household characteristics including household size, wealth index, parents’ schooling, and whether the household 
is labor constrained. Additionally, the first two columns also control for youth’s in-school status. Standard errors 
clustered at the EA level are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL TABLE FROM CHAPTER 4 
Table C.1— Key Variable Definitions, Measurement, And Collection 
   Waves collected 





respondents were ever 
willing to wait for any future 
value or not in the 
hypothetical intertemporal 
choice module. 
If respondents ever said they 
would wait one month to receive 
a future value, they were coded 
0. If they always opted to receive 









denoting whether or not the 
respondent has any cash 
savings.  
Respondents asked whether or 
not they had saved any cash in 
the last thirty days for an 
emergency or to buy something 
special in the future. 1/Yes 0/No 




A stress index comprised of 
Likert scale responses 
(1=never to 5=always) to 
each item. The higher the 
value, the more stressed the 
individual is. The scale score 
is the simple sum of 
responses across each item. 
In Zambia the ten-item Cohen’s 
Perceived Stress Scale (PSS) is 
implemented. In Malawi a 
validated 4-item version of the 








denoting whether the 
respondent worried about 
having enough food for their 
family in the past 7 days. 
In Malawi the question asks if 
over the past 7 days, the 
respondent worried that their 
household would not have 
enough food. Responses of 
‘Yes’=1, and responses of 
‘No’=0. In Zambia, this item is 
taken from the Household Food 
Insecurity Access Scale, and 
refers to the past four weeks, and 
is coded 1 if they worried three 






in 1 year 
Dichotomous variable 
denoting whether 
respondents believed their 
life would be better in one 
year from date of interview.  
Respondents asked “Do you 
think your life will be better in 1 












respondents agreed or 
strongly agreed that they 
generally feel happy.  
This was one item in a larger 
module. In Malawi, respondents 
ranked the extent to which they 
agreed with the statement “I 
generally feel happy” on a scale 
from 1=strongly disagree to 
5=strongly agree. Responses of 
‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ coded 
as 1/Yes. Responses of ‘strongly 
disagree’ ‘disagree’ and ‘neutral’ 
coded 0/No. In Zambia, the 
question asked ‘do you generally 
feel happy’ with response options 






An average quality of life 
index score from 1 to 5 based 
on Likert scale responses to 
the eight questions. The 
higher the value, the higher 
the quality of life the 
individual has.  
An 8-item quality of life module 
was used in which respondents 
were asked how strongly the 
agree or disagree with 8 positive 
statements one might say about 
their life such as “I am satisfied 
with my health” or “The 






Notes: In each study W1 is the baseline. In Malawi survey years are 2013, 2014 and 2015. In Zambia survey 
years are 2010, 2012, 2013 (June), 2013(November). 
 
 
